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Abstract
Over the next twenty years, the proliferation of threats in the undersea environment will 
likely challenge the platform-centric model that the United States Navy uses to maintain 
dominance in Undersea Warfare (USW). Meanwhile, rapidly maturing technologies offer greater 
capabilities to potential adversaries around the world. Such a paradigm creates an imperative for 
the Navy to harness emerging technologies to maintain USW dominance amid a dynamic threat 
environment, while balancing cost, risk, and required performance. This systems engineering 
analysis develops Advanced Undersea Warfare Systems (AUWS) that provide a technological 
and tactical advantage based on the needs of the warfighter. Following critical analysis of the 
numerous possible alternatives for performing the necessary Command, Control, 
Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) and 
prosecution and an objective screening process, four system architectures, and associated 
operational concepts, are selected for detailed analysis. From cost, risk, and performance 
analyses, superior AUWS concepts are shown to be flexible, scalable, and tailorable systems that 
balance critical need areas. This analysis highlights the need for new warfare systems that can 
meet future challenges to the traditional platform-centric model for USW dominance. Using the 
results and recommendations in this analysis will allow the Navy to deploy capabilities that 
effectively and efficiently meet future operational needs.
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Over the next twenty years, the wide range of potential threats proliferating in the 
undersea environment, ranging from asymmetric to highly advanced, will likely challenge the 
platform-centric model that the United States Navy uses to maintain dominance in Undersea 
Warfare (USW). In the contested littoral waters where employment is likely, the Navy cannot 
accept the risk incurred by relying on multi-billion dollar assets to control the undersea 
battlespace. 
Meanwhile, rapidly maturing technology in the fields of autonomous command and 
control systems, unmanned vehicles, distributed undersea networks, and energy capacity, to 
name a few, offer greater capabilities to navies around the world while lowering the barriers for 
entry into USW. Such a paradigm creates an imperative for the Navy to harness emerging 
technologies to maintain USW dominance amid a dynamic threat environment, while balancing 
cost, risk, and required performance. This systems engineering analysis utilizes a comprehensive, 
objective, and forward leaning approach to develop Advanced Undersea Warfare Systems 
(AUWS) that provide a technological and tactical advantage based on the needs of the 
warfighter.
AUWS proactively maintains USW dominance through weapons, sensing, and 
communications superiority, capitalizing specifically on netted and unmanned systems. 
Identified from extensive stakeholder interviews and analysis, AUWS addresses the following 
critical need areas: the ability to be deployed and recovered by a wide range of platforms; the 
ability to operate covertly; the ability to maintain persistent forward presence independent of 
supporting assets; the ability to develop an internal tactical picture and contribute to an external 
common operational picture; the ability to operate in a range of modes from fully autonomous to 
direct human control; the ability to discriminate between threats and non-threats (either 
autonomously or with human assistance); and the ability to prosecute enemy manned and 
unmanned assets. Together, these need areas address the most pressing aspects of the problem 
facing the Navy in the undersea battlespace; however, each area must be balanced with the 
others, which leads to a design tradespace. Within that tradespace, a multitude of possible 
alternatives exist that could perform the Command, Control, Communications, Computers, 
xxii
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) and prosecution necessary to dominate 
the USW environment.
Following critical analysis of the possibilities and an objective screening process, four 
system architectures, and associated operational concepts, are selected for detailed analysis. 
These alternatives consider both new and proven technologies applied to both traditional and 
developmental tactics to offer four distinct approaches to enhance USW dominance in the future. 
Results of comprehensive cost, risk, and performance analyses show that systems that effectively 
balance risk with required performance provide the most utility for the Navy in the future USW 
environment. Specifically, the top capabilities defined in this study balance the degree of 
distribution of the network (i.e. network-centricity) with centralized firepower, as neither 
extreme proves effective in addressing critical needs. 
 Analysis of the alternatives reveals three key qualities for AUWS: flexibility, scalability, 
and tailorability. AUWS is flexible with respect to deployment and recovery platforms, 
communication networks, and levels of autonomy. This flexibility allows operational 
commanders the freedom to employ AUWS in a variety of environments and operational phases, 
while integrating with the larger fleet network to form a human-machine team. AUWS is scalable 
to a range of operational areas and threat environments because the operational commander can 
adjust area coverage and performance by incrementally allocating the appropriate number of 
units to the given mission. AUWS is tailorable to the specific needs of the mission. Whether the 
priority is early warning or active prosecution, the operational commander can configure AUWS 
to yield a tactical advantage and frustrate the enemy’s ability to counter the system.
While this analysis does reveal important characteristics for AUWS, more importantly it 
shows the need for new warfare systems that can meet future challenges to the traditional 
platform-centric model for USW dominance. By using the insights gained from this analysis as a 
guideline, a path to persistent USW dominance is developed. In the near term, detailed analysis 
of AUWS and the future undersea battlespace should continue, while rapid prototypes should be 
fielded in the fleet to garner feedback on how the systems and operational concepts can be 
improved. In the intermediate time frame, a Program of Record, perhaps similar to the concepts 
developed in this analysis, should be initiated based on the research of an AUWS Future Naval 
Capabilities Manager. It is recommended that the technological aspects of AUWS be developed 
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in parallel to prevent specific technologies from stalling an otherwise capable system. In 
particular, it is recognized that autonomous threat discrimination is the single greatest technical 
challenge for AUWS; however, even larger non-technical (e.g. political, legal, ethical)  issues 
exist for autonomous weapons. Mitigation measures, such as adjustable autonomy, allow for the 
development of AUWS in a timely manner. The DoD acquisition process should be given 
significant lead time to allow for full operational capability by 2030. The specific nature of an 
AUWS program is not as important as the initiation of the process. 
The undersea battlespace of the future is a complex, dynamic environment that cannot be 
neatly divided along platform or community lines. Based on the results of this analysis, the Navy 
should posture itself – at all levels – to take advantage of the opportunities presented by the 
changing undersea battlespace. As technology continues to mature, Advanced Undersea Warfare 
Systems should be a critical element of such a posture. Using the results and recommendations in 
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1. Introduction
Undersea Warfare is changing rapidly. Technology that allows persistence, precision, and 
stealth, all while incurring minimal risk, is necessarily transforming the way navies operate in the 
undersea environment. Senior US Naval leadership has indicated that USW forces need to 
harness the latest technology in order to provide the requisite capabilities to operational 
commanders of the future; however, specific technologies, systems, or concepts have not been 
selected for development. Figure 1.1 shows just one artist’s concept of what the future USW 
environment might look like. The rapid advance of a wide range of technologies potentially 
viable in USW creates the need for a thorough, objective, and forward-thinking examination of 
Advanced Undersea Warfare Systems (AUWS). Systems engineering analysis provides 
recommendations on system architecture, as well as several operational insights, that will give 
the Navy the advantage in the undersea environment and help it maintain maritime superiority 
around the world.
Figure 1.1: Artist Rendition of a Possible Future USW Environment1
1.1 Project Team
The Systems Engineering Analysis Cohort 17, Team B (SEA-17B) Capstone Project 
Team, Figure 1.2, consists of Naval Officers from the United States and Military Officers and 
Professionals from Singapore studying at Temasek Defense Systems Institute (TDSI). Seven core 
members from the SEA curriculum at NPS started the project in the summer of 2010, while the 
1 Naval Surface Warfare Center, Panama City. Advanced Undersea Weapon System. Panama City, 2010.
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TDSI team members joined the project in January 2011. Table 1.1 shows the SEA-17B team 
members and their operational areas of experience (core SEA team members and project advisors 
highlighted in bold).
Figure 1.2: SEA-17B Team Members
Front Row: RADM (Ret.) Richard Williams, Lu Zheng Liang, Tan Yik Fung, LT Jonathan 
Saburn, LT William Walker, LT Jim Drennan, LT Philip Castaneda, Dr. John Osmundson, ME5 
Chan Chung Wei, CPT Kelvin Zhu
Middle Row: Koh Wee Yung, LT Matt Malinowski, CPT Teo Yong Kiong, LCDR Alwin 
Wessner, LCDR Tracy Emmersen, LT Christian Silvestrini, Wee Hong Chuan, Pek Wee Kok, 
Lim Choon Wee, CPT Sor Wei Lun
Back Row: MAJ Ong Zi Zuan, LT Tommy Mills, MAJ Wong Chee Heng, CPT Daniel Perh, 
CPT Ng Kiang Chuan, David Chiam 
Not Pictured: LT Scott Harvey
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Table 1.1: SEA-17B Team Members
Dr. John Osmundson (NPS Faculty Advisor)
Associate Professor, Information Sciences Dept.
RADM (ret.) Rick Williams (Technical Advisor)
NPS Chair of Mine and Expeditionary Warfare
Castaneda, Phil
Aviation (SH-60, USN) 
Koh Wee Yung
Weaponry (MoD) 
Drennan, Jim (Project Manager)
Surface Warfare (USN) 
Lim Choon Wee
Sensors (MoD) 
Emmersen, Tracy (Deputy PM)






Commando (SG ARMY) 
Silvestrini, Christian
Surface Warfare (USN) 
Ong Zi Xuan
Intelligence/Infantry (SG ARMY) 
Walker, William (Lead Systems Engineer)
Submarine Warfare (USN) 
Pek Wee Kok 
Networks (MoD)
Wessner, Wes
Aviation (F-18)/Information Professional (USN) 
Perh Hong Yih Daniel
Infantry (SG ARMY) 
Harvey, Scott
Submarine Warfare (USN) 
Sor Wei Lun 






Surface Warfare/Information Warfare (USN)
Teo Yong Kiong 






Operations Research (MoD) 
Wong Chee Heng 
Combat Engineer (SG ARMY) 
Kelvin Zhu
Combat Engineer (SG ARMY)
The members of SEA-17B possess a wide range of operational backgrounds. US Naval 
Officers come from the aviation, surface, subsurface, and information dominance corps domains, 
while the Singaporean members represent the Army, Navy, and Ministry of Defense. Due to the 
many years of combined operational experience the team uses a warrior ethos in guiding their 
analysis. Since most team members will be moving on to operational follow-on tours, the 
understanding that they might one day have to depend on the system they recommend, adds 
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further initiative and motivation. Aside from personal investment, the Project Team’s value lies 
in the unique blend of operational and academic perspective of its team members. The 
operational experience of these naval officers combined with the engineering, analytical, and 
acquisitions education they have obtained at NPS and TDSI provide the Project Team the tools to 
effectively navigate the space between warfighter needs and delivered systems.
1.2 Project Background and Literature Review
A recent recommendation from the Commander, Naval Mine and Anti-Submarine 
Warfare Command (NMAWC) to the Chief of Naval Operations states that in order to maintain 
dominance in USW requires harnessing rapidly advancing technologies, such as Unmanned 
Undersea Vehicles (UUVs) and underwater networks. One particular recommendation, as shown 
in Figure 1.3, is to focus far-term efforts on the development of an AUWS that combines aspects 
of mining (MIW), mine countermeasures (MCM) and Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW). New 
technologies promise the ability to conduct multiple forms of USW from a single system without 
risking lives and expensive platforms.2
Figure 1.3: NMAWC Vision for Transforming Mine Warfare3
2 Calvano, Charles. "SEA-17 Project Tasker." Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 2010.
3 Naval Mine and Anti-submarine Warfare Command. Mine Warfare Update. San Diego: Department of the Navy, 
2009.
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From this NMAWC initiative, an Initial Tasking Document was developed to provide 
guidance to the Project Team. The full text of this document can be found in Appendix A. While 
the Initial Tasking Document is considered the only governing document for the project, several 
other documents have had significant influence and are worth mentioning here.
• Unmanned Systems Roadmap: an integrated planning document issued by the Secretary 
of Defense in 2009 designed to provide a common vision for future unmanned systems. 
Specifically, this document sets forth prioritized capability needs and broad goals to 
ensure unmanned systems contribute to cost-effective, transformational capabilities.4
• The Navy Unmanned Undersea Vehicle Master Plan: the Navy’s guiding document on 
the use of Unmanned Undersea Vehicles, released in 2004. This document identifies and 
prioritizes the capabilities needed for UUVs and makes specific programmatic 
recommendations to achieve those capabilities.5
• The Navy Unmanned Surface Vehicle Master Plan: the Navy’s guiding document on 
the use of Unmanned Surface Vehicles, released in 2007. This document defines the 
Navy’s USV vision and defines capabilities, establishes levels of performance, and 
evaluates technology needs in support of that vision. Surface vehicles are not excluded 
from the USW environment and therefore must be considered in the AUWS analysis.6
• A Survey of Missions for Unmanned Undersea Vehicles: an independent report 
conducted by the RAND Corporation and sponsored by the Navy in 2009. This document 
analyzes and critiques the Navy’s UUV Master Plan. It makes its own recommendations 
on how the Navy could best capitalize on the capabilities offered by UUVs.7
• The Unmanned Imperative: the final report of the Navy’s Strategic Studies Group 
XXVIII, released in 2009. This report presents operational, organizational, and technical 
concepts that enable the Navy to effectively wield unmanned systems in times of peace 
and war.8
4 Office of the Secretary of Defense. Unmanned Systems Roadmap (2009-2034). Washington D.C.: Department of 
Defense, 2009.
5 Smith, Roger M. and Joseph A. Walsh. "The Navy Unmanned Undersea Vehicle Master Plan." 2004.
6 Thomsen, James E., Victor G. Guillory and Thomas A. Benes. The Navy Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV) 
Master Plan. Washington D.C.: Department of the Navy, 2007.
7 Button, Robert W, et al. A Survey of Missions for Unmanned Undersea Vehicles. Santa Monica: RAND 
Corporation, 2009.
8 Hogg, James R. "The Unmanned Imperative." 2009.
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In addition to these influential documents, the Project Team utilized the strategic 
guidance of the nation’s military and civilian leadership. These documents are discussed 
specifically in the Stakeholder Analysis section of this report.9
1.3 Critical Assumptions
The Project Team makes several critical assumptions that guide this analysis and 
recommendations. No assumptions are made arbitrarily; they are based on personal experience, 
preliminary research, stakeholder guidance, and several hours of debate. The purpose of these 
assumptions is to scope and bound the project to a manageable level given the time and resources 
available.
• Time Frame: The system developed in this project is intended to reach initial operational 
capability by the year 2030. This time frame is chosen to align with NMAWC’s far-term 
vision for AUWS and to look past the current paradigms of technology and force 
structure. It is assumed that Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) will effectively address littoral 
and MIW needs in the mid-term, but new capabilities will be necessary by the year 2030. 
Additionally, 2030 is selected because it represents a low point in the shipbuilding plan 
for operational submarines, and AUWS may be necessary to augment submarine mission 
capacity.10
• Geographical Area of Interest: Analysis of future undersea threats and the current 
demand for undersea ISR assets indicates that coastal waters will be the primary focus 
area for AUWS. Coastal Waters are defined in this report as the water from land out to 
200 nautical miles (NM), coinciding with Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). This 
analysis considers strategic choke-points for their unique physical, commercial, physical, 
and military nature, but does not focus on those areas exclusively. Over the next twenty 
years, the Project Team anticipates the maritime threat, and most of the benefits of MIW, 
to be concentrated in coastal waters. Since the coastal waters of the world vary 
significantly in hydrography, an effective AUWS must be tailorable and scalable to 
9 The Project Team is aware of several classified documents that could be of value to this analysis. However, 
because this analysis is conducted entirely at the unclassified level, those documents were not considered. It is 
recommended that results of this analysis be applied at the classified level, taking those documents into account.
10 O'Rourke, Ronald. Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress. 
Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2010.
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unique requirements of the mission area of interest. Theoretically, any effective AUWS 
would be scalable for use in deep water scenarios but further study is required to analyze 
the impact of this environment on mission requirements. 
• Focus on Mine Warfare: MIW is just one of many concepts that may benefit the 
analysis of AUWS. This analysis focuses on offensive MIW for its value in the future 
USW environment. In particular, the expected budget constraints, the need for multi-
mission capabilities, and the desire to separate the warfighter from the weapon all point 
to MIW as an area of value. When commenting on the potential value of AUWS, VADM 
Richard Hunt, Commander US Third Fleet, notes that he would much prefer to deploy 
weapons that force the enemy to react rather than focus on clearance efforts.11 
• Focus on Unmanned Systems: This analysis focuses on unmanned systems, which are 
defined in this report as systems in which a human operator, if any, is not co-located with 
the system itself. The Project Team remained solution-neutral during the problem 
definition phase in accordance with systems engineering practices. However, to align 
with stakeholder guidance and scope the project to a manageable level, manned systems 
are excluded from the bulk of this analysis. A preliminary analysis, summarized in Table 
1.2, indicates that unmanned systems have an apparent advantage in meeting AUWS 
objectives. As a control measure, a manned system is included in the analysis of 
alternatives to validate those advantages. 
11 Hunt, Richard. Personal interview. Dec. 2010.
7





Size of System X
Onboard Communications Equipment - -
Onboard Engagement Processing X
Command and Control X
Operation Cost per Mission X
Inherent Risk to the Operator X
• The Character of the Future USW Environment. The USW environment is defined in this 
report as the physical and tactical domain that can be utilized to conduct military 
operations beneath the surface of the sea. Therefore, surface and air operations are 
included in the USW environment. It is assumed that maritime asymmetric warfare, such 
as attack from diesel submarines or small boat swarms, will remain a significant threat in 
the given time frame. One or more foreign navies will represent a formidable challenge to 
US maritime superiority, and at least one nation will possess its own version of AUWS. 
In addition, it is assumed that budget constraints will not be alleviated over the next 
twenty years.
1.4 Systems Engineering Process
This analysis meets the objectives set forth in the Initial Tasking Document through the 
application of Systems Engineering. In particular, a tailored SE “VEE” process model is used to 
guide the Project Team through the SE process to successful project completion. The “VEE” 
process model, an example of which is shown in Figure 1.4, addresses problem definition, 
system implementation, and integration while providing feedback loops in the form of 
verification and validation. The process is not sequential in nature; rather the tasks are executed 
in a parallel and iterative process throughout the project lifecycle. Figure 1.5 depicts the SEA-
17B Project Cycle, which combines aspects of the tailored SE “VEE” process model with project 
management concerns to provide an overall graphical view of the project.
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Figure 1.4: Systems Engineering “VEE” Process Model12
Figure 1.5: SEA-17B Project Cycle (tailored “VEE” Process Model) 
12 Langford, Gary. Systems Engineering Integration Handbook for SE4151. Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 
2009.
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The project is divided into four basic sections aligned to the NPS academic calendar: 
Preliminary Preparation, Research, Design, and Deployment. The Preliminary Preparation Phase 
(Summer 2010) consists of team organization, networking activities, and some preliminary 
research. 
The Research Phase (Fall 2010) consists of research and stakeholder analysis. Activities 
include project technical research, stakeholder interviews, and stakeholder/needs analyses. 
Outputs of this phase are a refined problem statement and an identification of specific needs.
The Design Phase (Winter 2011) comprises the majority of the analysis for the project. It 
consists of a functional analysis (including alternative generation), an analysis of alternatives, 
preliminary cost and risk analyses, and modeling and simulation efforts. Outputs of this phase 
include a selection of refined concepts for further examination and preliminary analysis results 
based on modeling and simulation.
The Deployment Phase (Spring 2011) consists of continued risk and cost analyses 
alongside the in-depth analysis of the modeling and simulation results. Although verification and 
validation occur throughout the project cycle to ensure traceability to stakeholder needs, the 
Deployment Phase is also used to thoroughly verify and validate the products and processes of 
the Project Team. Outputs of this phase are comprehensive recommendations based on cost, risk, 




The stakeholder analysis serves three purposes in the Systems Engineering Process. The 
first, problem statement construction, is the identification of specific capability gaps as defined 
by the personnel who will ultimately implement, operate, finance, and live with the system. The 
second is to drive the requirements generation and system specification from Key Performance 
Parameters (KPP) to lowest level criteria. The third is to provide the foundation of traceability 
between problem statement and system requirements for the purpose of validating the system.
2.1.1 Methodology
Using the Initial Tasking Document as a guideline, a generic questionnaire (Appendix B) 
is employed to address the tasked aspects of AUWS in a solution-neutral approach. A group of 
personnel in the operational, industrial, and research fields are selected for interview using a 
combination of advisor recommendations, operational experience, professional networking, and 
targets of opportunity. The responses to these questionnaires are then synthesized and analyzed to 
determine key themes that could lead to stakeholder needs and requirements. 
2.1.2 Classification
The traditional paradigm of primary, secondary, and tertiary stakeholders is too simple to 
represent the spectrum of people invested in this project. Further, the proposed area-based 
organization of stakeholders into Operational, Industrial, and Research, Development, Test and 
Evaluation (RDT&E) bodies still does not address all of the project’s facets. To fully explore the 
scope of the body of stakeholders, a matrix of stakeholders, shown in Table 2.1, is utilized.
11
Table 2.1: Stakeholder Classification Matrix









Industrial CEOs Engineers Technicians
Acquisitions POTUS, Congress DoD Acq SUPPO/SK
RDT&E PEOs LSE SME
External 
US Taxpayers
Friendly Concerned Global Citizens and Governments 
Neutral Concerned Global Citizens and Governments 
Hostile Affected Population and Governments
This stakeholder matrix shown utilizes three tiers divided amongst two categories and 
their associated sub-categories. The three tiers, Decision Makers, Integrators, and Implementers, 
are intended to map to requirements by specification from broadest to most specific, respectively. 
In the highest tier are Decision Makers who directly influence the creation and direction of the 
system. The middle tier is comprised of Integrators who ensure the system effectively inter-
operates with existing system architectures and environments. Integrators are involved in both 
the implementation of the system and the high level decision making process. The lowest tier 
consists of Implementers who are responsible for bringing the system into reality, whether in 
terms of acquisition, construction, operation, or research and development. The categories, 
Internal and External, represent the two different groups involved with any system. The Internal 
Stakeholders are composed of the Operational, Industrial, and RDT&E communities mentioned 
previously as well as the Acquisitions community. The External Stakeholders are comprised of 
civilians and governments from US, Friendly, Neutral, and Hostile populations.
2.1.2.1 Internal Stakeholders
Operational: For the Operational sub-category, the top tier consists of government policy 
makers and military decision makers, from the President to the service chiefs. The middle tier is 
comprised of military personnel ranging from top-level Combatant Commanders (COCOMs) to 
Group or Squadron Commanders. The lowest tier consists of the unit Commanding Officers, 
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wardrooms, and crews that will directly operate the system. This breakdown covers the needs for 
AUWS from the strategic level to the operational to the tactical. For example, an endurance 
requirement at the top tier (Decision Makers) may be specified in days. That requirement will 
have constituent (Integrators) requirements championed by operational commanders in the 
middle tier. Beyond a generic desire for a set number of days on station, there may now be 
specific requirements for the types of batteries or fuels to be used based on logistics and 
regulations. At the tactical level, even more specifics (i.e. battery capacities, current draw, etc.) 
will emerge as Implementer requirements.
Industrial: The Industrial sub-category represents the defense contractors operating 
within the military industrial complex. While one might assume that this category only applies to 
a specific contractor supplying AUWS, it is actually more realistic to include the contractors 
bidding on the project, the contractors providing similar or potentially integrating components, 
the contractors providing the launching platforms, and any sub-contractors needed to fulfill the 
acquisition. For a nominal description, the top tier is represented by a Contractor’s Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO), the middle tier by engineers, and the lowest tier by technicians. In this 
hierarchy, the CEO might desire a lucrative acquisitions process, such that production costs may 
be minimized to improve profit margins. The engineer may favor a simple, modular, mass 
produced design to facilitate future upgrades and cost reduction. The technician may desire a 
simple design to facilitate ease of assembly. These three sets of desires address different facets of 
design requirements.
Acquisitions: The Acquisitions Sub-Category represents the government officials, DoD 
civilians and military personnel responsible for funding AUWS. The President of the United 
States (POTUS) not only has sole responsibility for the command of the military (Operational 
sub-category), but also shares responsibility with Congress for the overall financial well-being of 
the federal government (Acquisitions sub-category). At this level, broad requirements for cost 
savings and rapid acquisition may translate to a requirement for a cost-effective program of 
record. The stakeholders at the middle tier, consisting of various acquisitions personnel (Program 
Executive Officers, contracting officers, etc.) would convert the generic cost-effectiveness 
desires to specific metrics for program cost by phase, as determined by budget. The lowest tier of 
the sub-category is populated by operational logistics and supply personnel who are responsible 
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for funding upkeep and operations. The cost metrics would evolve further into specific 
requirements for time, money, and resources needed to field the system.
RDT&E: The fourth and final sub-category of External Stakeholders is RDT&E 
personnel, ranging from Program Executive Officers (PEO) to Systems Engineers to Subject 
Matter Experts (SME). This category consists of the broadest range of people and agencies. 
From broad military research agencies like the Office of Naval Research (ONR) to specific 
military warfare discipline groups like NMAWC to civilian consulting agencies staffed by 
mixtures of civilian and retired military personnel. In this sub-category, cutting-edge 
technological requirements like autonomous operation are magnified and refined as they 
progress downward by tier. That autonomous requirement develops communications protocols 
capable of integrating with existing systems at the middle tier. At the low tier, specific 
bandwidths and transmission rates then emerge.
2.1.2.2 External Stakeholders
The External Category is much simpler, but much larger in its composition. The multi-tier 
paradigm does not hold up in the External Category as the people within each sub-category more 
or less hold the same stake in AUWS. For this reason, there are sub-categories but no tiers 
among External Stakeholders. These people may not have direct contact with AUWS, but its 
employment will have longstanding effects on all civilians, regardless of their affiliation (i.e. 
sub-category). 
United States Civilians: US civilians will absorb the financial burden of the program via 
taxes and will also carry the burden of world opinion, which may include suffering retaliation by 
hostile nations as a result of employment. For these reasons, factors such as cost, resource 
consumption, and environmental impact are legitimate concerns. To mitigate retaliation, AUWS 
must be effective enough to drive cessation of hostilities if employed, but must not utilize such 
means that excessive collateral damage (either in property or people) is caused or longstanding 
negative consequences are suffered by the affected peoples. Furthermore, US civilians would 
likely be less supportive of conventional mine warfare employment. An AUWS that possesses 
autonomy but lacks discrimination would essentially be a minefield. In short, AUWS must 
effectively discriminate its targets, operate effectively under set Rules of Engagement, and must 
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not use weapons of mass destruction like nuclear agents or biological toxins that may cause 
permanent damage to the affected ecosystem and/or populace.
Friendly and Neutral Nation Civilians: Friendly and Neutral nation populations are 
considered as a single group of civilians. They may not pay for the system or have to live with 
any collateral damage or localized environmental effects, but they must still be considered. If 
AUWS is unable to accurately execute missions in a fashion that does not violate international 
treaties and precedents (i.e. commits war crimes) then international relations may be strained. 
Furthermore, any combat operations occurring on the high seas or in straits and chokepoints of 
military significance can and will affect all sea-going nations and their economic well-being. 
Simply put, AUWS cannot indiscriminately damage or sink any and all ships within its tactical 
envelope, nor cannot it utilize methods like nuclear warheads or biological toxins.
Hostile Nation Civilians: The final sub-category, Hostile nation civilians, can include 
both constituents of a hostile sovereign nation state as well as the indigenous (and possibly 
cooperative) population of the combat zone. Applying this definition to the current conflicts in 
Iraq and Afghanistan for illustrative purposes, Iraqi civilians would be considered part of this 
sub-category as would the entire population of Afghanistan. These stakeholders will suffer direct 
effects of AUWS employment. Fishermen will risk injury or death due to attacks on unintended 
targets. Coastal peoples will suffer health and economic hardships if AUWS emits toxic or 
hazardous wastes. Whole populations may suffer if weapons of mass destruction are used as 
munitions. While it is easy to discount the intended recipients of a piece of ordnance, the 
civilians surrounding the target must always be considered.
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2.1.3 Stakeholder Interview Results
Figure 2.1: Map of Stakeholders Analyzed
Figure 2.1 shows the different groups and individuals consulted for the AUWS 
stakeholder analysis. In general, the highest level Internal Stakeholders and most External 
Stakeholders are not available for personal interview. Despite a lack of personal interaction in 
these groupings, the AUWS project is not without input, as some groups may be polled merely 
by observation or deduction, as is the case with all External stakeholders, or by extrapolation 
from sub-category constituents of a different tier, as is the case with Industrial Implementers. 
Decision Makers, such as the President and the Chief of Naval Operations, are analyzed by 
reviewing their publicly available strategic guidance.
While stakeholders are identified in the previous section by category and sub-category, 
results are presented by tier to foster traceability by aiding the mapping of stakeholder needs to 
requirement levels. External stakeholders are addressed following tier results.
2.1.3.1 Decision Makers
The President’s 2010 National Security Strategy and the CNO’s Guidance for 2011 
indicate the objectives and desires of these top level stakeholders. 
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The President wishes to “safeguard the sea” by “keeping strategic straits and vital sea 
lanes open” and “improving the early detection of emerging maritime threats.” He asserts, “We 
must maintain our military’s conventional superiority while enhancing its capacity to defeat 
asymmetric threats.” Also of note is the imperative to “spend the taxpayers’ dollars wisely.”13
The CNO, by virtue of his more specialized area of expertise, is more specific in his 
statements. In his discussion of required force levels, he states that a minimum of 313 ships are 
currently needed, while only 288 exist in inventory today. Further exacerbating the problem is 
the fact that a projected 320 ships will be needed by 2024. This disparity in supply and demand 
cannot be fixed by simply reducing the number of missions, nor can it can be addressed by 
throwing more money at the problem. “Increased financial pressure” requires the Navy to ensure 
that its “limited resources are appropriately invested”. Simply put, the Navy cannot rely solely on 
an expensive, traditional platform-based acquisition program. To meet this challenge, the CNO 
envisions the use of high-endurance UUVs utilizing modular designs with open architecture. 
This vision is not without constraint, however. Just because AUWS can reduce manpower costs 
and risks to personnel and equipment, if it does not meet the exact requirements of the Navy at a 
cost that is acceptable, it will not be fielded. The need for a rigorous systems engineering process 
is evident in his statement: “We will question every requirement and only develop those 
capabilities we need, not just want.”14
From these two documents certain overarching themes emerge. The resources of the 
military in general and the Navy in particular are stretched thin while the mission profiles and 
requirements to ensure global maritime security continue to expand such that there are simply 
not enough platforms to handle the tasking. The country cannot realistically supply more 
traditional platform-based solutions in time to meet the need, much less pay to construct and 
operate them. Even if the country could meet every mission with the existing fleet inventory, 
there are some tasks that are simply too dangerous to risk a multi-billion dollar asset crewed by 
dozens (if not hundreds) of highly trained, well compensated individuals. A “game-changing” 
system is needed to meet these needs.15
13 Obama, Barack. National Security Strategy. Washington, D.C.: Office of the President of the United States, 
2010. 5, 34, 50.




Synthesized from the desires of the President and the CNO, the following generic 
characteristics emerge for AUWS:
• Capability to conduct data collection and dissemination
• Capability to filter and process data to create intelligence onboard
• Capability to conduct engagement with hostile forces
• Some degree of expendability (the loss of the asset should not have an unacceptable or 
strategic impact)
• Minimal manning (reducing cost while raising expendability)
• Affordability (allowing larger inventory for better mission coverage while raising 
expendability)
2.1.3.2 Integrators
Just as the top tier stakeholder results seem to fit together nicely as a result of proximity 
and rigid hierarchy, the convergence of ideas diminishes somewhat as the range of stakeholders 
increases. There are dissenting opinions amongst responders as to whether unmanned assets are 
necessary and, if so, the missions that should be covered. Some stakeholders favor a given 
warfare area (MIW, ASW, SUW) over another, as is expected based on one’s experience and 
preferences, but the most widespread disparity is with regard to the utility of MIW. As the 
Navy’s offensive mining capability has been phased out, the warfare culture has changed to the 
point where many people use MIW and MCM interchangeably. When asked about the utility of 
MIW, many respond with adamant conviction that MCM is of great use to the Navy, but fail to 
mention anything about offensive mining.
Those responders that do respond with opinions on offensive mining generally feel that it 
is a warfare area that has been neglected for some time, and based on the current fiscal 
environment and given the wide range of maritime threats present and emerging, the Navy would 
do well to re-examine offensive mining as a cost-effective solution of providing area denial 
while protecting more valuable assets. The generally positive view of MIW is qualified with the 
need to take the next step forward. Rapidly advancing technologies must be harnessed to 
capitalize on the benefits of MIW while overcoming the traditional political obstacles to mining, 
such as the danger to innocents and the cost of recovery (e.g. post-hostilities minefield 
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clearance). To summarize: “Focus on effects. Generate asymmetric effects that are not already 
done better via other means. Avoid replicating the mine fields of times past. Just like laser guided 
munitions made dumb bombs obsolete, AUWS should make mining obsolete.”16 Beyond MIW 
discussion, the following focus areas emerge:
• High Endurance. Regardless of design, AUWS must be capable of conducting extended 
independent (though not necessarily autonomous) operations. More than one stakeholder 
mentions a need for a minimum of 30-days endurance,17 18 19 which stems from publicly 
stated CNO goals.20 This analysis takes the CNO’s goal into consideration; however, the 
endurance requirement is also analyzed from the mission perspective. In other words, the 
minimum endurance needed to accomplish given tasking is estimated and compared to 
the CNO goal.
• Modular. Many responders espouse a need for a solution to multiple mission profiles, but 
they also stress that a “one-size-fits-all” option may not be viable, as its overall capability 
may be lacking as it attempts to cover all bases. For this reason, stakeholders mention 
either multiple systems or modular configurable systems that could be adapted to the 
mission at hand. ISR and Area Denial are both specifically called out in addition to 
conventional ASW and SUW missions.21 22
• Clandestine. Multiple responders discuss the efficacy of keeping high value assets out of 
harm’s way while simultaneously inserting ISR/engagement capability without the 
target’s knowledge.23 24 25 Other stakeholders note the potential utility of notifying the 
enemy that AUWS has been deployed, either for deterrence or disruption purposes. Even 
in this case, some measure of stealth is necessary to prevent individual AUWS units from 
being detected and targeted. Also, the presence of a clandestine system can be announced 
16 Hebert, David. Personal interview. Oct. 2010.
17 Ellis, W.G. Personal interview. Oct. 2010.
18 Everhart, Dave. Personal interview. Oct. 2010.
19 Martin, Gifford. Personal interview. Oct. 2010.
20 Standifer, Cid. "CNO Wants 30-Day Mission in Seven Years." Inside the Navy 22 Oct. 2010.
21 Hebert, David. Personal interview. Oct. 2010.
22 O'Donnell, Jerry. Personal interview. Oct. 2010.
23 Ellis, W.G. Personal interview. Oct. 2010.
24 Everhart, Dave. Personal interview. Oct. 2010.
25 Matthews, Tony. Personal interview. Oct. 2010.
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when desired, but an overt naval presence cannot be hidden as easily. In fact, a 
clandestine capability enables a deterrent effect even when no system is present.
• Cost-effective. Most responders feel that a primary requirement for AUWS and any other 
UUV should be the ability to conduct a mission for less than the cost of a high value 
asset, mitigating the risk of financial loss. Measures taken to ensure that AUWS won’t be 
lost or mission-killed could save even more money.26
Assembling these themes with other inputs provided by Integrators results in the 
emergence of several specialized characteristics:
• Capability to operate independently of a tending vessel or station for periods of a month 
or more
• Capability to conduct clandestine operations
• Capability for recovery or self neutralization (as a caveat, the per unit cost must be driven 
down to support one time use) 
• Capability to communicate with a host platform and other units within the system
• Capability to provide intelligence collection and dissemination with minimal time latency 
to support tactical action 
• Capability to conduct non-lethal mission kills (mitigates the risk of collateral damage)27
• Capability of deployment/recovery from multiple platforms (i.e. submerged, air, surface, 
or shore)
• Capability to operate autonomously or under direct operator control, and anything in 
between in the Man in the Loop continuum28
2.1.3.3 Implementers
This stakeholder base is significantly larger than the Middle Tier base. The individual 
Project Team members all fit into this category, so personal experience is included in this portion 
of the analysis. The reduction in convergent thought observed during the transition from 
Integrators to Implementers is exponentially larger than the reduction seen between Decision 
26 Ellis, W.G. Personal interview. Oct. 2010.
27 Drennan, Frank. Personal interview. 10 Oct. 2010.
28 Hill, Randy. Personal interview. 16 Sept. 2010.
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Makers and Integrators, which is expected, given the comparative jump in respective stakeholder 
pools.
This community will prove most valuable during operational testing and evaluation and 
actual fielding of the unit. Sailors have always been known for their ingenuity underway, and 
many side effects, functions and emergent behaviors that were never considered during the initial 
build will be discovered, exploited, or remedied by Petty Officers, Chiefs, and Officers. This 
notion highlights the importance of integrating AUWS into the larger force to create an effective 
team of man and machine. An autonomous system operating on its own, even one capable of 
learning, is ultimately limited by its programming and cannot capitalize on the innovation of the 
warfighter.
The same confusion between MIW and MCM seen among Integrators is rampant among 
Implementers. A complete lack of emphasis on offensive mining, the absence of training 
evolutions, and the removal of most mines from the USN inventory is most likely to blame. The 
other universal concern is the need for UUVs, provided they are easy to maintain and of good 
reliability.29
The following characteristics are synthesized from community input and team member 
personal experience:
• Ease of deployment and recovery
• Ease of maintenance
• Minimal physical footprint and low weight to accommodate onboard storage and/or airlift
• Survivability




• Minimal upkeep requirements for tools, cleanliness, etc.
• Minimal logistics footprint
• Capability to provide meaningful and accurate real time data
29 Brunelle, Elaine. Personal interview. Oct. 2010.
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2.1.3.4 External Stakeholders
Lacking representative samples of specific inputs from these populations, observation of 
general public opinion via news outlets and social media amongst other methods leads to a list of 
basic desires for the system that do not necessarily map to high, middle, or low tier.
• Should be relatively inexpensive
• Should not use nuclear fuels if the system is used as a weapon
• Should not use nuclear warheads of any type
• Should not use chemical agents/biohazards/toxins as weapons 
• Should not adversely affect the ecosystem, either through the production of 
environmental hazards (e.g. oil slicks, radiation, hazardous waste, etc.) or disruption of 
marine life
• Should be recoverable or capable of neutralization/sterilization to prevent collateral 
damage after cessation of hostilities
• Should minimize collateral damage through target discrimination and accurate munitions 
delivery
• Should be capable of correctly following established Rules of Engagement, whether 
operating autonomously or under human control
2.1.4 Stakeholder Analysis Results
The Stakeholder Analysis is the basis of the Systems Engineering Process. If the Systems 
Engineer cannot identify what the customer actually needs, then the right system with the right 
capability cannot be provided. Further, just listening to what the customer has to say or reading 
the information they provide is not sufficient. Critical thought and discussion go into the culling 
of actual needs from discourse peppered with wants and “wouldn’t it be nice if’s.” So often, the 
customer may know what they need or want, but cannot accurately convey it. In other cases, the 
customer may not really even understand what they need, and that need must be derived from 
information provided. 
By collecting and analyzing this information, the Initial Tasking Document refined into a 
relevant problem statement. That problem statement is molded into a set of needs, again via 
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stakeholder inputs. Those needs are then fashioned into specific, rigorous requirements with 
specific metrics, measures of effectiveness, and performance thresholds.30
2.2 Problem Definition
While stakeholder analysis begins the formulation of a set of needs for AUWS, it does 
not paint the whole picture. The fundamental question of why AUWS is needed is not quite 
answered by studying the needs and desires of potential stakeholders. An independent analysis of 
the problem that AUWS must solve is necessary to fully understand how to develop the right 
system.
Future USW Capacity: The number of platforms available to conduct USW is at risk of 
falling short of operational demands in the near to mid-term future. MCM ships are being 
replaced by Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), of which the Navy is planning to build and operate 55 
over the next 30 years. The MCM mission is just one of many, including ASW, that this modular 
ship is expected to conduct. If an LCS is not outfitted with an MCM or ASW Mission Package, 
then it would have to enter port and undergo a swap-out in order to contribute to USW missions. 
Other surface combatants have simultaneous multi-mission capabilities; however, since USW is 
just one of many missions they may be tasked with, they cannot be fully allocated to the USW 
force structure.
Submarines represent the majority of the USW force structure. The Navy states that 48 
operational fast attack submarines (SSNs) are required to meet future needs, yet its shipbuilding 
plan calls for only 39 operational SSNs in the year 2030. Furthermore, as of 2006 only about half 
of Combatant Commander requests for SSN tasking are met. Some observers, such as retired 
Vice Admiral Albert Konetzni, Jr., former Commander US Pacific Fleet Submarine Force, argue 
that even 48 operational SSNs will be insufficient when USW missions are not comprised 
primarily of ISR, but more traditional USW operations against an emerging near-peer 
competitor.31
30 This analysis develops general needs, performance metrics, and measures of effectiveness. However, specific 
requirements and thresholds are not established here. They must be developed based on further analysis with 
classified information and concurrence of top level stakeholders, using this analysis as a guide.
31 O'Rourke, Ronald. Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress. 
Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2010.
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Future USW Capability: The capabilities of the United States Navy’s submarine fleet 
are second to none and will most likely remain unchallenged in the near future. However, there is 
some question as to whether this prominent capability will be able to keep pace with rapidly 
advancing (and proliferating) unmanned and autonomous technologies. This challenge is 
exacerbated by the scheduled decrease in SSN capacity. LCS is intended to contribute to USW 
capabilities; however, a recent Navy report indicates that the baseline ASW Mission Package 
does not provide sufficient capability to meet the range of expected threats.32
Near-Peer Competitors: The traditional global order is being challenged by several 
emerging countries that have the ability to affect international economic and security issues. 
These countries are rapidly expanding and modernizing their navies as a signal of their intent to 
influence global politics.33 Consequently, many countries around the world are responding with 
their own naval buildup amid security concerns.34
Asymmetric Maritime Threats: Asymmetric maritime threats, such as small boat 
swarms, diesel submarines, and naval mines are easily employed over a wide geographical area 
by a large number of state and non-state actors. Since the threat axis is essentially 360 degrees 
and well-planned attacks offer negligible warning, these threats force most naval platforms into a 
defensive posture. Using surface combatants and SSNs to proactively counter asymmetric threats 
often subjects these high value assets to unacceptable levels of risk. For example, while an SSN 
might have the capability to clear mines or hunt a diesel submarine, these missions risk the loss 
of a high value asset that is often critical to the overall warfighting effort. 
Autonomous Undersea Threats: Historically, torpedoes and mines have always been 
autonomous and unmanned to some extent. Today, however, technology allows for much wider 
and greater capability among autonomous undersea weapon systems. Unfortunately, this 
technology is not an American monopoly. Countries around the world are currently investing in 
UUV and related research. Eventually, an adversary of the United States will develop its own 
version of AUWS. These systems incur far less risk than manned platforms, giving them a 
significant tactical advantage.
32 O’ Rourke.
33 Whiteneck, Daniel, et al. The Navy at a Tipping Point: Maritime Dominance at Stake?. Alexandria: Center for 
Naval Analysis, 2010.
34 Wander, Andrew. "Middle East in huge naval expansion." 31 March 2010. aljazeera.net. 16 Oct. 2010 
<http://english.aljazeera.net/news/2010/03/201033014527639619.html>.
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Challenge for Platform-Centric Solutions: The wide range of potential threats creates a 
scalability issue for naval platforms. The shipbuilding process cannot possibly keep pace with 
ever changing threats armed with rapidly advancing technology. Once a naval vessel is built, it is 
very difficult to scale it to the level of combat it is expected to face. The modular design of LCS 
is an attempt at scalability, but documented problems with this approach indicate that a different 
solution may be necessary in the long term. In short, a vessel built to fight and win large naval 
battles is not necessarily ideal to confront a swarm of small boats, as the risk of loss significantly 
outweighs the benefit of victory. Conversely, a vessel built to defeat the mine threat is probably 
not designed to defeat an enemy destroyer.
The overall problem that derives from both the stakeholder analysis and this independent 
analysis is described in the following statement:
Over the next twenty years the capacity and capability of USW 
platforms will not meet operational demands in non-permissive 
areas.  Furthermore,  the  emergence  of  near-peer  competitor  
navies, the distributed nature of the asymmetric maritime threat,  
and the development of autonomous undersea threats present a  
unique challenge that current platform-centric solutions are not  
ideally designed to confront.
This problem statement is shown graphically in Figure 2.2. The red areas represent the 
three general threat categories expected to confront the Navy in the future USW environment, 
particularly in the littorals. Given the status quo, the Navy will most likely be able to handle both 
asymmetric and near-peer competitor threats, assuming its USW capability will overcome any 
capacity shortfalls. However, the very technology that is being studied in this report will generate 
potential new threats as quickly as the technology develops. Without capitalizing on this 
powerful technology, the Navy’s traditional USW force structure will struggle to meet the 
challenge created by the combination of all three threats. Eventually, a crossover will occur after 
which the Navy will no longer be assured of its dominance in the USW environment. 
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Figure 2.2: Future of USW (maintaining status quo)
Figure 2.3 depicts the scenario if the Navy harnesses rapidly emerging technology (e.g. 
distributed undersea networks, unmanned and autonomous control systems, miniaturized 
weapons and sensors). Advanced threats no longer have a comparative advantage against 
systems such as AUWS, which can also be effectively employed against asymmetric threats and 
near-peer competitors within acceptable risk limits.
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Figure 2.3: Future of USW (with AUWS)
2.3 Operational Concept
Given the potential problem facing future USW forces, an operational concept is 
developed for an AUWS that would help those forces meet the challenges of the future. This 
operational concept aids in further clarifying what capability and capacity gaps AUWS will be 
required to fill. The specific operational activities that must be performed will vary with the 
parameters of the operating environment, involved players, and specific threat. So, while every 
instance cannot be reasonably modeled, the following is a brief description of stressing 
scenarios, described by threat (near-peer, asymmetric, or autonomous) in which AUWS will 
accomplish its mission. To validate this operational concept, two independent analyses, 
conducted by students of the Joint Campaign Analysis course at NPS, examine the operational 
impact of AUWS in a similar scenario. Both analyses find that AUWS can contribute 
significantly to overall mission accomplishment, either by improving performance in critical 
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activities such as ASW barrier search or by reducing the number of submarines required to 
perform high risk missions.35 36
Figure 2.4: AUWS Operational Concept (OV-1)
2.3.1 Deployment (pre-Phase 0)
Consider the littoral region, as shown in Figure 2.4, surrounding a near-peer competitor 
during a tense geo-political climate in the 2030 time frame. The Fleet Commander designates the 
need for discreet early warning and battlespace preparation in the area. Maritime Patrol Aircraft 
are airborne and flying their normal routes. Surface ships slow briefly during a transit. SSNs 
covertly infiltrate the coast just outside of territorial waters. Multiple AUWS units are rapidly 
and covertly deployed from these platforms. Each AUWS unit energizes, verifies system 
continuity, and verifies programmed tasking prior to release. Onboard the launch platform, the 
35 Sibley, Christy. CJTF Sea Tiger, Anti-Submarine Warfare: Impact of the Advanced Undersea Warfare System 
(AUWS) on the Submarine Battle. Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 2011.
36 Smith, David. CJTF Sea Tiger Maritime Component: Added use of VCAP Component. Monterey: Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2011.
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system operator sets AUWS to semi-autonomous mode. Each unit autonomously transits to its 
designated patrol zone under its own power, using its own guidance systems. Upon arrival within 
its assigned patrol region, it commences area monitoring. AUWS covertly conducts ISR to 
establish baseline traffic patterns and provide early warning of unusual activity. Although the 
system is equipped with weaponry, only a human operator can initiate an engagement, via the 
communications gateway node, in the semi-autonomous mode.
2.3.2 Monitoring (Phase 0)
Based on the information provided by AUWS, the Fleet Commander orders further 
AUWS units be deployed in a strategic chokepoint near a major naval port of the adversary. The 
shallow waters and heavy maritime patrol density make keeping a high-value covert asset, such 
as an SSN, in situ for real-time ISR a risky proposition, either from a physical accessibility 
aspect or a counter-detection aspect. Placing a covert distributed sensor system in the area will 
provide early warning of increased military traffic, which may be indicative of imminent 
hostilities, allowing the United States to mass forces as needed to prepare. As a covert sensor, 
AUWS can also observe activity that occurs in the absence of prominent warships. When not 
actively communicating with an external network, AUWS enters a dormant mode to conserve 
power.
2.3.3 Area Denial (Phase 1)
The situation in the region has escalated to the point that hostilities may not be avoided. 
Minor skirmishes have broken out and the entire adversary fleet is preparing to mobilize. As a 
deterrent measure, the United States announces that it has deployed controllable, discriminatory 
weapons outside of each of the adversary’s ports and it will give the order to engage naval 
warships if the fleet attempts to sortie. In reality, fully functional AUWS units are only deployed 
near two major naval bases. Decoys that randomly transmit acoustic signals are positioned 
outside of other ports. One adversary strike group ignores the warning and deploys. While the 
ships make it safely to sea, appropriate AUWS units are set to fully autonomous mode, denying 
the ships re-entry into port for resupply. Meanwhile, US Naval ships that would traditionally be 
required for Area Denial are free to conduct other missions.
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2.3.4 Prosecution (Phase 2-3)
When those adversary ships that successfully deployed attempt to return to port, AUWS 
is prepared to engage. Operating in fully autonomous mode, the AUWS units do not incur a time 
delay or risk counter-detection from communications with an external network. AUWS engages 
all naval vessels attempting to transit its area of responsibility, while sparing local fishing traffic 
based on acoustic signature and behavior.
Meanwhile, another AUWS force is monitoring the aircraft carrier operating area. Due to 
the high density of friendly and neutral traffic in the area, it is operating in friendly force defense 
mode. The system autonomously maneuvers and sends contact reports to the combat information 
center aboard the aircraft carrier, but cannot conduct offensive engagements on its own. 
However, when a diesel submarine enters the area and fires a torpedo at the aircraft carrier, 
AUWS is permitted to quickly react. One AUWS unit neutralizes the torpedo before it reaches 
the aircraft carrier, while another prosecutes the adversary submarine. 
2.3.5 Recovery/Neutralization (Phase 4)
Increasing cost constraints require AUWS to be reusable if at all feasible. AUWS must be 
able to deploy, operate, and be recovered by a surfaced or submerged platform in the area. 
However, if recovery is inadvisable due to risk, or if enemy activities detect or recover AUWS, a 
self-destruct capability must be present to ensure that sensitive hardware and software is not 
compromised. 
A submarine has returned to the region just outside of the 12 nm limit to recover AUWS 
units conducting the area denial mission near adversary ports. Upon receiving the recall beacon, 
the AUWS units autonomously begin to transit to the recovery point. Internal diagnostic checks 
on some units indicate that underwater shock from nearby engagements have severely reduced 
power available for propulsion, making recovery infeasible. These AUWS units upload critical 
information to the rest of the AUWS network and signal their intent to scuttle themselves. This 
mitigates the risk of sensitive information and technology falling into enemy hands and the 




Akin to any technologically innovative project, AUWS faces several non-technical issues. 
A few of these issues warrant additional elaboration: Perception of Mine Warfare, Rules of 
Engagement, and International Maritime Law.
2.4.1 Perception of Mine Warfare
Over the course of naval history, mine warfare has experienced many ups and downs. 
This is largely due to neglect and fear coupled with periodic renewals of interest in the mine 
warfare discipline. Figure 2.5 illustrates the historical cycles of MCM and offensive mining. 
Many consider mine warfare (MIW) as an indiscriminate method of crippling or destroying 
vessels. This is not the primary purpose of a minefield however. Mining operations embrace 
many unique methods of employment. Mines are generally used to control the sea through 
regulation or denial of passage or access to a defined area. They can be used to inflict damage, 
hinder, disrupt, or deny sea going operations of an enemy.37
Figure 2.5: Historical Mine Warfare Cycles38
37 Commander, Mine Warfare Command. NWP 3-15. Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 2004. 1-2.
38 Williams, Rick. Historical Mine Warfare Cycles. Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 2011.
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Traditionally minefields are used to protect ports and other high value areas by sealing off 
the most common methods of passage. These minefields tend to be extensive in order to ensure 
success. This requires a significant number of mines rendering sea lanes almost impassable to all 
vessel traffic. As technology evolves, the United States Navy must not overlook the viability of 
offensive mining in controlling waterways while mitigating manned requirements. Potentially, 
just a few AUWS units could effectively execute the mission (among others) of what was once a 
large indiscriminate minefield, significantly reducing cost and risk.
The negative connotation associated with the term “mining” is nothing new. During the 
Vietnam Conflict, mines were called “destructors” in order to avoid the negative political 
implications associated with offensive mining. Today, “effectors” is a popular term. Regardless 
of what terminology is used, mines have been a very useful, highly successful tool used 
throughout history. The traditional roadblocks of danger to innocents and cost of post-conflict 
cleanup are being rapidly overcome by technological advances in areas such as undersea 
command and control, computer processing systems, and unmanned mobile systems. 
Mine Warfare is a viable force multiplier. Due to its relatively low cost of operation and 
outstanding suitability to the harsh maritime environment, MIW should not be ignored. Just the 
threat of mines can greatly influence an adversary’s psyche while crippling logistical 
infrastructure, thus providing an irrefutable advantage to the United States. Additionally, mines 
can afford a covert preemptive strike capability at very little risk to the laying force, particularly 
when considering smart mines. While AUWS will go further in terms of technology and 
operational employment, rendering the traditional notion of a mine obsolete, the principles of 
Mine Warfare should not be forgotten.
2.4.2 Rules of Engagement
Typically, the Rules of Engagement (ROE) for the employment of mines are described in 
detail in operation plans (OPLANS) and operation orders (OPORDS) as promulgated by the 
applicable geographic Combatant Commander. ROE comply with the laws of war as well as 
applicable National Command Authority (NCA) guidance throughout the range of mining 
operations. While ROE may vary based on the situation, certain basic concepts like the definition 
of a mine may need to be re-examined. Dr. P. W. Singer, author of Wired for War and senior 
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fellow at the Brookings Institution, notes that systems such as AUWS may have a similar impact 
as UAVs are having on cruise missile doctrine. According to some definitions, armed UAVs 
could be considered cruise missiles and vice versa. ROE and other doctrine are being updated 
accordingly. In the same manner, a mobile, intelligent, and controllable AUWS is closer to the 
definition of a submarine than a mine. ROE may need to be updated to clarify this ambiguity.39
2.4.3 International Maritime Law
“International law and practice regulate the use of the seas, each nation’s rights regarding 
its national territory and waters, the initiation and conduct of armed conflict, and limitations 
regarding employment and types of weapons.”40
Mining operations are considered by the international community to be acts of war unless 
they are conducted as a protective measure within a nation’s coastal waters. Proper notifications 
to commercial shipping must be made in order to prevent unintentional damage or destruction to 
vessels transiting affected waterways.
The Hague Convention (VIII) of 1907 set forth several international laws that are still in 
effect today regarding the use of sea mines. Here are the specific provisions outlined:41
• Armed, unanchored mines must have a maximum life of 1 hour
• Armed, anchored mines must become unarmed if they break free from their moorings
• Mines must be designed to become harmless should they miss their target
• It is illegal to mine solely against commercial shipping
• Neutral nations are not to be interfered with, and the safe transit of neutral shipping must 
be ensured
• Mines must be removed by the planting force at the conclusion of hostilities
Although, the United States did not ratify the Hague Convention, the restrictions and 
principles laid forth have always been abided by.
39 Singer, P.W. Personal interview. 15 Mar. 2011.
40 Joint Chiefs of Staff. JP 3-15: Joint Doctrine for Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare. Washington, D.C.: Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 1999. I-V.
41 Hague Conference of 1907. "Avalon Project - The Laws of War." 18 Oct. 1907. Yale.edu. 22 Apr. 2011. 
<http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/lawwar.asp>.
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Another treaty of note is the Seabed Arms Control Treaty of 1971. This treaty prohibits 
the use of tethered weapons of mass destruction outside of the 12 nautical mile coastal region. 
This includes the use of both bottom and moored mines.42
In all cases it is important the Navy fully understands the laws that govern the use of 
mines and other undersea weapons, as they will influence the development of AUWS. More 
importantly, AUWS will likely have an impact on international law. For example, the use of 
unrestricted submarine warfare by Germany in World War I led to the United States, Britain, 
Japan, France, and Italy signing agreements essentially making this tactic illegal. The agreements 
required submarines to surface and provide a safe place for crews before attacking merchants. In 
fact, unrestricted submarine warfare was the justification for US entry into the war. Yet, less than 
three decades later, the United States Navy itself used this tactic against the Japanese in World 
War II, with almost no debate.43 History is filled with examples of technology driving 
international law. As technology continues to advance, and more and more countries begin to 
embrace the concept of weaponized unmanned undersea systems, the United States and the 
international community may need to reassess this particular area of maritime law.
2.5 Specific Areas of Need
The areas, or categories, of need for AUWS shown in Figure 2.6 are developed from the 
input of stakeholders, the future challenges facing USW forces, a preliminary operational 
concept, and other issues that may impact the system. These needs are not prioritized relative to 
each other. Rather, they are all deemed the most relevant and warrant further refinement into top 
level requirements.
42 Russian Federation, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America. 
"Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on 
the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor and in Subsoil Thereof (Seabed Treaty)." 11 Feb. 1971. NTI.org. 22 Apr. 2011.
43 Singer, P.W. Personal interview. 15 Mar. 2011.
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Figure 2.6: Specific Areas of Need for AUWS
• Threat Discrimination: AUWS must be capable of identifying threats from normal 
vessel traffic. AUWS should utilize sensor data, such as visual and acoustic signatures, 
and target behavior, such as speed and maneuvering, to determine hostile identity and/or 
hostile intent. The balance between probability of false positive (i.e. friendly/neutral 
identified as threat) and probability of false negative (i.e. threat identified as 
friendly/neutral) should be adjusted according to the specific mission and consequences 
of each type of error. Threat discrimination is recognized as one of the most difficult 
challenges facing the development of AUWS.
• Detection Avoidance: AUWS must minimize detectable signals from the following 
categories: acoustic emission, RF emission, IR emission, visible contrast/reflectance, 
RCS, magnetic anomalies, and laser cross section among others. Mobility to evade an 
enemy or a neutral, such as a trawling vessel, is highly desirable. In this context, 
detection avoidance also encompasses other types of security. AUWS must avoid the 
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compromise of sensitive information, advanced technology, and dangerous weapons 
either through self-destruction or returning to base upon mission completion.
• Adjustable Autonomy: An AUWS operator must be able to designate the level of 
autonomy as a function of operational phase, tactical situation, current mission, and 
availability of communications. Level of autonomy will generally form a trade space with 
discrimination and communication. Highly autonomous modes will require less 
communications with an operator but will incur greater risk of discrimination error, and 
vice versa.
• Persistent Forward Presence: AUWS must have an endurance of no less than 30 days, 
including deployment, operations, and recovery. Aside from being a stated CNO goal, 
this level of endurance is commensurate with reasonable logistics support (e.g. 
maintenance, re-seeding, etc.) for area denial missions. Endurance must be coupled with 
independence from tending vessels in order to bring a unique capability to the USW 
force. This area is a significant technological challenge, but one that is currently receiving 
much attention from stakeholders in all categories. 
• Enemy Prosecution (manned and unmanned): AUWS must harness the capability to 
engage designated maritime targets in order to neutralize threat platform mission 
effectiveness (i.e. mission kill). Neutralization should occur by means of kinetic assault. 
Such neutralization is limited by target survivability, which is a function of susceptibility, 
vulnerability, and recoverability. AUWS should be capable of engaging unmanned 
systems, ranging from mines and torpedoes to enemy versions of AUWS.
• Operational Picture Development: AUWS must have the capability to transmit 
information about its area of responsibility to decision makers in a tactically relevant 
timeline. Since AUWS can operate autonomously, it must be able to not only contribute 
to the combined operational picture but also develop an internal operational picture of its 
own. Therefore, it must process sensor data into tactical information within its local 
network. This need drives the requirement for sensors, communicators, and processors. 
Undersea communication at long range with minimal time latency and high data rates is a 
significant technological challenge. 
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• Platform Independence: AUWS must be capable of deployment and recovery from 
multiple platform types found in the United States military inventory. Surface ships 
should be able to deploy units over the side, aircraft should be able to drop units from 
altitudes commensurate with mission requirements based on airframe safety parameters, 
and submarines should be able to deploy units from either torpedo tubes or lock-out 
trunks. Surface ships should able to recover units either via davits or well decks and 
submarines should be able to recover units in the same manner they were deployed. This 
need does not imply that AUWS must be capable of deployment and recovery from all 
platforms in the United States Navy inventory. Rather, it is critical to avoid relying on a 
single platform or allowing any platform to assume a central role in mission 
accomplishment.
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3. Functional Analysis and Allocation
3.1 Functional Analysis
A robust functional analysis allows the development of meaningful physical alternatives 
and provides a traceability to ensure that any considered alternative performs the necessary 
functions to meet mission requirements. The specific functions that define the conduct of the 
AUWS mission are derived from the key areas of need identified from Needs Analysis. Those 
top level functions are decomposed into sub-functions to determine what, and how many, 
physical elements would be necessary for sufficient performance. Measures of effectiveness 
(MOEs) and measures of performance (MOPs) are mapped to functions and sub-functions, 
further contributing to traceability to stakeholder requirements. An analysis of functional flow is 
also considered to determine potential interactions between functions. Functional analysis gives 
insight into which functions are more critical than others, aiding the allocation and alternative 
generation processes. 
At each step in the process, the previous steps are re-evaluated to ensure that sufficient 
granularity exists. The constant review of previous products against new products results in the 
creation of a refined overall input/output description of the system and a robust definition of the 
connections within the system. This thorough analysis allows one to map functions and sub-
functions to physical architectures and functional connections to interfaces such that the actual 
utility of a physical concept can be identified. 
3.1.1 Functional Mapping
Table 3.1 maps functions to each need area.
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Table 3.1: Functional Need Traceability
Need Area Function
Threat Discrimination Perform ISR
Detection Avoidance Provide OPSEC
Adjustable Autonomy Perform C3
Persistent Forward Presence Provide Power, Perform C3
Enemy Prosecution (manned and unmanned) Prosecute, Perform C3
Operational Picture Development Perform ISR, Perform C3
Platform Independence Maneuver, Perform C3
From this mapping, six top level functions are identified:
1. Provide Power
2. Maneuver
3. Perform Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
4. Perform Command, Control, and Communication (C3)
5. Prosecute
6. Provide Operational Security (OPSEC)
A seventh function, “Provide Structure,” exists that defines the need for a physical 
construct that houses the components that perform the constituent functions. Together, these 
seven functions define the conduct of AUWS operations as desired by stakeholders.
3.1.2 Functional Decomposition
Figure 3.1 shows the top level functional decomposition defined by the necessary 
functions. All functions are equally valued in terms of the functional hierarchy and are denoted 
by a “1.X”. The flow and interrelation of the seven functions will be further explored, but a 
complete function-by-function decomposition must be performed first. Relevant MOEs and 
MOPs are described with each function and sub-function. A full list of MOEs and MOPs 
considered can be found in Appendix C.
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Figure 3.1: AUWS Top Level Functional Decomposition
3.1.2.1 Provide Structure
Function 1.1, Provide Structure, refers to the need to provide a physical architecture for 
the system’s components and therefore feeds into every other function. While this function is not 
decomposed into detailed sub-functions, it is important to consider because it serves as a 
transition for the functional allocation and alternative generation processes. Every AUWS 
function must be performed by a physical element, which must be integrated with all other 
physical elements into a cohesive architecture. While it is important to recognize the difference 
between the physical and the functional, the function of providing physical structure cannot be 
ignored. MOEs associated with this function are the capability to house physical elements for 
each function without adversely affecting performance of other functions, and the capability to 
integrate physical elements. 
3.1.2.2 Provide Power
AUWS must have an operational endurance of no less than thirty days. This includes 
stored energy requirements, recharge requirements, and the power distribution requirements to 
operate independently of a manned asset. The power requirements encompass deployment, on-
station, and recovery operations. Periods of loitering, patrolling, and sprinting must be 
considered. 
Function 1.2 provides power of some form to all components within AUWS. Nearly 
every function and sub-function requires power of some sort. To provide power, certain sub-
functions covering required capabilities must exist:
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• The ability to receive power of some form from both internal and external sources 
(Function 1.2.1).
• The ability to store that received power in some medium for later retrieval (Function 
1.2.2).
• The ability to manage power reserves and determine appropriate action based on capacity 
and component power draw (Function 1.2.3).
• The ability to distribute power (Function 1.2.4) based on power management inputs such 
that power allocation is adjusted (Function 1.2.4.1) or maintained (Function 1.2.4.2).
• The ability to control the generation of power internally (Function 1.2.5) using onboard 
re-charging elements (Function 1.2.5.1) or not (Function 1.2.5).
Given these requirements, the complete functional decomposition for Function 1.2 is 
displayed in Figure 3.2. Without addressing functional flow, the need for binary, or “on/off,” sub-
functions (Functions 1.2.4.1/2 and 1.2.5.1/2) may not be readily apparent, but when analyzed 
from a logical AND/OR process it follows that power distribution will either remain constant or 
change and power will either be generated or it will not. This is further discussed during the 
Functional Flow portion of the functional analysis.
Figure 3.2: Provide Power Functional Decomposition
MOEs associated with this function are: the capability to operate for the required time 
frame of 30 days; capability to recharge; and the capability and capacity to store energy. 
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3.1.2.3 Perform C3
AUWS operators must be able to designate level of autonomy as a function of operational 
phase, tactical situation, current mission, and availability of communications. The levels of 
autonomy range from total man-in the-loop control to fully autonomous operations. On-board 
processing power aids in the ability for AUWS to operate effectively. Additionally, AUWS 
should have the capability to transmit a near real-time picture of an area of interest to decision 
makers. MOEs associated with this function are: the probability of successful command 
automation; the capability to change the level of autonomy; and the capability to communicate 
(receive and transmit) messages.
The performance of a C3 function is more complex than a power provision function, such 
that C3 must be discussed in a tiered fashion. Figure 3.3 shows the three primary sub-functions 
of the C3 function, Command, Control, and Communicate.
Figure 3.3: Perform C3 Functional Decomposition
Decomposing Function 1.3.1, Figure 3.4 shows the hierarchy of the Command function. 
Command, in the broadest sense, is concerned with the receipt of orders (Function 1.3.1.1), the 
evaluation of overall system status for the purposes of determining feasible responses (Function 
1.3.1.2), the evaluation of sensor data to determine appropriate action (Function 1.3.1.3), the 
analysis of the specific order (Function 1.3.1.4), and the execution of that order (Function 
1.3.1.5). 
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Figure 3.4: Command Functional Decomposition
Expounding upon the Function 1.3.1.2, the processing of System Status, there are three 
sub-functions to consider: the receipt of component status reports (Function 1.3.1.2.1) with 
regard to power, functionality, armament, positioning, visibility, and readiness; the analysis of 
those component status reports (Function 1.3.1.2.2); and the fusing of that data into a 
comprehensive evaluation of overall system readiness (Function 1.3.1.2.3). This system status 
will be used to constrain actions in response to orders or programming, as well as provide 
manned assets with system health and battle damage assessments (BDA).
Function 1.3.1.3, Process ISR Data, is similar in that it consists of sub-functions for the 
receipt of ISR data from system sensor suites (Function 1.3.1.3.1) and the analysis of that ISR 
data (Function 1.3.1.3.2). Analyzed data is used to simultaneously develop an environmental 
status for the operational area (Function 1.3.1.3.3) and a tactical picture of the operational area 
(Function 1.3.1.3.4). The environmental and tactical pictures will be used to determine 
appropriate system response to orders and programming, and will also be transmitted to manned 
assets to improve the Combined Operational Picture for the Operational Commander.
Figure 3.5 shows the functional decomposition of the Control Function (Function 1.3.2).
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Figure 3.5: Control Functional Decomposition
The Control Function determines the autonomy status of AUWS, which is presented for 
ease of analysis as full autonomous operation (Function 1.3.2.1), semi-autonomous operation 
(Function 1.3.2.2), and full remote manual control (Function 1.3.2.2). In further analysis, semi-
autonomous operation could be decomposed into several gradations. A more detailed approach 
might resemble the taxonomy used by ONR for UAVs, shown in Table 3.2.44
44 Button, R. W., J. Kamp, T. B. Curtin, and J. Dryden. A Survey of Missions for Unmanned Undersea Vehicles. 
Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2009. 64-65.
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Table 3.2: ONR Levels of Autonomy for UAVs
Fully Autonomous The system requires no human intervention to perform any of the designed activities across all planned ranges of environmental conditions.
Mixed Initiative
Both the human and the system can initiate behaviors based on sensed 
data. The system can coordinate its behavior with the human’s behaviors 
both explicitly and implicitly. The human can understand the behaviors of 
the system in the same way that he or she understands his or her own 
behaviors. A variety of means is provided to regulate the authority of the 
system with respect to human operators.
Human-Supervised
The system can perform a wide variety of activities once given top-level 
permissions or direction by a human. The system provides sufficient 
insight into its internal operations and behaviors that it can be understood 
by its human supervisor and appropriately redirected. The system cannot 
self-initiate behaviors that are not within the scope of its current directed 
tasks.
Human-Delegated
The system can perform limited control activity on a delegated basis. This 
level encompasses automatic flight controls, engine controls, and other 
low-level automation that must be activated or deactivated by a human 
and act in mutual exclusion with human operation.
Human-Assisted
The system can perform activities in parallel with human input, thereby 
augmenting the ability of the human to perform the desired activities. 
However, the system has no ability to act without accompanying human 
input.
Human-Operated
All activity within the system is the direct result of human-initiated 
control inputs. The system has no autonomous control of its environment, 
although it may be capable of information-only responses to sensed data.
The Control function takes user input, programming, and mission profile into account to 
select autonomy mode and adjusts configuration accordingly, which then has an effect on all 
other aspects of AUWS operations.
Figure 3.6 shows the functional decomposition of the final sub-function of C3, 
Communicate (Function 1.3.3), which consists of the receipt of communications (Function 
1.3.3.1) external to the system or external to the node, the distribution of that data (Function 
1.3.3.2) to appropriate systems or components and the transmission of data either externally 
(Function 1.3.3.3) or internally (Function 1.3.3.4). An important MOP for this sub-function is the 
average data message completion time (MCT), which is essentially the time it takes to 
communicate a message externally. 
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Figure 3.6: Communicate Functional Decomposition
3.1.2.4 Maneuver
Maneuverability for AUWS encompasses deployment, employment, and recovery. The 
system must be capable of being launched from a safe distance, deliver itself to the mission area, 
and relocate as necessary. Movement during operation may or may not be required. Due to the 
diminishing nature of the defense budget, AUWS should be reusable when feasible or 
expendable if unit cost can be held low enough. In order to be reusable AUWS must be 
recoverable by a surfaced or submerged platform operating in the area. The system should be 
able to return to a safe location for recovery when required by recovery platform. Expendable 
systems that cannot perform the recovery function are also considered.
Figure 3.7 shows the four sub-functions that describe AUWS’ ability to maneuver. 
AUWS should maneuver in a manner by which the system has the a functional capability to 
deploy (Function 1.4.1) either on its own or with the assistance of another asset, i.e. self- 
contained propulsion system for transit to operational area vice air drop over operational area. 
Further, the system, once in the operational area, should be able to conduct its patrol (Function 
1.4.2) in whatever mission profile it is assigned or whatever mission profile the systems deems 
appropriate based on situational awareness described by the Command function. AUWS should 
have a Navigate function (Function 1.4.3) that defines its ability to self-locate and move 
accordingly in support of mission accomplishment. Finally, AUWS should be capable of 
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recovery (Function 1.4.4) of some kind such that a field of undersea weapons is not left on 
station beyond the desired operational period. MOEs associated with the Maneuver function 
include the probability of surviving deployment and recovery, the capability to maneuver on 
patrol, and the capability for autonomous or semi-autonomous recovery.
Figure 3.7: Maneuver Functional Decomposition
Figure 3.8 shows the breakdown of the Deploy function. This function covers the 
deployment of AUWS from multiple platforms in support of the need for a non-platform centric 
design. While not specifying the specific mode of launch (torpedo tube launch, artillery launch, 
air drop, etc.), it is desirable that any physical architectures be designed to accommodate 
deployment from a submerged asset (Function 1.4.1.1), including submarines and/or UUVs, a 
majority of surface combatants (Function 1.4.1.2), airborne platforms (Function 1.4.1.3) capable 
of air drop, and shore installations (Function 1.4.1.4).
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Figure 3.8: Deploy Functional Decomposition
As shown in Figure 3.9, the Patrol function covers the maneuver capabilities required 
from the moment of deployment to the moment of recovery (or neutralization), covering inbound 
and outbound transit (Function 1.4.2.4) and operations while on station. Depending on physical 
architecture and mission profile, on station maneuver may include Loitering (Function 1.4.2.1), 
Roving (Function 1.4.2.2) and Sprinting (Function 1.4.2.3). Should the need arise, transit may 
also be required for relocating AUWS to new operating area, such as the entrance to a port.
Figure 3.9: Patrol Functional Decomposition
The Navigate function (Function 1.4.3) covers the specifics of the system’s navigational 
tasks so as to accomplish the other Maneuver sub-functions. From Figure 3.10, navigation 
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consists of determining self-location (Function 1.4.3.1), providing propulsion (Function 1.4.3.2), 
and steering (Function 1.4.3.3).
Figure 3.10: Navigate Functional Decomposition
The Recover function (Function 1.4.4) is defined by the system’s ability to cease 
operations as an active warfare system either by physical recovery or by self-neutralization. 
Figure 3.11 shows the use of submerged (Function 1.4.4.1) and surface (Function 1.4.4.2) assets 
to recover AUWS, or the use of a Scuttle function (Function 1.4.4.3) to self-neutralize.
Figure 3.11: Recover Functional Decomposition
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3.1.2.5 Perform ISR
One of the fundamental purposes of AUWS is the ability to provide timely, accurate 
situational awareness via a robust sensor suite. With the possibility of being placed in the world’s 
busiest ports or straits, AUWS must have the capacity to handle significant peak vessel traffic. 
AUWS must be able to correctly establish its environment, conduct searches, detect and identify 
threats from the entire operational picture, track those threats, and accurately classify targets. 
MOEs associated with ISR include: the probability of location accuracy; probabilities of correct 
target detection, recognition, prioritization, and classification; and the capability to develop 
situational intelligence. 
From Figure 3.12, the tactical picture is developed by the Search (Function 1.5.1), Detect 
(Function 1.5.2), Track (Function 1.5.3), and Classify (Function 1.5.4) functions, wherein every 
received sensor signature is analyzed for movement, localized, classified, and discriminated into 
environmental activity, organics, contacts, contacts of interest, and threats. The fifth and final 
function is Intelligence Collection (Function 1.5.5). Intelligence Collection is the means of 
collecting reconnaissance data beyond simple tactical positioning, consisting of acoustic 
intelligence (Function 1.5.5.1), communications intelligence (Function 1.5.5.2), signals 
intelligence (Function 1.5.5.3), electronic intelligence (Function 1.5.5.4), and electro-optical and 
infrared (EO/IR) data (Function 1.5.5.5). Fusing these sub-functions together, an accurate 
environmental status and tactical picture can be formed which will benefit AUWS operations as 
well as the Operational Commander’s overall situational awareness. An important MOP for ISR, 
which is used in modeling and simulation, is the proportion of detections to actual contacts 
present.
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Figure 3.12: Perform ISR Functional Decomposition
3.1.2.6 Prosecute
AUWS must harness the capability to engage or deter designated maritime targets in 
order to neutralize threat platform mission effectiveness. The success of AUWS lies in its ability 
to effectively employ force to deter, damage, or destroy a target of interest as designated by the 
user or system within a specific period of time. Neutralization occurs by means of kinetic assault. 
Such neutralization is limited by target survivability, which is a function of susceptibility, 
vulnerability, and recoverability. Deterrence, on the other hand, occurs through the use of decoys 
or simply as a by-product of system employment resulting in the adversary altering operations. 
A wide number of effectiveness measures can apply to AUWS prosecution. Much like a 
traditional mine field, the first engagement can cause a change in adversary operations, which 
significantly alters the initial probabilistic conditions. Therefore, an average or total number of 
threats killed over the entire mission duration is not necessarily indicative of true system 
performance. Occasionally, the probability of killing the first threat encountered or the expected 
number of kills for the first N threats are more appropriate MOEs. For the purposes of this 
analysis, the effectiveness of prosecution is measured by the proportion of threats killed to 
threats encountered on the first day of active engagement. To simplify the modeling and 
simulation effort, threat reaction to a successful prosecution is not modeled. Essentially, the 
model assumes that a few threat vessels will enter the operating area before they begin to take 
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evasive action. The reason for choosing this MOE is to give a common ground for comparison of 
all alternatives and to avoid yielding misleading results for systems that perform well initially but 
degrade quickly.
Figure 3.13 outlines the three primary types of engagement covered by the Prosecute 
function. Monitoring (Function 1.6.1) is the active, focused collection of data on a specific target 
for purposes of reconnaissance, early warning, or targeting. Deterrence (Function 1.6.2) is a 
functional description of a hold-at-risk or area-denial mission, wherein the perceived presence of 
AUWS will prevent free maneuver or local control of the seas for hostile contacts. The third and 
final sub-function engagement (Function 1.6.3) which is further delineated into the employment 
of non-lethal (Function 1.6.3.1) and lethal (Function 1.6.3.2) measures. In more specific terms, 
engagement can result in a mission kill by crippling critical threat systems (propulsion, weapons, 
damage control, etc.) or an asset kill (the sinking or destruction of the threat). The employment 
of non-lethal measures is particularly desirable for autonomous modes of operation because it 
mitigates risk. In other words, even if the probability of incorrect identifying a cruise liner as a 
threat is increased, the severity of the consequences is decreased dramatically.
Figure 3.13: Prosecute Functional Decomposition
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3.1.2.7 Provide OPSEC
Operational security includes the ability of the system to avoid detection by enemy 
sensors and, if detected, avoid capture and compromise. Detectable signals of interest include: 
acoustic emission, radio frequency (RF) emission, IR emission, visible contrast/reflectance, radar 
cross section (RCS), magnetic anomalies, and laser cross section. By minimizing these signals, 
AUWS can reduce observable signatures and thus operate more covertly. By changing 
operational modes (e.g. entering dormant mode) the system can minimize exploitation. If the risk 
factor to US vessels mitigates the feasibility of recovery or if AUWS falls into undesired hands, a 
self-neutralization feature will be triggered to ensure that sensitive hardware and software are not 
compromised.
Provide OPSEC is divided into two functions, detection avoidance (Function 1.7.1), and 
compromise avoidance (Function 1.7.2), as shown in Figure 3.14. MOEs associated with Provide 
OPSEC include the probability of detection avoidance and the capability to self-neutralize. 
Detection avoidance is further broken down into passive and active measures. The 
passive measure, Provide emissions control (EMCON) (Function 1.7.1.1), is the effective 
management of emissions in RF, satellite, and acoustic spectrums to prevent detection by enemy 
assets. The active measure, changing operational posture (Function 1.7.1.2), is the change of 
operational activity to prevent detection by enemy assets. 
In the event of successful detection and localization by enemy assets, the risk of 
compromise is minimized via evasive action (Function 1.7.2.1) including aggressive, radical 
maneuver and bottoming techniques, or the use of self-neutralization (Function 1.7.2.2), wherein 
onboard data is deleted, internal systems are destroyed, and the unit itself is scuttled in such a 
way that if debris is recovered, it will be devoid of any value to enemy assets. This sub-function 
is considered separate from the Scuttle function (Function 1.4.4.3) because it is performed in 
response to different stimuli. AUWS is scuttled when recovery is infeasible due to damage, 
power available, etc. whereas the system self-neutralizes when there is an imminent risk of 
compromise by the enemy. 
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Figure 3.14: Provide OPSEC Functional Decomposition
3.1.3 Functional Flow
From the complete functional decomposition described in the previous section, a 
functional flow can be developed for each tier of the overall hierarchy. For a full review of the 
functional flow block diagrams (FFBD) and other diagrams associated with Functional Analysis, 
refer to Appendix D. Figure 3.15 shows the top level FFBD for AUWS. Viewing the flow of 
functions from left to right, it is apparent that any physical architecture must provide structure 
(Function 1.1) and power (Function 1.2) before any other functions may be addressed. From 
there, the remaining functions that define the actions undertaken by AUWS are performed in 
tandem, as signified by the AND logic. Only when Functions 1.3/4/5/6/7 are complete can the 
flow continue to the end of the process and outputs be produced.
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Figure 3.15: AUWS Functional Flow Block Diagram
Analyzing the functional flow from a higher level of abstraction leads to an input/output 
model for AUWS, as shown in Figure 3.16. This model considers not only the controllable inputs 
and intended outputs as discussed in functional decomposition, but also the uncontrollable inputs 
and unintended outputs (by-products) that may impact the system. The purpose of developing an 
input/output model is to give insight into which functions should be considered critical and how 
they might be allocated to physical elements.
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Figure 3.16: AUWS Input/Output Model
3.2 Functional Allocation
In an effort to ensure traceability from the physical architecture of AUWS to functional 
analysis, the primary functions are re-examined to determine which would have the most direct 
impact on the physical architecture. Tracing back to the original tasking document, it is obvious 
that providing an operational picture and engaging the enemy are of immediate interest. In order 
to accomplish this primary tasking, AUWS must be able to detect, communicate, and prosecute. 
The intended outputs from the I/O model validate these requirements. All of the intended outputs 
are directly related to these critical functions. Therefore, sensors, communicators, and 
weapons are deemed critical elements. 
Other top level functions certainly have an impact on physical architecture, but they do 
not necessitate additional elements. For example, mobility can be addressed as a characteristic 
for a sensor, communicator, or weapon to satisfy maneuverability needs, but a separate vehicle 
need not be added to the system. Even if one considers the sub-system level, where some 
physical element must exist to provide propulsion, maneuverability is not required by initial 
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tasking. Only critical functions (and therefore critical elements) are considered mandatory. Non-
critical functions are evaluated as part of trade space, so alternatives that do not perform some of 
these functions are considered.
Power generation is the lone exception in that it is a mandatory function that does 
require a physical element, such as a battery or an engine. Any power generating element, 
however, would only serve to support the critical elements in conducting their mission. In other 
words, an underwater diesel engine alone does not address any aspects of the AUWS problem 
statement or initial tasking. Providing enough power to sustain long term operations is 
recognized as one of the toughest technological challenges in the development of AUWS; 
however, the intent here is not to focus on the power issue at the expense of valuable operational 
analysis. System concepts are analyzed on the basis of power consumption and the capacity to 
store energy. It is assumed that all concepts will have equal access to the most beneficial 
technologies. Promising power generation technologies are researched and discussed separately.
3.2.1 Alternative Generation
Even after limiting the physical architecture to weapons, sensors, and communicators, 
there are still countless alternatives to be considered for AUWS. In order to establish a 
foundation for the alternative generation process, a dendritic model is used that enumerates 
different types of sensors, communicators, and weapons. The original dendritic model is then 
reduced by eliminating infeasible or low-potential branches and making some operational 
assumptions. The reduced model is used to generate preliminary concepts for physical 
architectures. From these preliminary concepts, four are selected for further analysis using a 
scoring and screening process. Design of Experiments is utilized to ensure the concepts 
effectively cover the design space and to validate the alternative generation process.
The original dendritic model is shown in Figure 3.17. Included in this model is any 
element type that could feasibly have utility for AUWS, based on research, operational 
experience, and first principles. It is apparent that two separate communicators are necessary to 
meet AUWS requirements, internal and external, and that multiple variations may be suitable for 
each. Internal communications would be short range between AUWS elements while external 
communications would be long range between AUWS and a command center or monitoring 
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asset. If AUWS contains one type of sensor, internal communicator, external communicator, and 
weapon, this model produces 3,136 possible architectures. If, however, AUWS contains one or 
more of each element, which is typical for redundancy or reliability purposes, over 1 billion45 
possibilities exist!
45 This number is based on 7 sensors, 8 internal communicators, 8 external communicators, and 7 weapons; using 
one or more of each element. Combinations Possible=27∗28∗28∗27
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Figure 3.17: Original Dendritic Model
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This model produces an unmanageable number of possible architectures. To aid 
elimination of infeasible or less promising options, the project team held an AUWS Warfare 
Innovation Workshop in December 2010. The workshop brought together NPS students from 
various nations and curricula, shown in Figure 3.18, for a week of innovation and generation of 
potential AUWS concepts and was vital to improving the original dendritic model. Several 
element types emerged as highly promising from the results of the workshop and were reinforced 
by independent research. It was also apparent that others were infeasible due to technological 
constraints or simply not meeting mission requirements. The most promising element types are 
included in the reduced dendritic model, shown in Figure 3.19. For a detailed review of the more 
promising technologies considered, refer to Appendix E.
Figure 3.18: Participants of AUWS Warfare Innovation Workshop
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Figure 3.19: Reduced Dendritic Model
From this reduced model, there remain 32,76846 possible architectures (assuming one or 
more of each element). In order to further reduce this number, several assumptions are made 
regarding the operation of AUWS, based on previous research and analysis.
• Sensors: It is common for EO and IR sensors to be combined together in a single unit, so 
they are regarded as a single element type. Furthermore, EO/IR sensors would not be 
ideally suited for underwater detection, so the only two possibilities considered are 
passive acoustic sensors with and without EO/IR sensors. 
46 This number is based on 3 sensors, 4 internal communicators, 4 external communicators, and 4 weapons; using 
one or more of each element. Combinations Possible=23∗24∗24∗24
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• Internal Communicators: Physical messenger vehicles and RF communications are 
deemed infeasible for the purposes of communicating between AUWS elements, either 
due to time and power constraints or due to excessive exposure on the sea surface (i.e. 
AUWS elements would frequently need to surface to communicate with each other via 
RF due to its high attenuation in seawater).
• External Communicators: Digital acoustic communication and fiber optic cables are 
deemed infeasible for the purposes of communicating to an external network. Acoustic 
modems need significant technological advancement before they can communicate 
effectively at such long ranges and the large sound signature represents an OPSEC risk. 
For the various areas in which AUWS may be required to operate, deployment of 
hundreds of miles of fiber optic cable creates logistical requirements that outweigh the 
benefits of using AUWS in the first place. Physical messenger vehicles are only 
considered as a backup to RF communications.
• Weapons: Each potential architecture is limited to only one type of weapon. Redundancy 
and reliability could be achieved by distributing several of the same weapon type 
throughout the system. This method permits all four feasible weapons to be evaluated 
evenly and a decision whether to combine weapon types made. The Analysis of 
Alternatives includes a discussion regarding combination of weapons.
3.2.2 Preliminary Concept Development
With these assumptions in place, only 48 combinations are possible. Of these 48 potential 
physical architectures, seven preliminary concepts are developed. The goal in developing these 
concepts is to make them as disjoint as possible, thereby minimizing redundancy. The seven 
preliminary concepts developed are listed below.
• Alternative 1: This alternative consists of twin UUVs modeled after Mk48 ADCAP 
torpedoes. Units would be deployed from manned assets and then transit to the 
operational area. Once in the operational area the communications/ISR UUV would 
proceed with dispensing a network of sensor nodes from an internal storage bay. Once the 
network had been laid the unit would anchor to the sea floor and deploy a tethered RF 
communications and EO/IR sensor buoy, a cylindrical broadband sonar array, a 
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narrowband sonar strand array, and a recharging unit. The second UUV would deploy to 
the operational area and serve as a prosecution unit with onboard sub-munitions, such as 
lightweight torpedoes, which would either be distributed for later launch or launched via 
the primary unit. Additional variants could utilize onboard miniature UUVS to conduct 
ISR or larger warheads to function as self-guided torpedoes.
• Alternative 2: This alternative consists of a series of small, expendable devices that 
would serve as intelligence-collection, weapons, or communications nodes in a physically 
connected network that would cover a chokepoint in a surveillance net that would retain 
prosecution capability. Acoustic sensors and communicators are used within the network, 
and RF communications are used to exfiltrate data to a command center. Embedded 
warheads inside weapon nodes provide prosecution capability.
• Alternative 3: This alternative is a distributed network of identical weaponized acoustic 
sensor/communications nodes working in conjunction with a central gateway node. The 
basic unit is a small, non-recoverable node that would anchor to the sea floor. The 
gateway node would receive information from the local network and transmit externally 
via a RF communications buoy. Limpet explosives contained within the nodes would 
electro-magnetically attach to passing ships. These attached explosives are used to either 
destroy or deter passing craft by detonating on command via small communications 
receivers. By deactivating the ordnance, the system could mitigate the risk of collateral 
damage.
• Alternative 4: This alternative consists of a large diameter UUV teamed with torpedo-
sized or smaller UUVs working together to collect intelligence and engage targets as 
needed. The larger size of the main unit would theoretically allow longer endurance and 
possible recharge capability while the smaller units would allow greater mobility. The 
smaller UUVs would establish a surveillance network via acoustic sensing and 
communications. They would prosecute targets by affixing limpet explosives to the hull. 
The main unit would serve as the gateway with a tethered RF communications antenna. 
• Alternative 5: This alternative is an adaptation of Alternative 1 with a smaller form 
factor. This concept would utilize UUVs about the size of Mk-46 torpedoes in order to 
facilitate airborne delivery. Instead of lightweight torpedoes, this concept would utilize 
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mini torpedoes, such as the Compact Rapid Attack Weapon (CRAW), for prosecution. 
Additionally, this concept streamlines the number of variants in order to ensure capability 
among several Navy platforms while reducing overall costs. The implication is that this 
Alternative would necessitate more units than Alternative 1 to cover the same area.
• Alternative 6: This alternative consists of a large UUV that would deploy pairs of ocean 
floor sensor/communications nodes connected by fiber optic cables. Communications 
nodes would have acoustic modems for communicating between pairs. The UUV would 
deploy tethered a communications buoy that would provide surface ISR capability and 
serve as a communication gateway. The UUV would provide prosecution capability with 
externally mounted lightweight torpedoes. The UUV would be capable of self extraction 
and physically carrying information back to a command ship. 
• Alternative 7: This alternative consists of a lightweight torpedo-sized UUV that would 
utilize undersea glider technology to patrol an area converting vertical into horizontal 
motion so as to minimize power draw and thereby increase endurance. The glider, while 
surfaced, would provide ISR and communications capability. Gliders would also utilize 
acoustic sensors and communications among each other. Prosecution would be 
accomplished by strategic positioning of gliders and detonation of an embedded warhead. 
Essentially, this concept is a homogeneous network of gliders with self contained sensors, 
communicators, and weapons.
3.2.3 Concept Narrowing
A scoring and screening process is used to reduce the set of alternatives down to a 
number that facilitates full system modeling and simulation for each concept. The goal is to 
select three to four concepts to model and analyze in detail. 
3.2.3.1 Criteria
The functions and associated need areas for AUWS are used as criteria for narrowing of 
available concepts. Below are the judging criteria, as based on requirements and functional 
decomposition.
Power: This criterion is a representation of operational endurance in days, in available 
energy, energy consumption, and ability to operate independently of a manned asset. Those 
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systems with larger energy storage capacity coupled with energy efficient processes and recharge 
capability score higher marks than those systems without.
C3: This criterion is a representation of varying levels of autonomy, and is graded as the 
ability to provide both man-in-the-loop and autonomous operation. Systems with more onboard 
processing power balanced by more opportunities for human interface receive higher marks than 
simpler devices with no human input opportunities.
ISR: This criterion is a representation of the ability of a system to provide near-real time, 
accurate situational awareness via multiple sensor suites. Systems with broader range per 
deployed mission package and more robust sensor suites receive higher marks than those with a 
more limited range or less sensor redundancy.
Prosecution: This criterion represents the ability of the system to effectively bring force 
to deter, damage, or destroy a target of interest as designated by the user or system within a 
specific period of time. More versatile mission packages with larger overall explosive yield that 
could be employed rapidly receive high marks. Mission packages with limited maneuver 
capability and less overall firepower receive lower marks.
OPSEC: This criterion is a representation of the ability of the system to avoid detection 
by enemy sensors and, if detected, avoid capture and compromise. Systems with the ability to 
change operating modes or reduce observables receive higher marks than those that have more 
exploitable signatures or that cannot as readily evade or self-neutralize.
Maneuver: This criterion is a representation of the deployability, recoverability, and 
maneuverability of the system, or whether or not the system can be launched from a safe 
distance, deliver itself to the mission area, relocate if required, and return to a safe location for 
recovery as needed. Systems capable of launching from air, surface, and subsurface platforms at 
safe distances and then reposition as needed receive higher marks than close-range distributed 
network systems that have no organic propulsion capability.
Structure: This criterion is included as part of the eight defining top level functions of 
AUWS, and is representative of the reliability, survivability, susceptibility, maintainability, 
availability, etc. of the individual system. As the concepts are academic constructs of the system, 
and all unfeasible architectures are removed from contention, this criterion results in no 
discernible variation among the proposed systems.
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Cost-Effectiveness: This criterion is included due to the inherent need for any new 
system to be affordable and cost-effective. Prior to a thorough cost analysis and without existing 
systems to consider, the task of estimating costs is extremely challenging. Rough differences in 
order of magnitude are considered (e.g. cost of a heavyweight torpedo vs. cost of a series of 
nodes similar to those in development today) based on the team’s existing knowledge and 
experience. However, no fine differentiations are made outside of system size and complexity. 
This process serves as the foundation for an in depth cost analysis for the selected concepts.
Table 3.3 shows the matrix that is utilized to compare, contrast, and select viable and 
desirable alternatives. Alternative 1 is chosen as a reference arbitrarily. It receives all “0”s to 
show that it is the baseline for analysis. For other alternatives, a “+” means that, for a given 
category, that alternative has more desirable traits than Alternative 1. A “0” means that no real 
differentiation between the capability of the alternative and Alternative 1 exists. A “-” means that 
one or more traits of the alternative in question are noticeably less desirable than Alternative 1 in 
that category. Summing the scores such that a “+” rewards one point, a “-“ deducts one point, 
and a “0” results in no points rewarded or deducted, a cumulative score is determined.
Table 3.3: Scoring Matrix
Function Alt. 1 Alt. 2 Alt. 3 Alt. 4 Alt. 5 Alt. 6 Alt. 7
Power 0 - + - + - +
C3 0 - - - 0 0 -
ISR 0 0 - 0 0 + 0
Prosecute 0 - + 0 0 0 -
OPSEC 0 - - - 0 0 -
Maneuver 0 - - - + - 0
Structure 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cost-Effectiveness 0 0 + - 0 0 +
Score 0 -5 -1 -5 +2 -1 -1
3.2.3.2 Results
From Table 3.3, it is shown that Alternatives 1 and 5 receive the highest marks, while 
Alternatives 3, 6, and 7 tie for third place. Alternatives 2 and 4 are discarded due to low scores. 
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Upon further analysis, Alternatives 1 and 5 are combined into the single Alternative 5, since 
physical size is the only significant difference between the two alternatives, and a lightweight 
torpedo is utilized by other concepts. For ease of reference, the selected alternatives (3, 5, 6, and 
7) are given the following designators:
• Alternative 3. SQUID: named for its prosecution method, which was inspired by the 
way a squid attacks its prey.
• Alternative 5. V-CAP (Variable CAPability): named for its ability to be configured for 
sensing/communication or prosecution capabilities within the same form factor.
• Alternative 6. LD-UUV: named for the large diameter UUV that comprises the main 
body of the system.
• Alternative 7. GLIDER: named for the gliding UUVs that comprise the network.
3.2.4 Design of Experiments
Even within a single combination of physical element types, there exist many possible 
system architectures. For example, the physical elements could be mobile or fixed, large or 
small, centralized or distributed, etc. Each of the selected alternatives has its own associated 
system architecture and it is important to determine if the four concepts represent a good sample 
of possible architectures. Using a Design of Experiments (DOE) approach enables a panoramic 
view of all possible architectures. The goal is to see if the selected alternatives fall within the 
same region of the design space, indicating redundancy, or if a large portion of the design space 
is not represented. 
The design space is composed of three factors, weapons, sensors, and communicators, 
each set at various levels. The characteristics for which levels are varied are shown in Table 3.4. 
From the first four characteristics alone, there are 16 possible levels for each factor. The last 
characteristic, configuration, is unique because the level of one factor affects another factor. For 
example, a sensor combined with a communicator limits the configuration possibilities of the 
communicator. Elements can be separate, combined with each of the other two, or all three can 
be combined, resulting in four possible configuration levels. The first 16 levels for each element 
are assumed to be separate, so 3 levels are added for a total of 19. Figure 3.20 graphically 
illustrates the overall design space for AUWS. 
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Table 3.4: Various Levels Considered 
for AUWS Factors






Figure 3.20: AUWS Design Space
From this design space, there are slightly less than 6,859 possible system architectures 
since some factor-level combinations are infeasible (e.g. a fixed sensor cannot be combined with 
a mobile communicator). Figure 3.21 shows a random sample of possible system architectures 
(S: Sensor; C: Comms; W: Weapon).
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Figure 3.21: Sampling of Possible AUWS System Architectures47
As modeled, the four selected alternatives effectively cover the design space; however, 
changes were made to the LD-UUV system based on the DOE process. Initial concepts for this 
alternative involved a swarm of smaller UUVs working in concert with a seabed sensor network. 
A quantitative look at the four selected system architectures revealed that the “swarm” concept 
was covered in many aspects by both Glider and Squid. Furthermore, mini-torpedoes were 
already used by V-CAP, while none of the alternatives used a weapon even as large as a 
lightweight torpedo. Consequently, the UUV and the weapon for this alternative were both 
enlarged in order to examine a previously neglected system architecture.
DOE is used here as a validation tool and not in the traditional way as a means of 
identifying the ideal system architecture. It is shown, however, that the concepts are modular 
47 Osmundson, John. Combination Diagrams. Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School.
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enough that the most beneficial aspects of each can be effectively integrated into a hybrid 
concept. Employing the best levels for each factor increases confidence that an ideal system 
architecture is achieved; however, a full factorial or fractional factorial experiment is 
recommended to verify these results.
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4. Overview of Selected Concepts
A detailed description of the four AUWS concepts, Squid, V-CAP, LD-UUV, and 
Glider, selected from the Alternative Generation process is given here to clarify not only the 
physical design of the concepts, but also how they accomplish the AUWS mission. Specific 
technologies for subsystems are mentioned to illustrate what is currently possible; however, a 
detailed design of system and subsystem components is reserved for further analysis. All 
performance parameters are based on unclassified and non-proprietary estimates from currently 
viable technologies. 
The concepts are defined in detail for the purpose of supporting an Analysis of 
Alternatives, therefore all four concepts are assumed to have equal access to the most promising 
technologies as they emerge. In this way, the concepts are evaluated based on their critical 
elements, system architectures, and operational concepts. 
4.1 Squid
The Squid system, as shown in Figure 4.1, consists of a network of individual nodes with 
deployable directed energy (DE) munitions acting as a limpet explosive via electro-
magnetization (EM). The main objectives of the system are to establish a meshed network of 
interconnecting nodes for ISR purposes as well as the formation of a prosecution field to engage 
identified hostile targets. 
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Figure 4.1: Notional Squid Field
4.1.1 Physical Description
The SQUID system consists of two types of nodes to be deployed: Weapons Nodes and 
Comms Nodes. The purpose of the Weapon Nodes is to deter, overwhelm, and engage identified 
hostile targets by deploying their DE munitions while the purpose of the Comms Nodes is to 
relay and transmit information collected back to the command center. Thus, the design for the 
two nodes differs due to their intended purposes as shown in Figure 4.2 (not drawn to scale).
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Figure 4.2: Squid Nodes
The Squid Nodes consist of a power unit, central processing unit (CPU), sensor and 
communication unit and an anchorage unit. The major difference between the two nodes is the 
addition of six 1kg shaped charges for engagement purposes on the Weapons Nodes and an 
additional RF buoy for external communications on the Comms Nodes.
As a reference, an artillery shell, such as the Long Range Land Attack Projectile 
(LRLAP) shown in Figure 4.3, would notionally be able to contain three Weapons Nodes. The 88 
inch projectile provides sufficient space and can be launched up to 74 NM from the Zumwalt 
Class Advanced Gun System, providing a viable means of deployment.48 The RF buoy and 
tethering cable for the Comms Node necessitate a larger size and therefore a separate means of 
deployment, such as air drop.
48 Lockheed Martin Corporation. "Long Range Land Attack Projectile (LRLAP)." 2009. LockheedMartin.com. 4 
May 2011.
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Figure 4.3: 155mm Long Range Land Attack Projectile49
4.1.2 Functional Description
• Power: Power consuming entities in the Squid Nodes include the on-board CPU, acoustic 
sensor, acoustic modem, RF communications, mini-servo motors for cable releasing and 
retrieving, electro-magnets and the electric detonators for the shaped charge. Power for 
each node is provided via two sources: lithium ion battery for C3 and ISR requirements 
and ultra-capacitors for additional power required during engagement. Figure 4.4 
illustrates the tradeoff between power and energy density for batteries and ultra-
capacitors. Batteries store large amounts of energy but offer low power output compared 
to ultra-capacitors, which can provide higher power output for short periods of time.




Figure 4.4: Ragone Plot of Electrochemical Devices50
• Propulsion: Not applicable. 
• Weapons: During engagement, the activated attack nodes release their magnetized DE 
munitions to float toward the surface in order to adhere to the metal hulls of the passing 
targets. Since magnetic force rapidly decreases in strength as distance increases, the 
effective range of the weapon is essentially limited by the trajectory of the explosive as it 
floats upward.
◦ Max Effective Range: 50 yards
◦ Explosive Size: 1 kg (shaped charge)
• C3: Internal communication between nodes within the system is accomplished via 
acoustic modem. The various nodes deployed to form the network act as relay nodes to 
transmit and transfer information collected to the Comms Node, usually one or a few, for 
further transmission to the Command Center to contribute to the common operational 
picture (COP). The system CPU is contained in the Comms Node for Command and 
50 Woodbank Communications Ltd. "Battery Performance Characteristics - How to specify and test a battery." 
2005. mpoweruk.com. 3 May 2011. <http://www.mpoweruk.com/performance.htm>.
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Control when operating autonomously. Each node determines the shortest path to the 
Comms Node(s). The data rate limitations on acoustic communication dictate that all 
nodes possess some signal processing capabilities to avoid sending raw acoustic data.51 
Performance parameters are referenced to the baseline performance of the AquaComm® 
Underwater Wireless Modem, an analogous system developed by DSPComm. External 
communication is accomplished via surface RF antenna tethered to the Comms Node(s). 
◦ Acoustic Comms Range: 0.8 NM (50% baseline due to size constraints)52
◦ Acoustic Data Rate: 1 KB/min53
◦ RF Comms Range: Line of Sight (may require airborne relay)
• ISR: ISR is achieved through detection of acoustic signals, such as a ship’s fuel systems 
or rotating machinery. Squid Nodes utilize hydrophones similar to those found in 
sonobuoys and other unattended acoustic sensors. A back-of-the-envelope (BOE) 
calculation, shown in Appendix F, leads to a conservative estimate of maximum detection 
range compared to current systems.
◦ Max Detection Range: 1.35 NM (50% baseline due to size constraints)
◦ Max Track Load: 5 per node
◦ Track Time Required for Contact Report: 1 min
• OPSEC: Squid consists mainly of low technology components, therefore the impacts of 
losses to the enemy are mitigated in system design. Due to the relatively small size as 
well as the nature of the operation of the Squid system, exploitation of the Squid Nodes 
underwater would also be difficult. Comms Nodes are the only elements that contain 
valuable information for the enemy, and Weapons Nodes can defend them from 
approaching threats.
4.1.3 Deployment
Weapons Nodes are primarily deployed via aerial insertion. Naval artillery, as shown in 
Figure 4.5, cruise missiles, and aircraft are all viable means of delivery. Weapons Nodes are 
51 This premise holds true for all four concepts.




distributed somewhat randomly throughout the AOR, depending on accuracy of deployment. For 
the purposes of this analysis, artillery launch is considered surface deployment. Over-the-side 
surface deployment, however, is considered risk prohibitive because it would create an overt 
naval presence in the AOR for an extended period of time. Capacity and covertness constraints 
result in very little added value for submarine deployment. Comms Nodes are deployed 
separately, surface, subsurface, or aircraft delivery, and placed strategically to optimize 
communication networks. For example, one Comms Node would be placed in the center of the 
AOR or two would be placed in the center of two halves of the AOR.
Figure 4.5: DDG-1000 Advanced Gun System54
After settling to the seabed, both Weapons and Comms Nodes must anchor to prevent 
drifting and ensure the communications network and prosecution field remain robust. Their small 
size and deployment concept prohibit the use of heavy weights. Effective anchoring can be 
achieved by mimicking marine life. RoboClam® Anchoring Technology, developed by Bluefin 
Robotics, utilizes the kinematics of the Atlantic razor clam to provide 3000 lbs of holding force 
54 Bacon, Lance. "The Scoop Deck - Advanced Gun System hits milestone." 28 May 2010. MilitaryTimes.com. 2 
May 2011. <http://militarytimes.com/blogs/scoopdeck/2010/05/28/advanced-gun-system-hits-milestone/>.
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in an eight inch long anchor, expending roughly one third the energy in one AA battery.55 
RoboClam® burrows into the seabed with alternating vertical motion, which fluidizes the soil, as 
illustrated in Figure 4.6. 
Figure 4.6: RoboClam® Digging Kinematics and Soil Fluidization56
4.1.4 Operational Employment
Once on station, Weapons Nodes establish communications with their nearest neighbor 
nodes and determine the shortest path to the nearest Comms Node. If a Weapons Node lands too 
far from any nearest neighbor it is not able to communicate with a Comms Node and therefore it 
is not considered part of the overall system. Weapons Nodes transmit and relay all contact reports 
to the nearest Comms Node, which either communicates externally or decides system response, 
depending on the level of autonomy. If an engagement is ordered, Weapons Nodes in the path of 
the threat release their limpet explosives, which float upward and attach magnetically to the 
ship’s hull. The explosives can be detonated based on contact, timer, or pre-programmed acoustic 
signal to give more flexibility to the operational commander.
4.1.5 Recovery
Squid is not intended to be recovered. The large number of nodes required for effective 
employment and lack of mobility of the system make recovery impractical. Squid is intended 
55 Bluefin Robotics. RoboClam Anchoring Technology. Boston: Bluefin Robotics, 2011.
56 Bluefin Robotics 1.
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instead to be expendable and cost-effective by maintaining a low unit cost. Weapons and Comms 
Nodes scuttle themselves based on a predetermined timer or acoustic signal. 
4.2 V-CAP (Variable CAPability)
The V-CAP system consists of twin UUVs, Hunter and Killer, modeled as a hybrid of 
heavyweight and lightweight torpedoes. The units are designed to be deployed from multiple 
platforms such as submarines, surface ships, aircraft and unmanned systems. Upon launch, the 
units transit on a pre-programmed route and speed to the AOR, providing a safe standoff range 
for the deploying platform. V-CAP conducts ISR via a self deployed distributed network and 
conducts prosecution via encapsulated torpedoes, similar to the concept of a CAPTOR Mine.
4.2.1 Physical Description
V-CAP Hunter and Killer Units are 21 inches in diameter, based roughly on the shape of 
a Mk-48 torpedo.57 The units are modular, allowing for lengths between 12 and 19 feet 
depending on mission requirements. As shown in Figure 4.7, the units are designed to be 
externally identical for ease of deployment, recovery, maintenance, and storage. The Hunter Unit 
consists of energy storage, propulsion, CPU, sensor payload, and a tethered communication 
buoy. When anchored vertically, the modules are laid out in the water column along a central 
tether, with the communications buoy on the surface. The Killer Unit houses two miniature 
torpedoes, and power, propulsion, and navigation equipment.
57 IHS Global Limited. "Mk 48 ADCAP." 27 July 2010. Janes.com. 3 May 2011. 
<http://search.janes.com.libproxy.nps.edu/Search/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/yb/juws
/juws0501.htm@current&pageSelected=allJanes&keyword=Mk 48 torpedo&backPath=  http://  
search.janes.com/  Search&Prod_Name=JUWS&  >.
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Figure 4.7: V-CAP Hunter (left) and Killer (right)
4.2.2 Functional Description
• Power: V-CAP adopts a hybrid system for power, utilizing chemical fuel for ingress and 
egress while utilizing batteries to power all other electronic devices. Solid state chemical 
fuels, such as OTTO Fuel II mono-propellant, offer high energy densities without the 
need for an oxidant and have proven reliable for underwater propulsion.58 Batteries offer 
rapidly improving energy densities and enable a recharge capability. A potentially viable, 
albeit immature, technology is power generation through wave or current motion, which 
58 Copperhead Chemical Company. "OTTO Fuel II." January 2006. CopperheadChemical.com. 3 May 2011. 
<http://www.copperheadchemical.com/Defense/OTTOFuelII_0106.pdf>.
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could be employed as a module in the Hunter Unit. This technology could prolong on-
station time, but not indefinitely. 
• Propulsion: The propulsion system of V-CAP is modeled after the Mk-46 torpedo. It 
similarly uses a two speed reciprocating external combustion engine using OTTO Fuel II 
to power its propeller and drive it through the water on ingress and egress. V-CAP transits 
at lower speeds than the Mk-46,59 reducing drag and power required. The propulsion 
system and fuel storage, however, must occupy a much smaller portion of the overall 
vehicle. A detailed calculation of maximum range (assuming zero on-station time) based 
on these considerations can be found in Appendix F.
◦ Max Speed: 20 kts
◦ Max Range: 221 NM (@ 5 kts)
• Weapons: The V-CAP Killer Unit utilizes miniature, or very lightweight, torpedoes for 
prosecution of threats. Using the Compact Rapid Attack Weapon (CRAW) as a guide, the 
unit can easily hold two of the 6.75 inch diameter weapons.60 Further miniaturization of 
the V-CAP weapon may be needed to accommodate other systems contained within the 
Killer Unit when it is configured for airborne deployment (shorter length). Therefore, 
range and warhead size are conservatively estimated. The miniature torpedoes are 
intended to conduct mission kills by homing on threat vessel propulsion systems.
◦ Max Range: 3000 yds61
◦ Warhead Size: 20 kg
• C3: Internal communications between sensor nodes, Hunter Units, and Killer Units are 
accomplished via acoustic modem. Sensor nodes transmit and relay all messages 
indiscriminately to the Hunter Unit. External communication is accomplished via 
tethered RF antenna that is deployed to the surface from the Hunter Unit nose cone. 
When operating autonomously, Command and Control is performed by the Hunter Unit 
CPU, which sends engagement orders to Killer Units. 




60 McMullen, Teresa. Compact Rapid Attack Weapon (CRAW). Arlington: 2009.
61 McMullen 12.
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◦ Acoustic Comms Range: 1.6 NM (baseline)62
◦ Acoustic Data Rate: 1 KB/min63
◦ RF Comms Range: Line of Sight (may require airborne relay)
• ISR: ISR is achieved primarily through acoustic detection by deployed sensor nodes and 
the Hunter Unit. Sensor nodes each contain a hydrophone while the Hunter Unit utilizes a 
vertical hydrophone array. The Hunter Unit also uses an EO/IR sensor located with the 
communication buoy for visual detection and target confirmation.
◦ Max Detection Range: 2.7 NM (baseline, refer to Appendix F)
◦ Max Track Load: 5 per node
◦ Track Time Required for Contact Report: 1 min
• OPSEC: For OPSEC concerns, all communications are encrypted and both Hunter and 
Killer Units are designed to be tamper-proof and contain self-destruct mechanisms that 
can destroy sensitive information stored within the units.
4.2.3 Deployment
V-CAP is designed to be deployed from multiple platforms, such as submarines via 
torpedo tubes as shown in Figure 4.8. Prior to deployment, the intended ingress and egress routes 
as well as the designated buoy release points and the unit anchor point must be preloaded within 
the units as they are not capable of communicating with the deploying unit during transit.




Figure 4.8: Submarine Launch of V-CAP
4.2.4 Operational Employment
Upon reaching its AOR, the Hunter Unit proceeds with dispensing a network of sensor 
nodes from an internal storage bay, as shown in Figure 4.9.
Figure 4.9: Deployment of V-CAP Sensor Nodes
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Once the network has been laid, the Hunter Unit proceeds to its pre-determined anchor 
point where it anchors itself in a vertical configuration with its tail end on the seabed, the mid-
section floating about 50 yards above the tail, and the nose section floating on the ocean surface. 
All sections are tethered together. The Hunter Unit acts as a central processing node and it 
receives sonar information from the sensor nodes and processes the information in tandem with 
the information its own sonar system collects. Unless operating autonomously, any potential 
target identified is relayed back to a command center where a human operator serves as a man-
in-the-loop to verify and issue the engagement order.
The Killer Unit deploys simultaneously to the AOR and serves as a prosecution unit. The 
unit operates by swimming into the AOR, anchoring itself within communications range of the 
Hunter Unit and awaiting an engagement order and targeting information, as shown in Figure 
4.10. V-CAP mini torpedoes are equipped with self guidance sonar seeker heads that guide the 
torpedoes to the target. Depending on the mission and AOR, multiple Hunter and/or Killer Units 
may be employed in coordination.
Figure 4.10: V-CAP Operation and Engagement
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4.2.5 Recovery
Both Hunter and Killer Units are designed to be recoverable by surface and subsurface 
assets. Upon completion of its mission the Hunter Unit collapses via tethered line back into 
torpedo form, then each unit un-anchors from the seabed and proceeds on its planned egress 
route. Egress routes can be updated and transmitted to the UUV units while they are still 
deployed should the need for a new recovery point arise. Upon arrival at the designated recovery 
point, both units can float to the surface or navigate into open submarine torpedo tubes. All 
unexploded ordnance must be jettisoned before recovering the Killer Unit. 
4.3 Large Diameter UUV (LD-UUV)
The AUWS LD-UUV concept is an extension of Navy and industry LD-UUV research 
and experimentation currently being conducted. This concept integrates the vehicle with an 
intelligent, distributed sensor network and lightweight torpedoes. Rather than focusing on a 
modular UUV capable of delivering a multitude of materiel (munitions, sensors, etc.), the AUWS 
LD-UUV concept focuses efforts on being an armed, networked ISR and prosecution asset. 
4.3.1 Physical Description
The vehicle itself, as shown in Figure 4.11, is based loosely on the Large Diameter, Long 
Duration (L2D2) UUV currently being developed by Naval Surface Warfare Center, Panama 
City Division. L2D2 is 254 inches long and 59 inches in diameter.64 The AUWS LD-UUV is 
larger to make use of the 87.5 inch diameter (and at least 18 feet long)65 Multiple All-up-round 
Canisters (MAC) employed on SSGNs and Virginia Payload Tubes (VPT) on Virginia Class 
SSNs.66 LD-UUV carries eight pairs of intelligent sensors nodes, connected by 1000 yards of 
fiber optic cable, to be delivered within the AOR. The LD-UUV can carry up to four lightweight 
torpedoes internally. In equipment bays not occupied by sensor nodes, removable battery 
extension packs can be installed to enhance the permanent onboard power supply.
64 Dudinsky, John. L2D2: Large Diameter Long Duration UUV. Panama City: 2011.
65 MACs are known to carry the Tomahawk missile, which is 18 feet long in its shortest variant.
66 Pike, John. "SSN-774 Virginia-class NSSN New Attack Submarine." 5 Sept. 2008. GlobalSecurity.org. 1 May 
2011. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/ssn-774-spiral-2.htm>.
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Figure 4.11: AUWS Large Diameter UUV
4.3.2 Functional Description
• Power: LD-UUV is powered by lithium ion, lithium polymer, or next generation 
batteries. The energy storage system is modular to allow for more batteries if the payload 
space is available. Power and energy requirements are recognized as a significant 
technical challenge for UUVs; however, the large size of LD-UUV should allow for 
sufficient energy storage space to provide necessary power.
• Propulsion: For propulsion, the LD-UUV makes use of an electric motor to turn an 
external propeller. Variable control surfaces provide maneuverability.
◦ Max Speed: 6 kts67




• Weapons: LD-UUV utilizes Mk-50, Mk-54, or next generation lightweight torpedoes for 
threat prosecution. The use of lightweight torpedoes balances firepower with size and 
weight requirements, allowing mission and/or asset kills while not sacrificing endurance, 
maneuverability, etc. Torpedoes are canted upward, outward, and forward in the vehicle 
body to maximize space for other equipment. Since Mk-50 and Mk-54 torpedoes only 
operate in circular search mode, software modifications may be needed to give the LD-
UUV weapon a line-of-bearing search capability.
◦ Max Range: 8 NM69
◦ Warhead Size: 45 kg (shaped charge)70
• C3: The LD-UUV serves as the gateway for communications between the sensor network 
and external command centers. A retractable RF antenna buoy is surfaced during normal 
operation for external communications (as a backup, the vehicle itself can physically 
carry messages to a command platform). Sensors communicate with each other via a 
combination of acoustic modems and fiber optic cables. Sensors that are physically 
connected to each other can communicate at high data rates with minimal power draw. 
Command and Control is distributed among the sensors and the LD-UUV. The network 
utilizes parallel processing techniques to make decisions as a group rather than relying on 
a central command node. Sensor node capabilities are referenced to 75% baseline due to 
the space and power requirements for higher processing capabilities. 
◦ Acoustic Comms Range: 1.2 NM (75% baseline)71
◦ Acoustic Data Rate: 1 KB/min72
◦ RF Comms Range: Line of Sight (may require airborne relay)
• ISR: Passive acoustic sensors are employed at each sensor node. Current hydrophone 
technology is used as an analogy to estimate performance specifications.
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◦ Max Detection Range: 2.0 NM (75% baseline, refer to Appendix F)
◦ Max Track Load: 5 per node
◦ Track Time Required for Contact Report: 1 min
• OPSEC: The use of fiber optic cables reduces risk of counter detection by eliminating 
approximately half of the acoustic signals in the network. All data and data processing is 
encrypted due to sensitive contact classification algorithms and contact data libraries 
present on each sensor node. Scuttle charges are also employed to destroy sensitive 
hardware. 
4.3.3 Deployment
LD-UUV can be deployed by a surface vessel, via davit or crane, or by a submarine, as 
shown in Figure 4.12. For submarine deployment, payloads should be configured prior to the 
mission so LD-UUV can deploy without the need for diver assistance. Airborne deployment is 
considered infeasible due to the large size of the vehicle. Even if an air drop did not damage the 
vehicle, few naval aircraft could support delivery.
88
Figure 4.12: Submarine Deployment of LD-UUV
4.3.4 Operational Employment
LD-UUV transits to the AOR under its own navigation. Once it reaches the 
preprogrammed point in the AOR, it surfaces to confirm its position via GPS and establishes 
communications with the command center to transmit status and receive direction. After 
confirming its position and communicating, it returns to depth via a vertical dive. 
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A vertical dive maneuver is performed to generate the sound speed profile (SSP). The 
SSP is used to calculate the maximum distance between node pairs and the maximum length of 
cable permissible between connected sensor nodes. Should the cable be severed, the nodes would 
be required to communicate via acoustic backup. If a cable is too long it would place the nodes 
out of acoustic range of one another. At operational depth, the LD-UUV deploys sensor nodes as 
necessary for the mission.
Figure 4.13: LD-UUV Deploying Paired Sensor Nodes
As shown in Figure 4.13, LD-UUV releases one sensor node as it traverses over the 
seabed paying out the appropriate amount of cable before releasing the second connected node. 
The nodes are delivered diagonal to the intended flow of traffic to balance benefits of 
simultaneous tracking from multiple sensors with improved communication time to the gateway. 
Once the paired nodes have been delivered, LD-UUV comes to rest on the seabed at the center of 
the AOR within communication range of the nearest nodes. 
ISR operations commence once the sensor field is in place and the ad hoc network is 
created. Each node senses acoustic signatures from passing vessels. Paired nodes work together 
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to identify contacts based on the sensed characteristics. A contact report is generated and 
transmitted to the next nearest node pair in the path to the LD-UUV, or to the node pair that is in 
the expected path of the contact if more confidence is required. The report is compared and 
added to the decision algorithm of the new node pair to increase the confidence in the 
identification of potential targets.
If acting autonomously, the LD-UUV engages threats immediately upon receipt of a 
confirmed threat contact report, and sends external COI reports when it deems appropriate. 
Otherwise, the LD-UUV sends kill recommendations or COI reports to a command center based 
on mission parameters. Routine contact reports are held at the detecting sensor node until a 
period of low activity permits communication to the LD-UUV. System operation is shown in 
Figure 4.14.
Figure 4.14: LD-UUV Operation and Engagement
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4.3.5 Recovery
The LD-UUV returns to a designated point as the mission dictates. It may be after a 
certain period of time, at a particular battery state, or upon receipt of command. One more option 
is for the LD-UUV to remain on station until complete battery discharge. This option requires 
manned retrieval in a potentially hostile environment. Once it has arrived at the rendezvous 
point, divers are required to re-seat the LD-UUV into an empty MAC, as shown in Figure 4.15. 
A retrieving surface vessel requires divers to attach a hoisting harness. 
Figure 4.15: Submarine Recovery of LD-UUV
4.4 Glider
The AUWS Glider concept utilizes small, lightweight UUVs that convert vertical motion 
into forward motion through variable buoyancy. This technique drastically reduces power 
requirements for propulsion, extending range and on-station time. Several Gliders compose a 
homogeneous ISR network that coordinates to cover an AOR. In order to communicate with an 
external network Gliders proceed to the surface. Each Glider is a self contained weapon used for 
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threat prosecution equipped an internal warhead in the nose that detonates upon intercept with a 
threat vessel.
4.4.1 Physical Description
The Glider, as shown in Figure 4.16, is approximately 6 feet in length and 10 inches in 
diameter, weighing about 100 kg. Two controllable sets of wings maximize its hydrodynamic 
propulsion. The tail has a vertical stabilizer for steering control.
Figure 4.16: Glider UUV
4.4.2 Functional Description
• Power: The Glider’s primary source of power is a fuel cell system designed to support 
the onboard sensor and navigation suite. A potentially viable candidate is a Magnesium-
Air Fuel Cell (MAFC) which uses a magnesium anode, oxygen as a cathode and salt 
water as the electrolyte.73 Fuel cell selection is dictated by size restrictions within the 
Glider UUV. As a possible supplemental source of power to support surface 
73 Messina, John. "Magnesium: Alternative Power Source." 23 Apr. 2010. Physorg.com. 3 May 2011 
<http://www.physorg.com/news191259549.html>.
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communication, solar cells located on the topside of the glider, could be used to enhance 
the operational duration of the communication sub-system.
• Propulsion: Glider uses buoyancy dynamics along with its wings to convert vertical 
motion force to horizontal propulsion force which requires very low power consumption. 
An internal ballast provides adjustable pitch and its steering is attained via a 
rudder/stabilizer system located in the rear of the craft. Buoyancy is adjusted through an 
internal compartment by varying volumes of seawater. While gliding motion greatly 
increases endurance and range, average horizontal speeds of only about 0.5 kts are 
attainable with existing technology. It is a critical assumption that by 2030 average 
horizontal speeds of two knots, which is evaluated as the minimum useful speed for 
tactical operations, will be sustainable. Glider also features a terminal speed boost by way 
of a propulsor tail cone assembly that is powered by OTTO Fuel II mono-propellant 
similar to fuel systems currently utilized in torpedoes.
◦ Max Speed: 2 kts
◦ Max Range: 810 NM (@ 2 kts)74
• Weapons: Glider carries a 10 kg high explosive charge located at the top part of the nose 
of the craft. A shaped charge design ensures a high probability of success when 
prosecuting a threat. Glider utilizes the screw or other critical system of a ship or 
submarine target as the desired point of impact to maximize efficiency.
◦ Max Range: 810 NM
◦ Warhead Size: 10 kg (shaped charge)
• C3: Glider uses an RF antenna for surface communication with other networks in support 
of Command and Control requirements. The system also uses an Iridium® satellite based 
modem for navigation updates and an acoustic modem for internal communications 
between Gliders. The Glider navigation information and mission data is relayed between 
Gliders as well as provided to command centers via satellite and airborne relays. Onboard 
processing is used by Glider to determine potential threats from an internal database 
downloaded prior to mission initiation. Autonomous operation is formulated based on a 
74 Button, Robert W, et al. A Survey of Missions for Unmanned Undersea Vehicles. Santa Monica: RAND 
Corporation, 2009. 156.
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typical mission profile involving ingress to the operational area, execution of mission 
waypoints/loitering in the mission area, and egress to a waypoint if the Glider has not 
been expended. 
◦ Acoustic Comms Range: 1.6 NM (baseline)75
◦ Acoustic Data Rate: 1 KB/min76
◦ RF Comms Range: Line of Sight (may require airborne relay)
• ISR: ISR is achieved through detection of acoustic signals. Each Glider contains a 
hydrophone array and processed acoustic signals are shared with other Gliders via the 
network.
◦ Max Detection Range: 2.7 NM (baseline, refer to Appendix F)
◦ Max Track Load: 5 per node
◦ Track Time Required for Contact Report: 1 min
• OPSEC: Glider produces no noise from combustion engines or motors; however, the 
acoustic emissions from constantly shifting ballast equipment may offset that noise 
reduction. Acoustic transmissions are encrypted and scuttle mechanisms are employed to 
prevent compromise.
4.4.3 Deployment
Glider is deployed via maritime surface and rotary wing air assets. Since the Glider 
UUVs are small and lightweight, they do not require special launching equipment. They can be 
launched from nearly any ship, such as the FFG shown in Figure 4.17, or helicopter using small 
teams, not just from specially fitted ships. In order to compensate for very low intercept speeds 
Gliders must be deployed in large quantities.




Figure 4.17: Surface Deployment of Glider77
4.4.4 Operational Employment
During the execution of its mission, each Glider conducts a barrier search between 
waypoints programmed prior to mission start. Glider maintains communication with the nearest 
members of the network, as shown in Figure 4.18. Surfacing periodically, Glider communicates 
with the nearest airborne assets and satellites to support the ISR mission. Contacts are reported to 
a command center based on their perceived level of importance. When an engagement order is 
received (or generated by one of the Gliders), targeting information is sent to the Glider in best 
position to successfully conduct an intercept on the target vessel.
77 All FFGs will be decommissioned by 2030. The purpose of this image is to show that any ship could deploy 
Gliders.
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Figure 4.18: Glider Network Operation
4.4.5 Recovery
Upon completion of its mission, Glider transits out of the AOR and surfaces to await 
retrieval by surface asset. Embarked helicopters are a feasible option to assist in retrieval, as 
shown in Figure 4.19. If need be the Glider can self-destruct or enter a hibernation state to be 
retrieved at a future time.
Figure 4.19: Glider Recovery Assisted by Helicopter Retrieval
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5. Analysis of Alternatives
The Analysis of Alternatives process, which deselects down to a single system 
architecture from the four selected concepts, is achieved via concurrent performance 
(effectiveness), cost, and risk analyses. Recommendations are made based on the results of these 
analyses, considering scenarios in which different factors have more value than others to 
stakeholders.
5.1 Performance Analysis
To accomplish a comprehensive comparative performance analysis of different 
architectures for the same conceptual system, a combination of stochastic modeling and 
simulation, analogous comparison using empirical evidence, and qualitative methods is 
employed. The results of those methodologies are then folded together with proper emphasis on 
individual factors to ensure appropriate analysis. It is imperative that results not just be averaged 
together to determine the most “effective system.”
Specific variables to be considered are identified and selected prior to analysis. The 
system MOEs and associated MOPs are a good place to start, but the amount of data required 
(some of which is not collectible outside of a Testing and Evaluation scenario) makes for a 
cumbersome and perhaps ineffectual analysis. To adequately assess the primary functions and 
identified need areas of AUWS, a set of seven MOEs (or representative MOPs) is selected to 
scope the analysis. These measures, with their associated units, are listed below:
1. Probability of Detection (%): probability of AUWS successfully detecting a real 
contact. Pd is modeled as the percentage of total contacts encountered by AUWS that are 
detected.
2. Probability of Kill (%): probability of AUWS successfully prosecuting valid threat, 
resulting in at least a mission kill. Pk is modeled as the percentage of total threats 
encountered by AUWS that are killed.
3. Average Data Message Completion Time (minutes): the time it takes for AUWS to 
send a message to an external network, from message generation (e.g. ship detection, in 
the case of a contact report) to the message being transmitted externally.
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4. Capability to Operate for a Minimum of 30 Days (days): the capability for AUWS to 
conduct operations in an AOR for 30 days, independent of external C2 or logistical 
support.
5. Capability for Deployment by both Contemporary and Future Platforms (number 
of platforms): capability for AUWS to be deployable from air, surface, and subsurface 
assets in the current or projected Navy inventory.78
6. Capability for Recovery by both Contemporary and Future Platforms (number of 
platforms): capability for AUWS to be recoverable by air, surface, and subsurface assets 
in the current or projected Navy inventory.
7. Capability to provide OPSEC (rating): capability for AUWS to avoid detection by 
enemy or neutral entities and, if detected, avoid compromise of sensitive information and 
equipment. This metric is used as a proxy for the Probability of Detection Avoidance 
MOE.
5.1.1 Modeling and Simulation
The ability for AUWS to detect contacts, communicate to external networks, and 
prosecute threats is analyzed using modeling and simulation. These functions are selected for 
modeling because they relate directly to initial tasking and the critical physical elements of 
AUWS (weapons, sensors, and communicators). The system concepts are modeled using various 
simulation programs and analytical models are used as inputs to realistically simulate system 
operation. The system models are evaluated in a generic scenario representing an international 
waterway. Their resulting performance is used to gain operational insights and contribute to 
overall Analysis of Alternatives.
5.1.1.1 Methodology
The primary program used for modeling system concepts is ExtendSim 7.0, a discrete 
event simulator (DES) developed by Imagine That! Inc. ExtendSim is an ideal platform for 
analyzing end to end models of system concepts because it can produce emergent behavior when 
the various system, target, and environmental parameters are incorporated into the simulation. A 
sample screen shot of the V-CAP model in ExtendSim is shown in Figure 5.1.
78 Shore deployment capability primarily supports experimentation and testing and is therefore not considered in 
the operational performance analysis.
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Figure 5.1: Screen shot of ExtendSim model (V-CAP)
Three of the four selected concepts are modeled in ExtendSim, with the exception of 
Squid, which is instead modeled in MATLAB 2010, a numerical computing environment and 
programming language developed by The MathWorks, Inc. MATLAB is ideally suited to model 
the random nature of Squid’s deployment methodology. Graphical output of a developing Squid 
field is shown in Figure 5.2. Green areas represent communication ranges and the red area 
represents an overlap where two nodes can communicate with each other.
Figure 5.2: Sample graphical output of MATLAB model (Squid)
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In order to provide realism for threat engagement, a physics-based model for weapon 
effectiveness is used as an input to the system models. The weapon model, which can be found in 
Appendix F, calculates a peak overpressure based on detonation distance from the target and 
compares it to a randomly generated value (within typical limits) for hull strength. Sensor 
performance, on the other hand, is simulated with a notional exponential curve for Pd as a 
function of range to contact at closest point of approach (CPA). Pd is 90% for contacts that pass 
directly over a sensor, and reduces down to zero as CPA approaches maximum detection range. 
This approach represents an improvement over “cookie cutter” sensor models; however, further 
analysis using a physics based sensor model is recommended.79
Finally, Simkit, an open source Java based program DES maintained by Professor Arnold 
Buss of the MOVES Institute at NPS,80 is utilized to help visualize system behavior and 
operational concepts. While performance is not analyzed using this program, a visual 
representation is generated that provides insight into the way systems should be operationally 
employed. For example, optimal unit positioning and search patterns can be determined through 
the observation of a Glider field, shown in Figure 5.3.
Figure 5.3: Sample screen shot of Simkit (Glider)
79 An attempt was made at developing a physics based sensor model, but the model produced unreliable results. 
The attempted model can be found in Appendix F.
80 Buss, Arnold. "Simkit Home Page." 24 Mar. 2010. Diana.nps.edu. 12 May 2011 <http://diana.nps.edu/Simkit/>.
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5.1.1.2 Model Scenario and Setup
The baseline scenario used to evaluate and compare the four system concepts is shown in 
Figure 5.4. The scenario simulates a single day in a busy international waterway in which traffic 
generally moves along a single axis, such as a channel or traffic separation scheme. AUWS is 
tasked to develop an operational picture of a 10 NM by 3 NM AOR within the waterway and 
contribute to a COP. Specifically, the mission is to detect and track all contacts, report all 
contacts of interest, and prosecute all threats attempting to transit the AOR.81
In this particular scenario, AUWS is operating fully autonomously, so no permission or 
engagement order from higher authority is required for kinetic action. For modeling purposes, 
AUWS sends a concurrent message when engaging a threat. For all models, it is assumed that 
weapons function properly and that all threats are correctly identified. Aspects of threat 
discrimination, such as false negatives and false positives, are discussed separately, in Appendix 
G, by analyzing the performance of an analogous system. Also, Pd is assumed to be independent 
for each sensor, since targets are not taking evasive or counter-detection actions and factors 
affecting detection are mostly inherent to each individual sensor. 
Figure 5.4: Baseline Model Scenario
81 Due to the mission parameters and expected traffic patterns, crossing traffic is not modeled. A preliminary 
assessment of AUWS performance can be obtained from this simplified model. Further M&S efforts 
incorporating multi-directional traffic and other realism enhancements are recommended. 
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The depth of the AOR is 300 feet with a seabed composed of mud and sand. Weather 
conditions are fair. On average, seven ships arrive in the AOR per hour,82 traveling an average of 
15 knots. Five per cent of all contacts are valid threats, so AUWS will encounter an average of 
eight to nine threats on a given day. The scenario lasts only one day because enemy behavior can 
be expected to change drastically once AUWS has conducted an engagement. While AUWS may 
be required to operate for 30 days or more, the scenario simulates the first day in which AUWS 
has been given authority to prosecute threats autonomously.
The quantity and placement of individual units for each system concept can significantly 
affect performance results in the given scenario. To account for varying capabilities and weapons 
capacities within individual units, a more sophisticated rule than simply “X number of 
units/weapons on station” must be employed. A logical assumption is made to dictate the 
quantity and placement of the units within each AUWS concept. It is assumed that it is desirable 
to employ a minimal number of units such that the AOR is fully covered by sensors and the first 
N threats have a non-zero probability of being successfully prosecuted, where N > 1. In other 
words, the enemy cannot be assured of any initial prosecution gaps or safe passages.83 Utilizing 
this rule provides a common basis for comparison among all system concepts. It is shown that 
cost and risk analyses can help determine if it is worthwhile to deploy more units to achieve 
higher Pd and Pk.
5.1.1.3 V-CAP Model
The V-CAP model utilizes four Killer Units, with two mini torpedoes each, and one 
Hunter Unit, with eight deployed sensor nodes, to cover the AOR. The layout of the individual 
units is shown in Figure 5.5. Separation between Killer Units is limited by the torpedo range, 
resulting in a rich, overlapping sensor field. When a vessel is detected, sensor nodes generate and 
relay contact reports to the Hunter Unit, which classifies the contact and determines system 
response. If the contact is classified as a threat, the Hunter Unit sends an engagement order to 
one of the Killer Units, which engages the threat with one of its mini torpedoes. Since overall 
82 United States Department of Energy. World Oil Transit Chokepoints: Malacca. Feb. 2011. 12 May 2011 
<http://ei-01.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/Malacca.html>.
83 For the purposes of this analysis, N = 2; however, ambiguity allows flexibility in system development and 
prevents the enemy from defeating the system by sending two decoy vessels ahead of the actual targets.
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weapons capacity (eight torpedoes) is equal to the expected number of threats, only one torpedo 
is used per engagement. 
Figure 5.5: V-CAP Engaging Threat UUV
5.1.1.4 LD-UUV Model
The LD-UUV model utilizes one LD-UUV, with four lightweight torpedoes, and 16 
paired sensor nodes cover the AOR. The ‘X’ pattern shown in Figure 5.6 is dictated by 
communication and detection ranges of the sensor nodes, while minimizing communication time 
to the LD-UUV. The ‘X’ layout also permits improved confidence due to simultaneous signal 
processing, as the sensor pairs are aligned with a perpendicular component to vessel traffic.
The sensor nodes are designed to have group-based decision making capabilities. 
Working together, the nodes compare sensor data and assessed confidence levels to determine if 
a threat truly exists and whether a message needs to be sent to the LD-UUV. A single node 
cannot make a threat determination on its own. When a potential threat is detected, a message is 
sent to the LD-UUV, with each node along the way contributing to the threat determination. If 
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the threat is determined to be valid,84 the system engages with one of its torpedoes, which have 
sufficient range to cover the entire AOR.
Figure 5.6: LD-UUV Engaging Threat Submarine
5.1.1.5 Glider Model
The Glider model utilizes 17 Gliders to cover the AOR. The most critical driving factor in 
system layout is the maximum speed of two knots. Intercept of much faster moving targets is 
difficult without relatively dense detection and prosecution barriers, as shown in Figure 5.7. The 
front line (detection barrier) detects approaching contacts, makes a threat determination, and, if 
necessary, sends an engagement order to the best positioned Glider in the back line (prosecution 
barrier). This process allows prosecuting Gliders maximum time to conduct their intercept. Since 
contacts transit the AOR from both directions, each line performs both functions depending on 
the direction the threat is headed. The limited distance that a Glider can pursue a threat helps 
maintain network integrity until the Glider successfully intercepts and detonates.
84 In the model, all threat messages that reach the LD-UUV are valid; however, non-threats sometimes generate 
threat messages, with decreasing probability as more nodes contribute to the message. This simulates the 
decision making process of LD-UUV and assesses its impact on internal communications, without introducing 
prosecution error.
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Figure 5.7: Glider Engaging Threat Surface Vessel
The maximum intercept range of 0.55 NM is determined from the Approaching Target 
Model,85 which can be found in Appendix F. Since the Gliders are mobile, it is not necessary to 
place a Glider every 0.55 NM. Each Glider conducts a barrier search along a 1.43 NM86 segment 
of the line. Barrier search provides a marginal kinematic enhancement factor because the Glider 
speed is so low compared to the target speed,87 but it does satisfy the requirement to deny 
guaranteed safe passage to initial threats by constantly shifting the prosecution gaps.
Once a Glider successfully intercepts a threat, its warhead detonates and it is removed 
from the network. Gliders redistribute themselves to heal the network and avoid coverage gaps; 
however, overall system performance degrades as Gliders are lost.
5.1.1.6 Squid Model
The Squid model utilizes 130 nodes (129 Weapons, 1 Comms) to cover the AOR. The 
pseudo-random nature of artillery deployment or high altitude air drop is modeled as random 
85 Eagle, James. Naval Tactical Analysis Lecture Notes. Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 2009. 9.
86 Seven equal sections of 10 NM. Seven Gliders per line is the minimum number required to keep Gliders in 
communication range when they are evenly spaced.
87 Eagle, James. Naval Tactical Analysis Lecture Notes. Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 2009. 5.
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scattering (uniform distribution) throughout the AOR. The model determines which nodes can 
communicate with each other and determines the shortest path to the Comms Node for each. 
Nodes that cannot communicate with any other node are considered out of network and are not 
used for detection and prosecution. Since random scattering cannot produce full coverage of the 
AOR with 100% certainty, a 99% probability of full coverage is accepted. This probability is 
achieved with 130 nodes, of which 126 are in network on average. After 130 nodes, marginal 
gains in coverage diminish rapidly, as shown in Figure 5.8.
Figure 5.8: Average Sensor Coverage vs Squid Nodes Deployed
When a Weapons Node detects a contact, it sends a contact report to the Comms Node, as 
shown in Figure 5.9. The Comms Node makes the threat determination and sends engagement 
orders to the nodes in best position for engagement. Weapons Nodes engage threats by releasing 
positively buoyant limpet explosives, which attach magnetically to the threat hull. In the model, 
Weapons Nodes release one explosive per target to maintain follow-on prosecution capabilities.
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Figure 5.9: Squid Engaging Threat Tanker
5.1.1.7 Modeling and Simulation Results
Table 5.1 summarizes the modeling and simulation results for the four system concepts. 
Values shown are 95% confidence intervals.
Table 5.1: Modeling and Simulation Results
Avg MCT (min) Pd Pk 
Glider 13.3-15.0 0.74-0.75 0.16-0.22
LD-UUV 2.9-3.1 0.80-0.81 0.33-0.43
Squid 3.5-3.7 0.97-0.99 0.07-0.09
V-CAP 4.5-4.7 0.80-0.82 0.54-0.65
From a communication perspective, LD-UUV outperforms the other system concepts in 
its ability to send a message to an external network quickly. The slightly shorter MCT compared 
to Squid and V-CAP is primarily due to LD-UUV’s use of fiber optic cables between pairs of 
sensor nodes. This method of communication is much faster than acoustic modem; however, the 
increased space requirements and complexity in deployment creates a tradespace and limits the 
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amount of cable that can be utilized. Glider has a considerably longer MCT because each Glider 
must surface to communicate externally. Without using its one-time terminal boost, this is a time 
consuming maneuver.88
Squid has the best detection capability, with nearly 20% higher Pd than the nearest 
competitor. This is a result of Squid’s use of many independent sensors. Significant sensor 
redundancy and overlap occurs when nodes are deployed randomly while trying to maintain the 
requirement of 99% probability of coverage within the AOR.
V-CAP achieves the highest Pk, arguably the most important MOP as it involves elements 
of communication, detection, and prosecution. A threat must be detected and a message must be 
communicated to a C2 node before it can be prosecuted. V-CAP’s superior prosecution 
performance is attributed to a sufficient inventory of capable weapons. Each mini torpedo is 
capable of conducting a mission kill and there are enough on station to handle the average 
number of threats expected. LD-UUV utilizes a highly effective lightweight torpedo, but it only 
carries enough to engage half the expected number of threats. Another LD-UUV would be 
required if more than four engagements are expected. Squid has an abundance of weapons on 
station, but each one is extremely limited in range and destructive capability. In fact, Squid 
achieves less than 10% Pk even with the assumption that all limpet explosives successfully attach 
to their target. Glider suffers in prosecution performance not only because the system degrades as 
Gliders are lost to engagements, but also because of its limited intercept capability. Notably, 
Glider’s probability of killing the first threat encountered is only 30%, assuming that the blast 
successfully damages the threat hull (or propeller, rudder, etc.).
V-CAP’s superior performance of 54-65% Pk is not necessarily acceptable for fleet 
operations. Unlike current USW platforms, however, V-CAP can be easily scaled up to improve 
performance in the given mission. Consider, for example, a V-CAP system consisting of eight 
Killer Units and two Hunter Units employed to accomplish the mission in the modeling scenario. 
Since there are now 16 torpedoes on station, assume that each threat can be engaged twice if 
necessary. This scaled up V-CAP system achieves a Pd of 91-93% and a Pk of 89-96%, certainly 
an acceptable level for current warfare systems. Cost- and risk-effectiveness analyses will show 
88 It may be possible to design a recharge capability for the terminal boost, but that is left for further analysis.
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that this comparable performance to current systems is achievable at a fraction of unit cost of 
system deployed, which can be considered a measure of operational risk.
The results of modeling and simulation provide a means to discriminate system concepts 
and also operational insights that could be widely applied. Insights gained from the results of 
modeling and simulation are further discussed after considering the results of other analyses. 
5.1.2 Endurance Analysis
Undoubtedly, endurance is a primary concern for AUWS. Aside from the ISR and 
deterrent value in persistent forward presence, logic dictates that higher endurance will provide a 
greater force multiplier by freeing up manned assets for other operations. There are many 
different ways to measure endurance, including total power draw by mission profile, nominal 
recharge rates, etc. Since the four selected alternatives have different methods of employment, it 
is difficult to compare specific performance variables head-to-head. For instance, LD-UUV 
requires power to transit in and out of the region, while Squid is air dropped and/or artillery 
launched into the operational area and requires no power for maneuver. The effect of a hybrid 
mono-propellant combustion engine with electric drive capability (V-CAP) must be effectively 
compared to propulsion via variable buoyancy and control surfaces (Glider). 
5.1.2.1 Methodology
For the above reasons, the specific number of days each concept can operate on a single 
sortie is the simplest way of ensuring the system meets baseline requirements while providing a 
common performance value to analyze. Specifically, the endurance of a single representative unit 
(one Glider, Squid Node, V-CAP Hunter Unit, or LD-UUV main vehicle) is analyzed in the same 
scenario used for modeling and simulation. A safe standoff range of 50 NM for deployment and 
recovery platforms is also imposed. To arrive at an endurance value, some scoping and bounding 
assumptions are made. Below is a list of assumptions and associated rationales.
• All four concepts utilize passive sonar systems for sensing functions. Understanding that 
the physical size (and theoretical power draw) of the various sonar suites may vary, the 
power draw is assumed to be the same for all concepts and is assumed to be constant 
from the moment of deployment to the moment of recovery/neutralization. For concepts 
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that use EO/IR sensors, the overall impact to power is considered negligible because 
those sensors are primarily used for target confirmation, an infrequent task.
• All four concepts utilize acoustic modems for internal communications and line of sight 
RF or Iridium satellite mobile communications for external transmission and reception. 
Understanding that the size, transmission range and bandwidth of the respective systems 
would determine the required power draw, three of the four concepts are assumed to 
utilize identical systems with identical power draws that are operating continuously at a 
constant draw from the moment of deployment to the moment of recovery/neutralization. 
LD-UUV is assumed to use 75% of the baseline power draw for communications to 
account for its use of intelligent sensor nodes that do not transmit all messages. Overall 
communication and sensor power draw is assumed to be 0.5 watts for V-CAP, Glider, and 
Squid, and 0.375 watts for LD-UUV.89 90
• Required propulsion power for V-CAP and LD-UUV is determined by calculating the 
estimated electrical power required to propel the system given physical specifications and 
a hydrodynamic drag coefficient of 0.2 (derived in Appendix F). A total value for 
required propulsion power is calculated by multiplying the power required by the amount 
of time propulsion will be required for a 30 day period to include inbound and outbound 
transits and projected maneuver required by mission profile. Glider is assumed to use a 
negligible amount of its own energy supply for propulsion, much like the Slocum 
Thermal Glider,91 and Squid does not have propulsion capabilities.
• To produce endurance in days, the overall percentage of energy required to complete a 30 
day mission is divided by 30 days to produce a predicted total number of days the system 
can operate on a single energy store.
• Energy capacity is estimated by multiplying a given energy density (J/kg) for a particular 
power source by the mass of the energy storage system, assuming 20% of the concept’s 
mass can be attributed to energy storage. V-CAP uses 50% battery and 50% mono-
89 DSPComm Inc. "AquaComm: Underwater Wireless Modem." 2009. DSPComm.com. 2 May 2011 
<http://www.dspcomm.com/products_aquacomm.html>.
90 RESON Inc. "Hydrophone TC4032." 2005. RESON.com. 5 May 2011 <http://www.reson.com/wp-content/
uploads/2010/12/TC4032.pdf>.
91 Teledyne Webb Research. "Thermal Glider." 2010. WebbResearch.com. 5 May 2011 
<http://www.webbresearch.com/thermal.aspx>.
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propellant, Squid uses 90% battery and 10% ultra-capacitor, Glider uses only fuel cells, 
and LD-UUV uses only batteries.
◦ Lithium ion battery: 460 kJ/kg92
◦ OTTO Fuel II mono-propellant: 350 kJ/kg (derived in Appendix F)
◦ Ultra-capacitor: 3.6 kJ/kg93
◦ Magnesium-air fuel cell: 1800 kJ/kg94
• Total system mass is determined by multiplying a density of 1298 kg/m3, derived from a 
heavyweight Mk-48 ADCAP torpedo,95 by the estimated volume (assuming the shape is a 
cylinder of known length and radius) of each concept.
• The density of seawater is assumed to be 1030 kg/m3.96
A threshold value is set at 30 days, in accordance with operational requirements and 
current guidance, with a goal value at 180 days, which is the maximum anticipated annual 
operational usage for a particular unit. For a sample calculation of endurance, refer to Appendix 
F. Overall endurance analysis results are shown in Table 5.2. For ease of analysis, values are 
calculated using SI units and then converted to US customary units where appropriate.
92 AllAboutBatteries.com. "Battery energy storage in various battery types." 12 January 2011. 
AllAboutBatteries.com. 5 May 2011 <http://www.allaboutbatteries.com/contact_us.html>.
93 Woodbank Communications Ltd. "Battery Performance Characteristics - How to specify and test a battery." 
2005. mpoweruk.com. 3 May 2011 <http://www.mpoweruk.com/performance.htm>.
94 Woodbank Communications Ltd. 1.




96 Raymond A. Serway, Robert J. Beichner and John W. Jewett. Physics for Scientists and Engineers. New York 
City: Saunders College Publishing, 2000.
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Table 5.2: Endurance Analysis Results
V-CAP LD-UUV Glider Squid
Length (m) 5.791 5.791 1.8 0.33
Diameter (m) 0.532 2.032 0.254 0.155
Speed (m/s) 2.57 2.57 0 0
Distance Propelled in 30 days (m) 209646 240760 0 0
Area (m2) 0.222 3.243 0.051 0.019
Propulsion Duration (s) 81574 93681 0 0
Propulsion Power Draw (W) 389 5670 0 0
Propulsion Energy Used (J) 31703207 531159673 0 0
Sensor Energy Used (J) 1296000 972000 1296000 1296000
Mass (kg) 1671 24377 118 8
Energy Storage Mass (kg) 334 4875 24 2
Energy Capacity (J) 135344752 2242685484 42619369 669807
Capacity Expended (%) 0.244 0.237 0.03 1.935
Predicted Endurance (Days) 123.044 126.436 986.559 15.505
5.1.2.2 V-CAP Endurance
The V-CAP Hunter Unit’s length and diameter are estimated to be equal to that of a 
Raytheon Mk 48 ADCAP torpedo,97 18 feet by 21 inches. It is important to note that the modular 
feature of V-CAP allows for lengths from 9 to 18 feet, which significantly affects predicted 
endurance. The impacts of this modularity are discussed later in detail. Speed for transit and 
maneuver is estimated at five knots. Distance traveled is estimated to consist of a 50 NM 
inbound transit from deployment position to the center of the individual unit’s operational area, a 
13 NM transit through the AOR to deploy sensor nodes, and a 50 NM outbound transit for 
recovery following completion of operations. Given this data, the Hunter Unit is predicted to 
have an endurance of 123 days, to include inbound transit, operations, and outbound transit.
5.1.2.3 LD-UUV Endurance
The LD-UUV is estimated to be 19 feet long, which makes it compatible with the 
Multiple All-up-round Canisters that currently launch Tomahawk missiles on submarines. The 
diameter is estimated at 80 inches to fit the 87 inch diameter tubes on existing SSGNs and future 





SSNs.98 Speed is estimated at five knots. Distance traveled is assumed to be the same 50 NM 
inbound and outbound transits as V-CAP, but with an “hourglass” maneuver pattern covering the 
whole of the 10 NM by 3 NM AOR to deploy sensor nodes. Using the same methodology as V-
CAP, LD-UUV is predicted to have an endurance of 126 days.
5.1.2.4 Glider Endurance
The basic dimensions of Glider are essentially those of the Teledyne Webb Research 
Slocum Thermal Glider,99 but scaled up 20% to accommodate weaponry and a terminal 
maneuver system, making it 5.9 feet long and 10 inches in diameter. Speed and distance traveled 
are not considered because electrical power is not being used to provide propulsion. For that 
reason, no power calculation is made for the work required to cover the required distance during 
the 30 day mission. The only power draw comes from the sensors and communications suite. 
This, combined with a relatively large battery, gives Glider a predicted endurance of 986 days, or 
nearly 3 years which is consistent with projections for the Slocum Thermal Glider.100
5.1.2.5. Squid Endurance
Squid Weapons Nodes are sized to fit three to a round within Lockheed Martin’s LRLAP 
(155 millimeters diameter by 2.2 meters in length)101 or a similar projectile. For this reason, a 
Squid node is estimated at 155 millimeters diameter and 0.33 meters length such that less than 
half of the LRLAP will consist of Squid nodes. The introduction of Squid nodes will obviously 
reduce the range of LRLAP, but since the projectile can be launched over 70 NM, it is assumed 
Squid can be effectively deployed from the 50 NM standoff range. Speed and distance traveled 
are both zero, because Squid does not have any propulsion capabilities. Similar to Glider, power 
draw is from sensors and communications systems only. Given this information, Squid nodes are 
predicted to have an endurance of 15 days, well short of the 30 day requirement. The small size, 
and low weight, of the Squid nodes leads to a very small battery, and therefore low capacity. 
98 Pike, John. "SSN-774 Virginia-class NSSN New Attack Submarine." 5 Sept. 2008. GlobalSecurity.org. 1 May 
2011 <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/ssn-774-spiral-2.htm>.
99 Teledyne Webb Research. "Thermal Glider." 2010. WebbResearch.com. 5 May 2011 
<http://www.webbresearch.com/thermal.aspx>
100Teledyne Webb Research 1.
101Lockheed Martin Corporation. "Long Range Land Attack Projectile (LRLAP)." 2009. LockheedMartin.com. 4 
May 2011
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5.1.2.6 Endurance Analysis Results
Strictly from an endurance perspective, Glider outperforms the other three system 
concepts by far. The excellent endurance of the gliding UUVs explains the popularity of this 
technology and is a valid reason for continued research. The relative closeness of V-CAP and 
LD-UUV with regard to endurance is expected, as the mission profiles are very similar, but V-
CAP benefits slightly from a smaller cross sectional area. Squid nodes, as modeled, are unable to 
meet the 30 day endurance requirement. This is significant because the sensor nodes employed 
by V-CAP and LD-UUV are designed similarly. An improvement in energy capacity or 
efficiency may be needed for these two concepts to meet the endurance requirement. Another 
option would be to deploy two Hunter Units or LD-UUVs so that half of the sensor nodes could 
be activated for 15 day periods each, covering the required 30 days.
5.1.3 Maneuverability Analysis
Several different MOEs and MOPs exist to measure the facility and effectiveness of each 
concept with regard to their ability to deploy (or be deployed), transit, navigate, and be recovered 
(as applicable). Specifically, deployability and recoverability do not lend themselves to 
quantitative analysis as the values selected for each alternative would ultimately be too 
subjective to analyze. Modeling and simulation does consider the direct impact of 
maneuverability on system performance. To provide a fair and universal comparison of the 
effectiveness of the different systems regarding deployment and recovery, the system concepts 
are analyzed qualitatively based on their ability to be deployed and recovered by both 
contemporary and future platforms. This qualitative analysis is based on the highly subjective 
nature of determining the relative importance of these particular facets of maneuverability.
5.1.3.1 Capability for Deployment by both Contemporary and Future Platforms
To compare the deployment capability of AUWS concepts, consider that there are 
effectively three types of platforms that can be utilized for system delivery: airborne, surfaced, 
and submerged assets. Based on the design of each system concept, some delivery assets may not 
be feasible. To assign a quantitative ranking to a qualitative discussion, a score of zero to three is 
assigned to each concept based on the number of platform types capable of accommodating 
AUWS. If a concept can conceivably be launched from all three types of platforms, it receives a 
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score of three. A concept that can only reasonably be deployed by two types of platforms 
receives a score of two, and so forth. If a concept can be deployed by an asset on a limited basis, 
or with significant restrictions, it is given a 0.5 for that particular platform type. Table 5.3 shows 
the results of this analysis.
Table 5.3: Deployment Scoring
Capability for Deployment by both Current and Future Platforms
Threshold 1 Score is based on the number of platform types capable
of launching each alternative.
3 = surface, subs, and air.
2 = 2 of 3 platform types.
1 = 1 of 3 platform types.






A threshold value of one is chosen, since a system that cannot be deployed from any type 
of asset is inherently a failure. A goal of three is chosen to represent the full range of options 
without giving any unwarranted benefit to units incapable of achieving deployment from all 
platform types.
V-CAP is readily deployable by submarines without modification due to the similarity in 
design to a standard Mk 48 torpedo. The modular construction of the V-CAP unit allows for the 
inclusion of fewer mission sections, resulting in a shorter overall length and lighter weight, 
allowing airborne assets such as the P-8 to carry V-CAP. Surface ships do not have 21” diameter 
torpedo launchers, but they may deploy V-CAP units over the side with standard crane or davit 
equipment. Based on this discussion, V-CAP receives a score of 2.5.
LD-UUV is sized to fit in the 87” diameter tubes of the current SSGN class and the future 
blocks of Virginia class SSNs. The large size and weight makes airborne deployment improbable. 
Surface ships, with a specialized crane installed, are capable of deploying LD-UUV. Given an 
inability to air drop and limitations on surface deployment, LD-UUV receives a score of 1.5.
Glider is a small UUV with relatively large control surfaces that currently are not 
designed to fold away due to weight and complexity restrictions. This design feature results in no 
readily available method to launch these units from a submarine at depth. Airborne deployment 
is also questionable, as dropping a Glider unit from a P-8’s operational altitude, even with a 
retarding device, would most likely result in damage to the sensitive control surfaces and 
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ballasting systems that are critical to the Glider’s mobility. Surface ships can easily drop Glider 
units over the side. In fact, small teams of sailors can launch Gliders by hand, without the need 
for installed cranes or davits. The lack of submerged or airborne deployment options gives Glider 
a score of one.
Squid units can only be mounted on the non-reloadable external six inch countermeasures 
pods on existing SSNs. Even if that system were utilized, the small number of nodes that could 
be delivered by a submarine would result in very little added value. Air dropping Squid is 
definitely feasible based on the compact, durable, and expendable nature of the nodes. Surface 
launch via drops over the side or artillery launch are both reasonable modes of delivery. Squid is 
able to deploy from two platform types; however, since the Comms Node must be deployed 
separately, Squid is docked one point for requiring two modes of deployment, resulting a score 
of one.
5.1.3.2 Capability for Recovery by both Contemporary and Future Platforms
The same methodology used to analyze deployment is used to evaluate recovery. A score 
is assigned based on the number of types of units capable of feasibly recovering each concept. 
Table 5.4 shows the results of the analysis.
Table 5.4: Recovery Scoring
Capability for Recovery by both Contemporary and Future Platforms
Threshold 0 Score is based on the number of platform types capable
of recovering each alternative.
3 = surface, subs, and air.
2 = 2 of 3 platform types.
1= 1 of 3 platform types.






A threshold value of zero is chosen in this case because not all concepts are designed to 
be recovered. Assigning this score avoids penalizing Squid needlessly, since recovery in and of 
itself is not assessed as a critical need. A goal value of three is assigned to prevent awarding full 
credit to concepts that are not recoverable by all platforms.
V-CAP may be recovered via torpedo tube by a submarine. Lightweight (air dropped) 
variants of V-CAP may be recovered by helicopter. Surface ships are generally capable of 
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recovering all variants of V-CAP. With the capacity of recovery by submerged, surfaced, and 
airborne assets, V-CAP receives a score of three.
LD-UUV may be recovered by a submarine and reloaded into a MAC. Airborne recovery 
is infeasible due to LD-UUV’s large size and heavy weight. Surface ships equipped with 
heavyweight cranes are capable of recovering LD-UUV. Without airborne recovery and 
limitations on surface recovery, LD-UUV scores a 1.5.
Glider cannot reasonably be retrieved by a submarine at depth because its control 
surfaces cannot fit into a torpedo tube opening. Airborne or surface ship recovery would be fairly 
easy to accomplish once the unit is surfaced. Glider therefore receives a score of two.
SQUID is non-recoverable by nature of its design, meaning no units may recover it. This 
results in a score of zero. Non-recoverability is not automatically detrimental, especially if the 
per unit costs are low enough where the individual nodes become expendable. That is not 
considered as part of the analysis here, but will factor into the cost analysis discussed later.
5.1.4 OPSEC Analysis
Capability to Avoid Detection is the metric used to evaluate the AUWS OPSEC function. 
It is challenging to estimate the designs, frequencies, and signatures of conceptual systems. In 
order to provide useful comparisons, some of the factors that contribute to detection avoidance 
are analyzed in a binary fashion. All four system designs lend themselves to “yes” or “no” 
answers for each factor, such that a score of one can be attributed for a “yes” and a score of zero 
can be given for a “no” response. When the results are averaged assuming an equal weight for 
each factor, a final score between one and zero can be assigned to each concept. Table 5.5 shows 
the results of the analysis.
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Table 5.5: Detection Avoidance Scoring
Capability to Avoid Detection
Threshold 0 Values are the average value of an equally weighted binary analysis of 
four factors, shown below. 0 = no, 
1 = yes.Goal 1
V-CAP LD-UUV Glider Squid
Evasion Capability 1 1 0 0
Lack of Exploitable Signature 1 1 0 1
Lack of Compromising Posture 1 1 0 1
Covert Deployability 1 1 1 0
Total Score 1 1 0.25 0.5
A threshold value of zero is assigned to reflect a complete inability to avoid detection. A 
goal of one is assigned to give full credit to concepts meeting all detection avoidance criteria.
Evasion Capability refers to a concept’s use of organic propulsion and maneuver 
capability to evade a searching threat or a potentially compromising neutral vessel. V-CAP and 
LD-UUV both maintain the ability to employ evasive maneuvers via a monopropellant 
combustion engine and electric drive, respectively. For this reason, they score a one for Evasion 
Capability. Glider’s high-speed terminal homing engine can provide short duration evasion, but 
following fuel burnout after 20 seconds, no fuel will remain to allow the Glider unit to engage, 
effectively providing a mission kill for that particular unit. With no dedicated means to evade, 
Glider scores a zero. Squid is immobile, and therefore also receives a zero.
Lack of an Exploitable Signature refers to the ability of a concept to adjust its emissions 
(both in communications and operational noise from mechanical and electrical sources) to avoid 
detection. V-CAP and LD-UUV can both change their emissions control (EMCON) status by 
reeling in their communications buoys to minimize the threat of visual or electronic support 
measures (ESM) detection. Additionally, both systems can proceed to the bottom and secure 
operational noise to minimize emissions. The Squid Comms Node can also reel in its 
communications buoy to reduce observables, and it has no moving parts, further minimizing 
exploitable signatures. These three concepts receive a score of one. Glider must surface to 
conduct communication, providing greater visual and ESM observables. Furthermore, Glider 
must continuously operate ballasting pumps and control surfaces to maneuver, resulting in 
incessant mechanical and electrical transients. Glider therefore receives a score of zero.
119
Lack of Compromising Posture is somewhat of a corollary to the Lack of Exploitable 
Signature metric, but it deals specifically with each concept’s exploitable configuration under 
normal operations. For example, V-CAP, LD-UUV, and Squid all maintain retractable 
communications buoys that can be rapidly reeled in to minimize the threat of detection. 
Otherwise, the units are stationary and silent, granting each a score of one. Glider must surface 
during communications operations, and it cannot rapidly dive to avoid detection. Not only is a 
larger RCS displayed due to the increased percentage of the UUV is exposed, but Glider cannot 
rapidly reduce its RCS by diving quickly. Due to this vulnerability, Glider receives a score of 
zero.
Covert Deployability refers to the ability to insert each system concept into an 
operational area without alerting threat contacts, sidestepping the whole issue of a detection 
threat. V-CAP and LD-UUV are both capable of long distance underwater delivery from 
submarines, granting them a score of one. Glider has marginal propulsion capability, but it can 
reliably travel long distances to provide a covert standoff range for deploying assets. Glider is a 
covert, although not rapid, deployable system so it receives a score of one. Squid must be air 
dropped or launched via artillery fire, both of which are likely to illicit the attention of units 
operating in the deployment area. For this reason, Squid receives a score of zero.
Averaging the scores for the four areas, a final value for the Capability to Avoid 
Detection for each concept is reached. V-CAP and LD-UUV tie by meeting all subcategory 
requirements, resulting in an overall score of one for each. Squid achieves an average score of 
0.5 placing it third, and Glider comes in last with a score of 0.25 with only its covert deployment 
capability contributing to OPSEC.
5.1.5 Performance Analysis Results
Table 5.6 is a compilation of the performance analysis results by MOE.
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Table 5.6: Summary of Performance Analysis Results
Threshold Goal V-CAP LD-UUV Glider Squid
Capability to Operate for 
Minimum of 30 Days (days) 30 180 123 126 987 16
Average Data Message 
Completion Time (minutes) 10 0 4.61 3.01 14.13 3.60
Capability for Deployment 
by both Current and Future 
Platforms (# of platforms)
1 3 2.5 1.5 1.0 1.0
Capability for Recovery by 
both Contemporary and 
Future Platforms (# of 
platforms)
0 3 3.0 1.5 2.0 0.0
Probability of Detection (%) 0 1 0.81 0.81 0.75 0.98
Probability of Kill (%) 0 1 0.59 0.38 0.19 0.08
Capability to Avoid Detection 
(rating) 0 1 1.00 1.00 0.25 0.50
5.1.6 Overall Measure of Effectiveness
To compare the performance of the four concepts, a single value representing the overall 
effectiveness of each concept must be developed. Normalizing and averaging the performance 
results alone does not provide a realistic Overall Measure of Effectiveness (OMOE). To reach a 
true OMOE, an Analytical Hierarchy Process is used to determine the weighting of stakeholder 
needs. Those stakeholder needs are referenced to functions, and those functions are referenced to 
the MOEs used to judge performance by a Quality Functional Deployment (QFD) for the 
purpose of deriving weightings for each MOE. Weighted, normalized performance results are 
then summed to calculate an OMOE value for each alternative. 
A sensitivity analysis is then performed to ensure that the resultant weights do not 
adversely skew the results. Upon completion of the sensitivity analysis and any adjustments 
deemed necessary by those results, a final OMOE exists for each alternative that can be then 
used, along with the results of the cost and risk analyses, to make a final system 
recommendation.
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5.1.6.1 Analytical Hierarchy Process
To start the process, the seven need areas are compared to each other using a standardized 




4. Persistent Forward Presence
5. Enemy Prosecution (manned and unmanned)
6. Operational Picture Development
7. Platform Independence
Table 5.7 shows the need area comparison while Table 5.8 provides an explanation of 
each value in the ranking system.
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Table 5.7: Need Area Comparison
More Important Need Area Less Important Need Area Intensity
Threat Discrimination Detection Avoidance 5
Threat Discrimination Adjustable Autonomy 1
Persistent Forward Presence Threat Discrimination 5
Threat Discrimination Enemy Prosecution(manned and unmanned) 1
Threat Discrimination Operational Picture Development 2
Threat Discrimination Platform Independence 5
Detection Avoidance Adjustable Autonomy 3
Persistent Forward Presence Detection Avoidance 5
Enemy Prosecution
(manned and unmanned) Detection Avoidance 4
Operational Picture Development Detection Avoidance 5
Detection Avoidance Platform Independence 5
Persistent Forward Presence Adjustable Autonomy 5
Enemy Prosecution
(manned and unmanned) Adjustable Autonomy 5
Operational Picture Development Adjustable Autonomy 9
Adjustable Autonomy Platform Independence 1
Persistent Forward Presence Enemy Prosecution(manned and unmanned) 1
Operational Picture Development Persistent Forward Presence 3
Persistent Forward Presence Platform Independence 9
Enemy Prosecution
(manned and unmanned) Operational Picture Development 1
Enemy Prosecution
(manned and unmanned) Platform Independence 9
Operational Picture Development Platform Independence 9
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Table 5.8: The Saaty AHP Rating Scale102
Intensity of
Importance Definition Explanation
1 Equal importance Two factors contribute equally to the objective
3 Somewhat moreimportant Experience and judgment slightly favor one over the other
5 Much moreimportant Experience and judgment strongly favor one over the other
7 Very much moreimportant
Experience and judgment very strongly favor one over the 
other. Its importance is demonstrated in practice
9 Absolutely moreimportant
The evidence favoring one over the other is of the highest 
possible validity
2, 4, 6, 8 Intermediatevalues When compromise is needed
Using Saaty’s scale, Threat Discrimination, for example, has a rating of five over 
Detection Avoidance, meaning that it is “much more important” and that “experience and 
judgment strongly favor [Discrimination] over [Detection Avoidance].” These values are derived 
from Needs Analysis. Validation of these numbers is addressed following discussion of the 
ensuing pairwise analysis shown in Table 5.9.
102Coyle, Geoff. The Analytic Heirarchy Process (AHP). Harlow, 2004. 2.
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Capability 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Weighting
Threat 
Discrimination 1 1.00 5.00 5.00 1.00 0.20 1.00 2.00 0.151
Detection Avoidance 2 0.20 1.00 3.00 0.20 0.25 0.20 5.00 0.066
Adjustable Autonomy 3 0.20 0.33 1.00 0.20 0.20 0.11 1.00 0.031
Persistent Forward 




5 5.00 4.00 5.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 9.00 0.266
Operational Picture 
Development 6 1.00 5.00 9.00 3.00 1.00 1.00 9.00 0.273
Platform 
Independence 7 0.50 0.20 1.00 0.11 0.11 0.11 1.00 0.029
Column Sum 8.90 20.53 29.00 6.51 3.76 3.76 36.00 1
Lambda Max Calculation 1.26 1.26 0.92 1.23 1.00 1.05 1.03 7.75
Consistency Index 0.125
Random Index (2001) - Saaty 1.32
Consistency Ratio 9%
A simple, or one-way, comparison relates the first need area to the six remaining areas in 
a pairwise matrix to generate comparative weights for each need. The process shown in Table 5.9 
is a comprehensive pairwise analysis wherein each need area is compared to every other need 
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area to provide a more exact weighting breakdown. Weighting is determined by averaging the 
normalized values for each comparison. Normalized values are determined for each cell by 
dividing the value of that cell by the column sum for that cell’s column.103 The following 
















This process can lead to inconsistencies in rankings; for example, in a simple three-way 
comparison between items A, B, and C, it follows that if A is better than B, and B is better than 
C, that A should be better than C. Inadvertently giving deference to C over A can be readily 
identified, but the process becomes more complex as more items are considered.104 In this case, 
the presence of seven need areas results in a total of 21 comparisons. To maximize consistency, 
Saaty’s random index (1.35 for n = 7)105 is applied to measure the overall consistency of 
response. Any value of 10% or less is indicative of acceptable consistency.106
This consistency ratio is determined by finding the geometric mean of each row. That 
geometric mean is divided by the sum of all row geometric means to develop a priority vector for 
each row. The column sum for each column is multiplied by the corresponding priority vector to 





∑ Priority Row −n
n−1
The original revision of this pairwise analysis resulted in a consistency index greater than 
30%. The values in Table 5.7 reflect the adjustments made to reduce the ratio to the 9%, while 
satisfying a common sense check and maintaining agreement with priorities identified in Needs 
Analysis. Figure 5.10 shows the final weighting of each need area. 
103 Hahn, Danny. "The Analytic Hierarchy Process." 2007. INCOSE.org. 11 May 2011 






Figure 5.10: Need Area Weighting Results
From Figure 5.10, it is evident that the key needs for AUWS are the ability to develop an 
operational picture of an AOR, prosecute enemies within that AOR, and to do so while 
maintaining a persistent forward presence with accurate discrimination capability. These four 
factors therefore hold the most influence in the analysis of alternatives. Detection avoidance, 
adjustable autonomy, and platform independence are of a significantly lower value.
5.1.6.2 Quality Functional Deployment
The next step of the Performance Analysis is to derive relative weightings for the seven 
MOEs to be analyzed given the weighting for the seven need areas derived from the pairwise 
analysis. A Quality Functional Deployment, a series of transformations using Houses of Quality, 
is employed to compare Needs to Functions.108 A House of Quality defines the relationship 
108 Provide Structure function is excluded. Provide Structure is a function defined by the provision of a physical 
architecture and enclosures to hold the components that execute the other functions of the system. It does not 
have any bearing on the weighting of the remaining six functions.
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between desires and capabilities using affinity values.109 Table 5.10 shows the first House of 
Quality.
Table 5.10: House of Quality 1 (Needs to Functions)
The weights determined in the pairwise analysis are listed in bold next to their associated 
need area. The italicized numbers represent affinity values linking need areas to functions. A 
value of nine indicates a strong affinity between the need and function. A value of three indicates 
a moderate affinity, a value of one is used for a slight affinity and a blank cell (zero) is used for 
no affinity. Affinities are subjective values derived from the needs analysis. The need weights are 
multiplied by the affinity numbers for each comparison, and then those values are summed to 
produce a weighted performance for each function. Each individual weighted performance is 
normalized to the sum of all weighted performances to produce a weighting for each function. 
The results of the first House of Quality are shown in visual format in Figure 5.11.
109 Blanchard, Benjamin S. and Wolter J. Fabrycky, Systems Engineering and Analysis, 4th ed. Upper Saddle River, 
2006. 77.
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Figure 5.11: Functional Weighting Results
The provided affinity values indicate that Perform C3, Perform ISR, and Prosecute are 
the most valuable functions, which supports the use of Communications, Sensors, and Weapons 
systems as the three critical elements for concept generation. This concurrence provides 
validation for the affinity values selected. Provide Power ranks fourth, with Maneuver and 
Provide OPSEC ranking last within a few hundredths of a point of each other. The low 
prioritization of these functions highlights the importance of considering systems that have little 
to no maneuvering or evasion capabilities, such as Glider and Squid. 
The next House of Quality compares functions to the MOEs selected for analysis, as 
shown in Table 5.11.
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Table 5.11: House of Quality 2 (Functions to MOEs)
Just as in the previous House of Quality, the previously determined functional weightings 
are listed in the column next to their respective functions. The columns represent the seven 
MOEs to be analyzed. The italicized numbers are affinity values derived from needs analysis, 
with nine representing a strong affinity, three representing a moderate affinity, one representing a 
slight affinity, and a blank cell (zero) representing no affinity between the function and MOE. 
The scores for each MOE are multiplied by the functional weightings to achieve weighted 
performances, which are then normalized to provide a final weighting for each MOE, which are 
shown graphically in Figure 5.12. 
130
Figure 5.12: MOE Weighting Results
Probability of Detection and the Capability to Transmit Message rank first and second, 
respectively, with a nominal margin of thee hundredths of a point. This further validates the 
consistent emphasis on sensors and communications systems. Probability of Kill is third, which 
validates the focus on weapons systems as the third primary factor. The capability to operate for 
a minimum of 30 days ranks fourth, detection avoidance is fifth, and the two maneuver MOEs, 
deployment and recovery capability, rank fifth and sixth. Again, the minimal influence on 
recovery capability is appropriate because it will not adversely affect systems that are non-
recoverable or expendable by design, such as Squid.
5.1.6.3 OMOE Determination
With weightings now derived for each of the seven MOEs being evaluated, the 
performance analysis results are normalized, as shown in Table 5.12.
131
Table 5.12: Performance Score Normalization
The threshold, goal and raw score values for each MOE are listed at the top of Table 5.12. 
The second section of rows, labeled Intermediate Scores, shows adjusted scores that use 
threshold and goal values as bounds. Some intermediate scores are negative, such as Glider MCT 
or Squid Endurance, because the system does not meet the threshold value. Intermediate scores 
are comparative in nature. The third section, labeled Scaled Scores, truncates numbers above one 
or below zero. This is done to facilitate the production of an OMOE in a consistent range and, 
more importantly, prevents extraneous reward for a system that greatly exceeds the identified 
goal. Likewise, no relative benefit is given to systems that “fail better” than other failing 
systems. 
The scaled performance scores, weightings, and resultant OMOE are shown in Table 
5.13. Each scaled score is multiplied by the associated weighting and summed to create an 
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OMOE score. These numbers are appropriately weighted overall performance scores for each 
concept. Each score is traceable to the original needs analysis and the resultant functional 
analysis because the weights of the needs and functions are considered in the determination of 
the analysis MOE weights. 
Table 5.13: Overall Measure of Effectiveness
5.1.7 Sensitivity Analysis
The weights used to determine each concept’s OMOE must be evaluated by sensitivity 
analysis to ensure that the subjective inputs used to develop those weightings do not adversely 
affect results. To analyze sensitivity, each MOE weighting is adjusted to a value of 1.00, 
resulting in all other weights equaling zero. With all emphasis placed on a single variable, a new 
OMOE is derived. Plotting the regular OMOE along with the new OMOE, a linear equation is 
developed that represents the relationship between variable weighting and OMOE for each 
alternative. Plotting the four linear equations gives a visual representation of the effect of 
variable weighting on each alternative. Points at which intersections occur are indicative of 
crossover points where an adjustment in weighting would change the rankings of the alternatives 
for that particular weight. Using this visual representation, one can determine whether minor 
adjustments would change the preferred alternative.110




Figure 5.13: Endurance Sensitivity
The vertical line near the origin of Figure 5.13 is representative of the analytical 
weighting of the MOE, 0.162. At all weightings from 0 to 0.162 the relative rankings of the 
different alternatives remain the same. V-CAP and LD-UUV remain first and second, 
respectively until this MOE’s weighting reaches a value above 0.5, as Glider’s impressive 
endurance drastically improves its OMOE. Squid’s OMOE slope is almost inversely proportional 
to Glider’s due to its low endurance. From Figure 5.13, it is evident that the 30 day endurance 
MOE is appropriately weighted, as no change in the top two alternatives will occur unless the 
weighting is more than doubled, which is unrealistic.
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5.1.7.2 Communications Sensitivity
Figure 5.14: Communications Sensitivity
The analytical weighting of the Communications MOE is set at 0.221, represented by the 
vertical blue line in Figure 5.14. An increase in this MOE’s weighting favors LD-UUV and 
SQUID due to their distributed network configurations. LD-UUV’s shorter communications time 
allows the concept to overtake V-CAP as the number one alternative at a weighting nearly double 
that of the analytical value. V-CAP suffers from relying completely on acoustic modems for 
internal communication and Glider suffers due to a very slow time to communicate driven by the 
slow ascent from depth to surface. From this portion of the sensitivity analysis, it is evident that 
only a significant increase in weighting would change the respective rankings of the system, 
which validates the analytical weighting.
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5.1.7.3 Deployment Sensitivity
Figure 5.15: Deployment Sensitivity
The analytical weight is set at 0.082 for the deployment MOE. The lack of intersection 
points in Figure 5.15 indicates that no possible change in the weighting of this variable will have 
an effect on the final ranking of the four concepts. V-CAP, which can be launched from all three 
types of platforms, will have continued improvement in MOE value as the weighting increases. 
The other three alternatives will decrease in value, as none of them are as platform independent 
as V-CAP for deployment. This diagram indicates that the analytical weighting of the 
deployment MOE is acceptable.
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5.1.7.4 Recovery Sensitivity
Figure 5.16: Recovery Sensitivity
As shown in Figure 5.16, V-CAP is again the top-ranked alternative regardless of 
recovery MOE weighting, initially set at 0.022. V-CAP’s ability to be recovered by all three 
types of platforms is reflected in the upward slope of its line, while Squid’s inability to be 
recovered drives its slope steeply downward. An increase in weighting benefits Glider, but the 
weighting would need to be increased almost thirty times before Glider would rank second, and 
it would still not score any better relative to V-CAP. For this reason, the analytical value of the 
recovery MOE weighting is acceptable.
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5.1.7.5 Detection Sensitivity
Figure 5.17: Probability of Detection Sensitivity
Set at 0.224, Probability of Detection is one of the top three MOEs by weight for this 
Analysis of Alternatives. As shown in Figure 5.17, V-CAP and LD-UUV will not change their 
rankings relative to each other regardless of change in MOE weighting. Squid, with its top marks 
in Pd (due to its distributed network and heavy overlap of sensor footprint) will become the top-
ranked alternative if and only if the MOE weighting is tripled to a value greater than 0.6. This 




Figure 5.18: Probability of Kill Sensitivity
Probability of Kill is weighted at 0.167, marked by the vertical blue line in Figure 5.18. 
V-CAP and LD-UUV do not change respective rankings at first and second for any value of Pk 
weighting. Squid and Glider do change rankings above 0.3, but this is inconsequential. Based on 
a lack of change in top alternative ranking, the initial value of prosecution MOE weighting is 
acceptable.
5.1.7.7 Detection Avoidance Sensitivity
Figure 5.19: Detection Avoidance Sensitivity
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 Detection avoidance is initially weighted at 0.122. Figure 5.19 shows that V-CAP and 
LD-UUV both approach a perfect OMOE score as weighting increases, but no change in ranking 
occurs at any value. Glider, with the lowest detection avoidance score, approaches a rank of zero 
as weighting increases, but no change in relative position occurs, as shown by a lack of 
intersections. For this reason, the weighting of the detection avoidance MOE is acceptable.
5.1.7.8 Sensitivity Analysis Results
V-CAP emerged as the top alternative under a reasonable distribution of MOE 
weightings. The three stochastically determined performance MOEs are perhaps the most critical 
and the most defensible values, as they are decidedly less subjective than the other MOEs. 
Focusing attention on Communications, Sensors, and Weapons MOEs still shows a noticeable 
preference towards V-CAP.
5.1.8 Performance Analysis Summary
The comprehensive scoring of the four concepts is shown in Figure 5.20.
Figure 5.20: Performance Analysis Results Summary (OMOE)
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All scores are on a zero to one scale. V-CAP is the highest performing concept with a 
score of 0.741, or 74.1%. LD-UUV is a close second with a score of 0.678, or 67.8%. Squid is 
third at 0.485 or 48.5%, and Glider has the lowest utility with a score of 0.376, or 37.6%. 
5.1.8.1 V-CAP
Of the three critical MOEs, Probability of Detection, Average Data Message Completion 
Time, and Probability of Kill, V-CAP only ranks first in Probability of Kill. The concept’s slower 
communications time and lower probability of detection are influenced by its smaller network 
and reliance on acoustic communications, but the concept’s top marks in deployability, 
recoverability, and detection avoidance coupled with its solid second place performance in 
endurance and superior prosecution performance give this alternative sufficient utility to rank 
ahead of the other concepts. 
5.1.8.2 LD-UUV
A close second, LD-UUV’s primary strength is its rapid ability to communicate, which is 
achieved by its hardwired paired node system. Average MCT is the only MOE in which LD-
UUV dominates the other alternatives, but the heavy weight of the communication MOE gives 
LD-UUV significant benefit. LD-UUV is comparable to V-CAP in that it is a mobile asset with 
deployable sensors and precision attack weapons. For this reason, its overall scores in other 
categories are very similar to V-CAP. Due primarily to its larger size the LD-UUV concept falls 
behind V-CAP, which reduces endurance capability as well as the number of assets that can 
deploy and retrieve the unit. LD-UUV’s final OMOE is lower than that of V-CAP, but this 
concept should not be discounted since it may have multiple utility in mission profiles other than 
the one modeled for this comparison.
5.1.8.3 Squid
Squid ranks third in performance among the four alternatives. The system’s distributed 
network gives it a large sensor footprint with sufficient overlap to provide a high probability of 
detection and a rapid MCT, which account for the majority of Squid’s utility. The low-yield, 
unguided, floating munitions employed by the system are not conducive to a high probability of 
kill, strongly reducing its overall performance score. The system’s lack of maneuverability or 
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recoverability also has negative effects on its OMOE; however, these effects are minor when 
compared to its inability to effectively prosecute threats.
5.1.8.4 Glider
Glider’s performance is lowest overall with an OMOE of less than half of the top 
alternative. While Glider sports the highest endurance of any alternative, it pays the price in 
speed and maneuverability. Those shortfalls hinder the speed at which Glider can transmit a 
message, reduce the likelihood of a successful engagement with a target (reducing Probability of 
Kill), and reduce the Probability of Avoiding Detection. Further reducing Glider’s utility is the 
reduction in the number of available weapons and sensing assets as engagements occur, since the 
number of Gliders on station decreases by one each time an attack is mounted.
5.2. Cost Analysis
The complexities involved in estimating the cost of conceptual systems, such as 
candidate AUWS concepts, do not favor a detailed accurate analysis of Life Cycle Cost. The 
results of this cost analysis will not provide a detailed LCC estimate of each AUWS concept 
accurate to within plus or minus a certain percentage; rather, a means of comparative analysis 
based on a similar functional framework is generated. In order to provide a comprehensive LCC 
estimate, additional, detailed examination of each individual concept would be necessary. Only 
the most pertinent portions of an LCCE are calculated in this analysis in order to provide a 
foundation for top level comparison. Figure 5.21 shows the generalized form of an LCCE. The 
sum of each section provides the total cost of a system over its useful life.
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Figure 5.21: Life Cycle Cost Estimate111
5.2.1 Research and Development Cost
Research and Development (R&D) costs are not included in the estimate for comparison. 
The least mature technology for all AUWS concepts is the decision engine. According to RAND 
Corporation, a 2008 survey of undersea vehicle developers indicates that autonomy is the single 
greatest long-term challenge in developing systems like AUWS.112 IBM’s state of the art 
supercomputer Watson (detailed in Appendix G) is able to audibly gather information and 
generate solutions to a problem with varying confidence levels. Each AUWS system will require 
a similar capability to autonomously identify and engage a target without producing a type I error 
(identifying a friendly or unknown contact as a threat and engaging it). Research and 
development of a super-compact Watson-like computer is needed. The costs incurred in the 
development of a miniaturized computer with such high processing capabilities is presumed to 
capture the bulk of R&D costs no matter the AUWS platform shape or size variant selected; 
required R&D expenditures apply equally to all concepts and are not calculated. 
111 Nussbaum, Daniel. Definitions and Terminology. Monterey: Naval Postgraduate Schook, 2011.




Procurement costs, or acquisition costs, will have a significant effect on a life cycle cost 
estimate. The amount of materiel to procure, the interval of procurement, and the possibility of 
future upgrades are only a few of the issues that affect procurement cost. Further analysis of the 
specific Science and Technology Gap related to AUWS is required for these issues to be 
clarified. Simple comparative estimations for procurement costs, detailed for each concept 
variant below, were developed and incorporated in the AUWS LCCE.
5.2.3 Operations and Support Cost
Operation and Support costs (O&S) have the greatest variation between concepts and are 
the costs used in the comparison of concepts. Each concept makes use of different quantities of 
acoustic sensors, warheads, energy (be it in the form of battery power, fuel cell, or Otto fuel II), 
and some type of fuselage. It is by way of analogy to current DoD materiel paired with the 
modeling and simulation scenario that an O&S estimate for each concept is generated.
An important component of O&S cost that is not addressed in this analysis is personnel 
cost. The unmanned nature of the AUWS concepts does not alleviate the need for personnel to 
train on, maintain, and operate the systems. In a larger arena, there is significant debate as to 
whether unmanned systems reduce personnel costs at all. This analysis assumes personnel costs 
will not differ greatly among the four concepts, and a detailed breakdown of such costs is left for 
further analysis.
In the modeling and simulation scenario, each concept operates in a 10 NM by 3 NM area 
with a depth of 300 feet. The simulations reveal the number of components necessary to cover 
the entire volume of water for each concept. They also reveal the average number of 
engagements conducted in the simulated time frame. These results aid the formation of an 
operational requirements construct for various periods of time. Each AUWS concept will operate 
24 hours a day for 30 days. It is assumed that AUWS will be employed six months out of every 
year. All concepts face the same deployment over one month, one year, ten years, and twenty 
years for the O&S estimate. On average, AUWS will be cleared to engage threats one day per 30 
day period. In other words, the results of one simulation run are used to determine weapons 
expended over the entire 30 day period.
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This cost analysis assumes a constant deployment schedule, constant threats, and no 
required upgrades to the systems. Within this simplified analytical construct, the four potential 
AUWS concepts can be effectively compared.
5.2.3.1 Common Equipment and General Assumptions
• All dollar values are given in fiscal year 2011 dollars.
• The cost of the employed acoustic sensor will be the same across all concepts and is 
analogous to the cost of a DICASS buoy (SSQ-62). The DICASS buoy has a maximum 
operation time of eight hours. From the Military Cost Handbook, each DICASS buoy 
costs the Navy $1,100.113 This returns a cost of $138 per hour of operation. With 720 
hours in a 30 day period, the cost of one sensor amounts to $99,000. This cost 
encompasses the hardware, software, and sensor energy used for the 30 day period. Since 
the DICASS buoy estimate also includes its ability to communicate, communication 
system costs are folded into the sensor cost estimate.
• Otto fuel II cost is derived from the cost and unclassified capabilities of a Mk-46 torpedo. 
From Appendix F, the energy stored in a Mk-46 torpedo is estimated at 40.5 MJ. The 
Military Cost Handbook prices the torpedo at $280,100.114 The dollar cost of each MJ 
provided by Otto fuel II is $6,916. 
• The automotive industry provides the current cost of lithium ion battery power. AUWS 
energy cost estimates associated with lithium batteries make use of Nissan Motor 
Company’s cost estimate of $375 per kilowatt hour ($104.2 per MJ).115 This estimate is 
not reflective of the expected cost decrease over the life of AUWS. 
• Explosive material cost is analogous to the Mk-54 torpedo. The Mk-54 carries 97 pounds 
(44 kg) of explosive material. Each torpedo costs $535,200.116 The cost per pound of 
explosive is $5,518, or $12,165 per kilogram.
113 Nicholas, Ted and Rossi, Rita. “SONAR/Sonobuoy Costs.” Military Cost Handbook. 13th ed. Fountain Valley: 
Data Search Associates. 2009. 3-4.
114 Nicholas, Ted and Rossi, Rita. “Torpedo/Mine Costs.” Military Cost Handbook. 12th ed. Fountain Valley: Data 
Search Associates. 1991. 9-4, 9-5.
115 Electric Vehicle News. "Nissan say Leaf EV Battery Pack Cost Only $375 per kWh." 6 May 2010. electric-
vehicles-cars-bikes.blogspot.com. 13 May 2011 <http://electric-vehicles-cars-bikes.blogspot.com/2010/05/
nissan-say-leaf-ev-battery-pack-cost.html>.
116 Nicholas, Ted and Rossi, Rita. “Torpedo/Mine Costs.” Military Cost Handbook. 13th ed. Fountain Valley: Data 
Search Associates. 2009. 5-4, 5-5.
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5.2.3.2 LD-UUV Cost Estimate
This concept employs a single LD-UUV that traverses into the operational area, delivers 
networked acoustic sensors, then lies in wait to deploy ordnance as necessary. At the conclusion 
of the 30 day mission, the vehicle transits out of the area of interest for collection by the 
controlling agency. The LD-UUV is assumed to have a lifespan of five years while supporting 
the simulated operational demand. It is also assumed that no intermediate or depot level 
maintenance is considered and no LD-UUV body is lost during the five year lifespan. The cost 
associated with the LD-UUV body is detailed as follows:
• The cost of the LD-UUV body is analogous to the cost of the Advanced SEAL Delivery 
System (ASDS) in terms of dollars per cubic foot. The United States Government 
Accounting Office (GAO) prices each ASDS at about $351 million.117 The 65 foot long 
by 8 foot diameter vehicle has a cost of about $108,000 per cubic foot. The LD-UUV 
body is envisioned to be 20 feet long and 80 inches in diameter giving a total volume of 
about 700 cubic feet. The cost of one LD-UUV body is about $75 million. 
◦ Ten Year Estimate (body): $150,197,000 
◦ Twenty Year Estimate (body): $300,392,000
• The LD-UUV delivers 16 non-recoverable acoustic sensor nodes throughout the area of 
interest for every 30 day mission. 
◦ Ten Year Estimate (sensors): $95,040,000
◦ Twenty Year Estimate (sensors): $190,080,000
• LD-UUV fires an average of three lightweight torpedoes in one 30 day mission. The 
lightweight torpedo is analogous to the Mk-54 torpedo. Each Mk-54 costs $535,200.
◦ Ten Year Estimate (weapons): $96,336,000
◦ Twenty Year Estimate (weapons): $192,672,000
• Lithium ion batteries power LD-UUV. It is estimated from Endurance Analysis that 532 
MJ are required for a 30 day mission. 
◦ Ten Year Estimate (energy): $3,326,000
117 Government Accounting Office. “Defense Acquisitions: Assessment of Selected Major Weapon Programs.” 
Washington: GPO, 2005. 27.
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◦ Twenty Year Estimate (energy): $6,652,000
• For the selected cost metrics (body, sensor, weapons, and propulsion energy) the total ten 
and twenty year operational cost estimates for LD-UUV are:
◦ Ten Year Estimate: $345 million
◦ Twenty Year Estimate: $690 million
5.2.3.3 V-CAP Cost Estimate
The V-CAP concept makes use of five vehicles (one Hunter Unit and four Killer Units) to 
meet the operational demand of the model scenario. To simplify the estimate, both V-CAP body 
types will have a lifespan of five years while supporting the simulated operational demand. No 
intermediate or depot level maintenance is considered and it is assumed that no V-CAP body is 
lost during the five year lifespan. The cost associated with the V-CAP bodies is detailed as 
follows:
• The cost to replace expired V-CAP bodies is assumed to be analogous to various Mk-48 
torpedo variants. The complexity of the Hunter Unit drives it to be analogous to the cost 
per kilogram of the Mk-48 Common Broadband Advanced Sonar System (CBASS). Each 
CBASS carries a cost of $3.8 million and has a mass of about 1670 kilograms ($2,275 per 
kilogram),118 which is equivalent to the projected mass of the Hunter Unit.
◦ Ten Year Estimate (Hunter Unit body): $7,600,000
◦ Twenty Year Estimate (Hunter Unit body): $15,200,000
• The Killer Unit cost is analogous to the cost per kilogram of the original Mk-48. Each 
original Mk-48 carries a cost of $2.97 million and has a mass of about 1550 kilograms 
($1,916 per kilogram).119 The mass of the killer is assumed to be the mass of the original 
Mk-48 less the mass of the explosive (1550-290=1260 kg).
◦ Ten Year Estimate (Killer Unit body): $19,315,000
◦ Twenty Year Estimate (Killer Unit body): $38,629,000
118 “Mk-48 CBASS.” Deagle.com. 25 Mar. 2011. 
<http://www.deagel.com/Torpedoes/Mark  -48-CBASS_a001143002.aspx  >.
119 Polmar, Norman. "The Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet: Torpedoes." United States Naval Institute 
Proceedings, Nov.1978. 159.
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• V-CAP Hunter Unit deploys eight non-recoverable acoustic sensors for every 30 day 
mission. 
◦ Ten Year Estimate (sensors): $47,520,000 
◦ Twenty Year Estimate (sensors): $95,040,000 
• V-CAP Killer Unit fires an average of 4.8 mini torpedoes in a 30 day operational period. 
The V-CAP torpedo is considered analogous to the Compact Rapid Attack Weapon 
(CRAW); however, the CRAW is still in a developmental phase and therefore lacks 
reliable unit cost data. The costs of the CRAW and V-CAP mini torpedoes are analogous 
to the Mk-54 torpedo by the previously calculated ratio of cost per unit of explosive. 
Each V-CAP mini torpedo carries 20 kilograms of explosive and is thus $243,270 per 
unit.
◦ Ten Year Estimate (weapons): $70,063,000 
◦ Twenty Year Estimate (weapons): $140,125,000 
• From Endurance Analysis, it is estimated that each Hunter Unit will require 33 MJ of 
energy for a 30 day operational period. It is assumed that Killer Units will require an 
equivalent amount of energy. Five total bodies are required for the same time period. V-
CAP stores half of its energy in the form of Otto fuel II, and the other half in lithium ion 
batteries.
◦ Ten Year Estimate (energy): $34,750,000 
◦ Twenty Year Estimate (energy): $69,450,000 
• For the selected cost metrics the total ten and twenty year operational cost estimates for 
V-CAP are:
◦ Ten Year Estimate: $179 million
◦ Twenty Year Estimate: $359 million
5.2.3.4 Glider Cost Estimate
The Glider concept makes use of 17 vehicles to meet the operational demand of the 
model scenario. Glider bodies are assumed to have a lifespan of three years while supporting the 
simulated operational demand. No intermediate or depot level maintenance is considered and it is 
assumed that no Glider body is lost (outside of the performance of its mission) during the five 
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year lifespan. The cost structure of the Glider concept is slightly different due to the fact that 
each Glider vehicle is the body, sensor, and warhead. Only Gliders that have not engaged a target 
are recovered following a 30 day operation. An average of 1.5 Gliders engages a target in every 
30 day operation. New Gliders replenish the pack to ensure every operation begins with 17 
Gliders. A Discrete Time Markov Chain model is used to estimate the number of the original 17 
Gliders that survive three years of deployment. From this model it is determined that, on average, 
3.2 units reach the end of their three year operational lifespan and require replacement. Beyond 
the three year deployment, Gliders may or may not require replacement following each 
operational month due to the age and survival of replenished units. Analysis is simplified by 
assuming a total of 3.2 units are replaced every three years. 
Glider body cost is analogous the cost of Teledyne Webb’s Slocum Glider. Rand 
Corporation reports the unit cost of Slocum Glider as $50,000 in 2002 dollars,120 which equates 
to $60,000 in 2011 dollars using the Navy Weapons Procurement (WPN) inflation index.121 The 
Slocum Glider is very compact having a body length of only 1.5 meters and a mass of 52 
kilograms.122 The volume of the AUWS Glider is slightly larger – to accommodate armament, 
terminal propulsion, sensors, communications, and energy stores – while the mass of the AUWS 
Glider is roughly doubled, hence a doubling in cost is appropriate. A single Glider body costs 
$120,000. 
Each Glider is equipped with one acoustic sensor, a ten kilogram warhead, a magnesium 
air fuel cell, and Otto fuel II for terminal propulsion. The associated cost of the sensor and the 
warhead are derived in the same manner as previous systems. 
The cost of magnesium air fuel cells is estimated at $185 per MJ, based on current market data.123 
Since Gliders only require a capacity of 1.3 MJ from their fuel cells for a 30 day mission, the 
unit cost is estimated at $240. For target intercept, assuming that the terminal maneuver of Glider 
is 20 knots for 15 seconds, energy required to overcome drag is 0.12 MJ. This energy value is 
derived from V-CAP range calculations found in Appendix F (Glider and V-CAP have equivalent 
120 Button, Robert W, et al. A Survey of Missions for Unmanned Undersea Vehicles. Santa Monica: RAND 
Corporation, 2009. 156.
121 Naval Center for Cost Analysis. "JIC_Inflation_Calc_FY11_Ver1a.xls." 2011. ncca.navy.mil. 13 May 2011 
<www.ncca.navy.mil/tools/JIC_Inflation_Calc_FY11_Ver1a.xls>.
122 Button 156.
123 Alibaba.com. Magnesium air fuel cell. 2011. 13 May 2011
 <http://www.alibaba.com/product-free/101662196/Magnesium_air_fuel_cell.html>.
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drag coefficients). Each Glider is loaded with enough Otto fuel II, estimated at $6,916 per MJ, to 
complete one terminal prosecution. The total cost of energy, combining the fuel cell and Otto 
fuel II, is $1000 per unit. 
The estimated cost of a Glider unit, $342,000, is the sum of the costs associated with the 
body, sensor, warhead, and energy. 
• Given the unit cost and the expected attrition rate, the total ten and twenty year 
operational cost estimates for the Glider concept are:
◦ Ten Year Estimate: $40 million
◦ Twenty Year Estimate: $75 million
5.2.3.5 Squid
The Squid concept employs immobile networked sensor nodes each armed with six 
explosive charges. 130 nodes are required to cover the simulated operational area. All deployed 
nodes are non-recoverable. Nodes are deployed to an area of interest via artillery deployment or 
air drop. Artillery munitions provide the means for a cost analogy to a Squid node. 
Each Squid node, for costing purposes, is analogous to the Navy’s Extended Range 
Guided Munition (ERGM). GAO prices each ERGM round at roughly $56,000.124 At the given 
cost, the ERGM comes equipped with a propelling charge, munition (or submunitions depending 
on configuration), and navigation capabilities.125 The complexity of the ERGM is roughly 
equivalent to the complexity of Squid Weapons and Comms Nodes, with the exception of 
acoustic sensors. The unit cost of a Squid node is estimated at $155,000, accounting for the cost 
of an acoustic sensor in addition to the baseline ERGM cost. Each deployment of 130 Squid 
nodes will cost approximately $20 million. 
• The ten and twenty year cost estimates for Squid are:
◦ Ten Year Estimate: $1,209 million
◦ Twenty Year Estimate: $2,418 million
5.2.4 Disposal Cost
Disposal costs are not calculated for this cost estimate.
124 Government Accounting Office. Defense Acquisitions: Challenges Remain in Developing Capabilities for Naval 
Surface Fire Support. Washington: GPO, 2006. 11.
125 GAO 11.
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5.2.5 Cost Analysis Summary
Overall twenty year cost estimates for each of the AUWS concepts are summarized in 
Table 5.14. Purely from an operational cost perspective, Glider is the most affordable alternative; 
however, cost is not the only factor involved in concept down selection. Various parameters are 
considered in the overall comparison to provide stakeholders with a system that meets their 
desires. For example, based on Pk, Glider may not be the best selection. The low cost of the 
system is thwarted by simulation results showing that very few Gliders actually succeed in 
engaging their targets. If the desire is to produce a glider-like system, then technological 
advances must be made to improve Pk or significantly more Gliders must be introduced to the 
operational area. Either case may significantly drive overall system costs up. Squid, on the other 
hand, is not a cost effective system given its high cost. If a specific need arises to develop a non-
recoverable, highly distributed system, the unit cost of Squid must first be driven down to an 
acceptable level to make the production decision fiscally sound. 
Table 5.14: Summary of Twenty Year Cost 
Estimates (FY11 $M)
V-CAP LD-UUV Glider Squid
Body 53.83 300.39 75 2,418
Sensors 95.04 190.08 -- --
Weapons 140.13 192.67 -- --
Energy 69.45 6.65 -- --
Total 359 690 75 2,418
5.3 Risk Analysis
A holistic approach is taken to assess the risk of each of the AUWS concepts. In the 
context of this analysis, risk is associated with the uncertainty of an unwanted event occurring. 
By exploring the technical, schedule, and cost aspects of the system in terms of its fundamental, 
hierarchical, and organizational structure; risk is comprehensively analyzed. Utilizing the Oak 






• Open to evaluation
• Politically acceptable
• Compatible with institutions
• Conducive to learning126
The trade-off between risks, benefits, and costs for the seven criteria – C3, ISR, 
Armament, Maneuver, OPSEC, Power, and Structure – of the four AUWS concepts are 
identified, quantified, and evaluated. By maintaining focus on technical, schedule, and cost risks, 
the likelihood and consequence of the critical areas are evaluated. Technical risk is determined 
by the possibility a requirement will not be achieved based on the combination of individual sub-
criteria within a risk factor criteria. Any factors influencing the technological development are 
considered, including budgeting and integration issues. Cost risks are based on the possibility 
that a system’s allocated budget would be exceeded. This includes cost over-runs and budgetary 
constraints factored over the system life cycle. Schedule risk is based on the possibility of the 
system failing to meet planned milestones. Schedule risks are often influenced by estimation 
errors originating in other areas. Taking all of these factors into consideration, risk is calculated 
as the probability of a risk event occurring (likelihood) multiplied by the severity of impact of 
that event (consequence).127 
The individual criteria level of risk is determined using a combination of empirical data 
and technical expertise. A more detailed breakdown of the empirical data used can be found in 
Appendix H. The likelihood and consequence of a risk event are rated using impact levels on a 
scale of one to five. The impact levels are determined based on the actual range of probability or 
severity assessed for each AUWS criteria. The relationship between the impact level, range, and 
weighting is shown in Table 5.15.
126 Fischhoff, B., et al., Approaches to Acceptable Risk: A Critical Guide. Eugene: Oak Ridge National Laboratory 
Sub-7656, 1980. 98.
127 Smith, Preston G. and Guy M. Merritt, Proactive Risk Management. New York: Productivity Press, 2002. 72.
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Table 5.15: Weighting Legend
Impact Level Actual Probability/Severity Range (%) Weighting
1 0 <= 20.5 0.1
2 20.5 <= 40.5 0.3
3 40.5 <= 60.5 0.5
4 60.5 <= 80.5 0.7
5 80.5 <= 100 0.9
An impact level one indicates a minimal impact by the assessed AUWS criteria. At the 
other end of the scale, an impact level five indicates a catastrophic impact to AUWS by the 
assessed criteria. Both consequence and likelihood impact levels are calculated for each AUWS 
criteria. These impact levels are then used to determine individual criteria Risk Factors for each 
AUWS concept.
5.3.1. Risk Factors
While there are several methodologies for assessing risk, risk is addressed here in terms 
of two major variables. These variables are then used to determine the overall total combined 
Risk Factor for the four AUWS concepts. The following mathematical expression, utilizing the 
individual criteria’s level of risk, is used:
Risk Factor RF =P fC f−P f  C f 
where Pf is the probability of failure and Cf is the consequence of failure.128 129 In order to 
determine the total risk for each of the AUWS concepts, the overall Pf and Cf are determined. The 
overall system Pf is determined by averaging the associated technical, schedule, and cost 
probabilities. The technical Pf averages the Pf for the seven criteria (determined from the 
associated weighting of the impact level) within each concept. In order to determine the overall 
Cf, the sum of the technical, schedule, and cost risks are determined relative to the consequence 
of their weighting:
C f =C f technical ∗ConsequenceWeighttechnicalC f schedule ∗ConsequenceWeight schedule
+ C f cost∗ConsequenceWeightcost
128 Blanchard, Benjamin S., Systems Engineering Management, 3rd ed. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 2004. 
328.
129 This model is adapted from the procedure included in the 1986 edition of the Systems Engineering Management 
Guide, published by the Defense Systems Management College, Fort Belvoir, VA. Although there are other 
models in use today, for the purpose of this analysis, this methodology is utilized and tailored for AUWS.
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The technical Cf for each system is determined in a similar fashion by summing each 
criteria’s Cf relative to the actual weight of the criteria: 
C f =C f  power ∗CriteriaWeight power...C f structure ∗CriteriaWeight structure
Table 5.16 shows the assessed overall Pf and Cf, and subsequent Risk Factor, for each AUWS 
concept.
Table 5.16: Total Risk Factor Results by System
AUWS Concept Pf Cf Risk Factor
V-CAP 0.34 0.32 0.55
LD-UUV 0.26 0.40 0.55
Glider 0.28 0.34 0.52
Squid 0.20 0.32 0.45
From the overall Risk Factors, a graphical representation of the relationship between 
likelihood and consequence, shown in Figure 5.22, is plotted for each of the four AUWS 
concepts. This analysis takes into account the individual criteria weighting as well as the 
weighting associated with the three categories, technical, schedule, and cost. The V-CAP and 
LD-UUV concepts exhibit the highest overall risk factors; this is due in large part to the level of 
immature technology which is further explained in the risk matrices analysis. Glider’s overall 
risk is slightly lower due to its reliance on more mature technology. Squid has the lowest risk 
factor, which is due primarily to the relative simplicity of its fundamental design.
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Figure 5.22: Overall Risk Factor Analysis for AUWS Concepts
5.3.2. Risk Management
With the risk factors of each criterion in the four AUWS concepts determined, each value 
is then applied to a risk analysis and reporting flow chart to determine the best course of action 
for risk management should the system be developed beyond the conceptual phase. Figure 5.23 
is the flow chart used for risk analysis. It delineates what mitigation actions or management 
procedures may be required based on the criteria overall risk factor. All of the AUWS concepts 
are assessed as Medium Risk overall. Risk Matrices help to highlight some of the individual 
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Figure 5.23: Risk Analysis Logical Flow Chart130
In addition to the risk flow chart, risk matrices are used to graphically represent the 
analysis of each criterion’s risk. Risk matrices are a pictorial representation of risk that 
qualitatively displays the risk priority in terms of likelihood and consequence. They provide 
decision makers with a means of prioritizing risk procedures. The matrices utilize green, yellow, 
and red sections to denote low, medium, and high risk respectively. As described in the flow 
chart above, low risks generally cause minimal impact, thus requiring minimal oversight. 
Medium risks may cause some problems to an overall program and require a mitigation plan to 
prevent a program disruption. High risks are those which have the potential to result in major 
disruptions to a program if left unaddressed. These risks require immediate and persistent action 
and review. A complete listing of risk matrices for all AUWS risk analysis can be found in 
130 Blanchard 331.
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Appendix I. The overall risk assessments for each of the four AUWS concepts’ individual factors 
are as follows.
5.3.3 V-CAP Risk Assessment
Table 5.17 illustrates that the areas requiring the most immediate attention for the V-CAP 
system are Cost, ISR, and Power. In order to mitigate some of the risk associated with ISR and 
Power, more resources should be allocated to the Research and Development phase. Since this 
system relies heavily on emerging technology the likelihood of cost over-runs is significant. This 
may be reduced through vigilant management of the project life cycle cost assessments.
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5.3.4 LD-UUV Risk Assessment
Similar to V-CAP, LD-UUV is faced with Cost, ISR, and Power as its areas most likely to 
incur difficulty, as depicted in Table 5.18. It follows logically that the same risk mitigation and 
management techniques utilized for V-CAP should be utilized for LD-UUV. A heavy reliance on 
emerging technology causes a significant risk cost over-runs.
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5.3.5 Glider Risk Assessment
Table 5.19 points out the most critical areas for the Glider concept are ISR and Maneuver. 
In order to mitigate some of the risk associated with ISR and Maneuver more resources should 
be allocated to the R&D phase. Of particular concern with Glider is the need for a significant 
increase in maximum speed. It is assessed that a minimum of two knots is necessary for Glider to 
be tactically useful and cost-effective. Given that power increases as the cube of velocity and that 
current gliders can maintain only an average speed of 0.5 knots headway, a 64-fold increase in 
power drawn from the environment will be required. Currents and other environmental factors 
only further increase the technological challenge to Glider. 
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5.3.6 Squid Risk Assessment
Table 5.20 indicates that Squid’s most critical areas are ISR, C3, and Power. Once again, 
in order to mitigate some of the risk associated with ISR, C3, and Power, more resources should 
be allocated to the R&D phase. Since this system is relatively simple in its design, cost and 
schedule over-runs are not as likely to occur; thus significantly reducing the overall system risk 
factor when compared to the V-CAP, LD-UUV, or Glider concepts. 
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5.3.7 Risk Analysis Summary
Figure 5.24 graphically depicts the relative risk for each criterion within the four AUWS 
concepts. This figure represents the relative magnitude of each evaluated risk factor when 
compared to its peers. While each concept has its individual risks, Power and ISR stand out as 
areas of high risk in most of the concepts.
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Figure 5.24: Individual Criteria Risk Factors for AUWS concepts
Figure 5.25 depicts the relative risk factor of the four AUWS concepts in terms of the 
weighting of the technical, schedule, and cost consequences. Technical risk stands out as the 
broadest concern. At least one of the concepts is considered low risk with regard to both cost and 
schedule; however, none of the concepts are considered low technical risk.
Figure 5.25: Consequence Risk Factors for AUWS concepts
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This risk analysis will aid decision makers in choosing the best system based on a better 
understanding of the relative risks associated among system designs. Additionally, critical areas 
within each system have been clearly identified and will further assist in mitigating adverse 
effects on the project life cycle due to unforeseen risks.
5.4 Comparison to the Status Quo
An important option to consider when confronting any challenging problem is to simply 
maintain the status quo. Often, a cost-effectiveness or risk analysis dictates that developing a 
new system would not be beneficial. This analysis considers how the Navy would address the 
generic scenario used in modeling and simulation, given that only traditional, currently available 
assets were utilized. The purpose is to determine if there is any benefit to investing in AUWS in 
the first place, and to validate the initial assumptions made regarding the advantages of 
unmanned systems. 
The specific objectives in the modeling scenario are to monitor the area of responsibility, 
detect all contacts, report contacts of interest to a remote command center, and prosecute contacts 
designated as threats. For the purposes of this scenario, AUWS is operating autonomously and 
does not require permission or triggering from external sources to prosecute threats.
There are several potentially viable assets available in the current inventory worth 
considering capable of meeting the scenario objectives. A traditional mine field could satisfy 
prosecution requirements; however, current mines do not have the capability to discriminate 
between threat and non-threat. Target detection technology could be improved upon to provide 
discrimination, but such improvement would require a significant investment on par with 
developing AUWS. If a traditional mine field were employed, the area of responsibility would be 
denied to all traffic. Furthermore, airborne assets would be required to deploy the mine field, 
since the fleet is currently phasing out the Submarine Launched Mobile Mine. Additional 
airborne or surface assets would be required for ISR and communication purposes. This 
complex, costly approach would most likely be unable to achieve all of the scenario objectives. 
A small group of surface combatants, such as LCS, could meet scenario objectives; 
however, the presence of warships eliminates the possibility of covert operations and could likely 
be provocative or otherwise undesirable in many of the littoral areas being considered.
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On the other hand, a single Virginia Class SSN could achieve the ISR, communication, 
and prosecution objectives while remaining covert. The SSN could be utilized to collect ISR data 
in the area of responsibility. The area to be evaluated is 10 NM by 3 NM and a depth of 300 ft. 
An SSN’s detection capabilities far exceed this range. Surface contacts could be localized and 
identified with a high degree of confidence, via electro-optical sensors, while submarine contacts 
would require several hours, possibly days, for identification. Localization of threat submarines 
would also be time consuming with a single SSN. The addition of a second SSN would 
significantly increase threat submarine localization capabilities, but would also effectively 
double the already substantial cost and risk of the operation.
While a SSN possesses several methods of communicating with a remote command 
center, the Commanding Officer and crew mitigate the need for most external communications. 
The CO is able to make many tactical decisions without higher approval (i.e. act autonomously), 
while sensor operators can process sensor data into tactically relevant information so that the 
messages that do need to be transmitted are greatly reduced in size.
An SSN could remain in the area for approximately 90 days undetected, easily satisfying 
the identified need for endurance and persistent presence. An SSN’s endurance is limited 
primarily by food storage capacity. It is therefore reasonable to assume that unmanned systems 
have the potential for greater endurance. Nuclear power is not likely to be a viable near-term 
option for unmanned systems, significant further research and technological development is 
required in this area. 
5.4.1 Performance Assessment
Overall mission effectiveness of an SSN is evaluated as being very high. Confidence in 
prosecution effectiveness is based primarily on the proven capabilities of the Mk-48, Mod-6 
torpedo. These torpedoes have been highly tested and have proven very effective. SSNs use 
sophisticated, multi-faceted sonar suites, such as the BQQ-10,131 to assist operators in detecting 
vessels. Powerful sensors and onboard data processing capabilities produce a high level of 
confidence in detection. Submarines also have state of the art communication suites, which allow 





them to transmit and receive data reliably with minimal time latency. If mission dictates, they 
can maintain persistent communications and contribute to the common operating picture.
The status quo alternative, based on a single SSN, is highly effective with regard to 
detection, communication, and prosecution. Assuming that AUWS could match the SSN’s 
performance in these critical functions, other areas still favor the SSN. They do not have to rely 
on additional assets for deployment or recovery, essentially mitigating that area of need. The 
presence of the CO and crew gives the SSN a clear advantage in threat discrimination, because 
they can designate a contact as a threat without having to communicate externally or rely on a 
computer to make the decision. Overall, the SSN is deemed as superior to AUWS with respect to 
performance alone.
5.4.2 Cost Assessment
An SSN has an average annual operating expense of $21 million.132 Using a 30 day 
operating scenario, that equates to about $1.75 million. Assuming the SSN expends eight Mk 48 
ADCAP torpedoes over the course of the scenario,133 the total cost of the operation is about $30 
million.134 Strictly considering the cost analysis in this report, an SSN is a significantly more 
expensive alternative than any of the AUWS concepts.
There is significant debate, however, as to the long term cost savings potential of 
unmanned systems over manned systems, particularly with regard to personnel costs. For 
example, UAVs require dozens of operators, maintainers, and analysts to successfully conduct a 
mission. Simply unmanning a vehicle does not alleviate personnel requirements, it merely 
displaces them. In fact, Congress noted in 2003 that “while the acquisition per unit cost [of 
UAVs] may be relatively small, in the aggregate, the acquisition cost rivals the investment in 
other larger weapon systems.”135
Assume, as a worst case scenario, that AUWS produces no cost savings over the SSN 
alternative over the system life cycle. In this case, only performance and risk would factor into 
the decision of whether or not to invest in AUWS. It will be shown that the analysis still favors 
132 Naval Center for Cost Analysis. Naval VAMOSC. 1996. 13 May 2011 <https://www.vamosc.navy.mil/>.
133 Average number of threats encountered in the simulation
134 Federation of American Scientists. "MK-48 Torpedo." 12 December 1998. FAS.org. 25 Apr. 2011 
<http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/weaps/mk-48.htm>.
135 United States Cong. Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003. Washington: GPO, 
2003. 243.
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investment in AUWS, even with cost ignored. If in the future, however, life cycle cost of any 
AUWS concept is found to be greater than an SSN, then investment is not recommended. 
5.4.3 Risk Assessment
With the four system concepts for AUWS, areas of risk analyzed are cost, schedule, and 
technical. The Virginia Class SSN, however, is a relatively mature system that relies on proven 
technology. Budget, schedule, and technical risks are negligible. With the SSN, there is only one 
risk worth considering: operational risk. An assessment of operational risk for the SSN and each 
of the four AUWS systems reveals a decisive advantage for AUWS.
5.4.3.1 SSN
While the probability of an SSN being lost or damaged in the given scenario is low, the 
consequences are severe. A Virginia Class SSN has an average unit cost of $2 billion136 and is 
manned by over 100 sailors. It also represents an operational, and sometimes strategic, asset that 
provides many more capabilities to the fleet than those required in the scenario. The costs of 
losing an SSN far outweigh the benefits of employing it in the small area of responsibility 
outlined in the scenario. In fact, the employment of even one SSN in this context represents a 
sort of risk “overkill”. If the area were larger, the SSN might be more appropriate. Still, the SSN 
is not tailorable to the mission at hand, so there is a very low probability that the cost, risk, and 
benefit of employing an SSN are appropriately balanced and suited to any given mission. The 
only option to improve system capability is to add an additional SSN, substantially increasing the 
overall inherent operational risk of the mission. 
AUWS, however, can be tailored by employing the number of units that the mission and 
area of responsibility dictate, thereby minimizing risk “overkill”. More importantly, AUWS 
eliminates the direct risk to the sailor. Consequently, AUWS has a tactical advantage over 
adversary manned assets because the manned assets incur the vast majority of operational risk in 
a direct confrontation. In other words, AUWS can afford to engage in activities deemed too risky 
for a manned asset.




Glider, like all AUWS system concepts, benefits from being an unmanned system when it 
comes to operational risk. The system is not without any operational risk, however. Gliders rely 
on ballast shifting and vertical movement in the water column for mobility. This analysis 
assumes that the gliders employed in the AUWS system will have the ability to maintain an 
average two knots in periodic, shifting currents up to five knots. It is recognized that this 
represents a significant technical risk, as current gliders are only able to maintain about half a 
knot. As discussed previously, 64 times the power would be required to achieve the desired 
speeds when assuming that power varies as the cube of velocity. Even if such speeds could be 
maintained, extreme weather and other unpredictable aspects of the maritime domain could 
inadvertently force the gliders out of their operational area. If the gliders cannot remain on-
station in their designated area, they essentially become a drifting mine field, which is a violation 
of current international law and a significant political liability.
5.4.3.3 LD-UUV
LD-UUV is the least tailorable of the four AUWS system concepts. There is some 
potential for this system not being appropriately suited to the mission with regard to operational 
risk. Still, this problem of tailorability is negligible when compared to the SSN. The primary risk 
to the LD-UUV concept is the desire for size increase that is currently trending in the community 
of interest. In an attempt to quickly solve power density problems and/or add more capabilities to 
unmanned systems, many stakeholders are advocating that all large diameter UUVs be built even 
bigger. While a size increase would certainly alleviate performance problems, the vehicles 
themselves would become more valuable. With more and more capabilities added and an ever 
increasing unit cost, eventually the loss of a single LD-UUV would be considered unacceptable – 
not unlike the SSN. Nevertheless, the LD-UUV concept, as modeled, is considered to have a low 
operational risk.
5.4.3.4 Squid
There are several operational risk concerns for the Squid concept. One of the primary 
methods of deployment, via naval artillery, introduces the risk of hitting neutral or friendly assets 
in the area of responsibility. Even if no collateral damage occurs, the firing of naval guns into 
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foreign littoral areas could be seen as escalatory and incite unwanted hostilities. The method of 
prosecution is also cause for concern. The magnetic shape charges rise upward toward a target’s 
hull via positive buoyancy. If an explosive misses its intended target, it must be rendered inert 
immediately, otherwise it might attach to a neutral or friendly hull. It is essentially a drifting 
mine by the nature of its functionality. 
5.4.3.5 V-CAP
The V-CAP concept is evaluated as having the lowest operational risk of all AUWS 
concepts. The mobility of V-CAP allows flexibility in deployment and recovery to accommodate 
areas of heavy traffic or political sensitivity. Like LD-UUV, V-CAP is anchored to the seabed 
during operation so there is no concern for weapons inadvertently drifting out of the area of 
responsibility. Also, threat prosecution is accomplished via precision attack torpedoes, reducing 
the risk of collateral damage. Unlike LD-UUV, however, external communications (gateways) 
and data processing can be easily distributed. More than one Hunter unit can be employed to 
eliminate a single point of system failure. Multiple LD-UUVs could also be employed, but the V-
CAP concept is a more tailored cost-effective solution. 
5.4.4 Comparison to the Status Quo Summary
The Navy could accomplish all of the mission objectives in the given modeling scenario 
with its current force structure, but an undesirable operational risk would be incurred. Any of 
today’s SSNs most likely would perform better in the given scenario than AUWS, at least the 
first generation of such systems. Keeping this in mind and ignoring the potential for cost savings, 
the comparison of AUWS vs. the status quo alternative comes down to a risk-benefit analysis. An 
analysis of risk, specifically operational risk, heavily favors AUWS over an SSN. All of the 
AUWS concepts have their own operational risks, but those risks, particularly those associated 
with LD-UUV and V-CAP, are negligible when compared to the SSN. It has been shown through 
modeling and simulation that, by employing more units, AUWS can be tailored to improve 
performance to a level on par with a SSN, while still maintaining a lower overall operational 
risk.
It is also worth noting that some of the advantages of unmanned systems over manned 
systems are not as clear cut as initially assumed. For example, an SSN’s ability to provide 
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persistent forward presence far exceeds that of current unmanned systems. While unmanned 
systems have the capability of lying dormant nearly indefinitely, significant technological 
progress must be made in the area of power density for unmanned systems to have an 
operationally relevant advantage over manned systems. Operational cost is not a clear advantage 
for unmanned systems. Certainly, the potential for cost savings exists, but it is yet to be proven.
5.5 Recommended Alternative
With the advantages of AUWS over the status quo, the results of performance, cost, and 
risk analyses are synthesized to make system recommendations. The results of all analyses can 
be combined to form a top-level preference score, with variable emphasis given to each factor. 
This preference score must use proper weighting to provide a meaningful recommendation. To 
examine the impact of the weighting for each factor, an overall sensitivity analysis is required.
5.5.1 Overall Sensitivity Analysis
Starting with scaled scores for performance, cost, and risk for each alternative, an equal 
weight of one-third is used to multiply each factor’s data to produce a score between zero and 
one for each alternative. The same methodology used for the performance sensitivity analysis is 
applied here. For each factor, the weight is increased to one while the remaining two factors are 
brought to zero. A linear equation is developed representing the change in final scoring due to 
change in weighting. Those four equations are plotted against each other to determine crossover 
points in the weighting at which the rank order of alternatives would change.
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5.5.1.1 Performance Sensitivity
Figure 5.26: Performance Sensitivity
The vertical line in Figure 5.26 represents the initial one-third weighting for performance. 
At no reasonable point would a change in performance weighting cause V-CAP to lose the top 
ranking. Glider’s overall score drops dramatically as the performance weighting is increased, 
starting in first place and ending in last. The relatively low cost and low risk factor make Glider a 
very desirable concept if performance is not a concern. There is significant sensitivity between 
LD-UUV and Glider, which indicates that either concept may be superior depending on how 
much performance is valued over cost and risk. Squid’s score is almost inversely proportional to 
Glider’s, with a score that rises with increased performance weighting, most likely due to 
reasonable communications times and detection capability discounted by excessive cost. 
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5.5.1.2 Cost Sensitivity
Figure 5.27: Cost Sensitivity
Figure 5.27 shows clear-cut changes in scoring for all concepts for variations in 
weighting. Only a doubling of the cost weighting will cause Glider to unseat V-CAP as the top 
alternative. Glider’s impressive scoring as cost weighting increases is indicative of its high cost-
effectiveness. Glider and Squid also repeat the performance analysis trend of having nearly 
inversely proportional equations. Squid, being the most expensive alternative by a significant 
margin, has a declining score. Once again, LD-UUV’s performance is very similar to that of V-
CAP, albeit slightly lower. The intersection of Glider and LD-UUV near the reference line is 
again indicative of their nearly indistinguishable overall utility.
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5.5.1.3 Risk Sensitivity
Figure 5.28: Risk Sensitivity
The risk score for each concept is fairly similar to cost, except each concept’s score 
decreases as weighting for risk increases, illustrated in Figure 5.28. V-CAP remains dominant 
regardless of how much weight is given to risk. Glider and LD-UUV once again intersect near 
the origin; however, the two linear equations are so similar throughout the entire range that the 
intersection is virtually meaningless. The risk inherent to Squid is apparent from the wide gap 
between its score and the others. 
5.5.2 Recommended Alternative Summary
The overall sensitivity analysis makes it apparent that only a major disparity in rankings 
for performance or cost will result in a different result for the top alternative. Glider is the only 
system that is affected by a major change, because its poor performance could be compensated 
for by low operational cost; if cost were worth at least 60% or performance were ranked at less 
than 10%. By this logic, a final recommendation is made on the grounds that performance, cost, 
and risk are equal in weight for the purposes of decision-making. Figure 5.29 depicts the overall 
score of each alternative given equal weighting to the three factors.
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Figure 5.29: Overall Concept Scoring
Squid can be readily discounted, leaving three concepts for consideration on first glance. 
V-CAP has superior utility when there is a desire to balance performance, cost, and risk equally. 
Glider and LD-UUV are nearly indistinguishable in utility. Both are reasonable alternatives, 
especially considering that their overall scores are only about 10% lower than the apparent front 
runner. Neither should be discounted off hand. 
Figure 5.29 is useful, but it does not tell the whole story. Figure 5.30 completes the 
picture with a Cost as an Independent Variable diagram of performance.
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Figure 5.30: Cost vs. Performance
Figure 5.30 shows the four concepts in space relative to cost on the horizontal axis and 
performance on the vertical axis. Glider and V-CAP are on the “cost-efficient” frontier, as they 
are furthest in the direction of high OMOE and low cost. Squid is significantly more expensive 
than any other alternative, providing almost 30% lower performance than the next-highest 
alternative at more than five times the cost. V-CAP and LD-UUV are closely grouped, providing 
similar performance and cost values.
Glider, V-CAP, and LD-UUV are all cost- and risk-effective alternatives; however, Glider 
is not currently recommended for investment for two reasons. First, there is no significant 
comparative advantage between LD-UUV and Glider from almost any analytical perspective. 
Since the Navy is already invested in LD-UUV research and development, it does not make good 
business sense to invest in a new concept that is projected to only provide the same amount of 
utility. Second, the significant operational risk outweighs Glider’s high endurance and cost-
effectiveness. It is recommended that the Navy wait until glider technology has advanced to the 
point that the vehicles can reliably maintain station in the most stressing environment conditions 
before investing in the AUWS Glider.
V-CAP and LD-UUV are recommended for potential investment, pending further 
analysis. While V-CAP costs less, performs better, and has a risk factor equivalent to LD-UUV, it 




intangibles that may drive a decision in favor of LD-UUV. V-CAP is the winner of this analysis, 
but LD-UUV cannot be discounted due to the similarity of the overall results. For this reason, V-
CAP and LD-UUV are both recommended for further analysis.
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6. Concept Evaluation Recommendations
The primary and secondary concept recommendations, V-CAP and LD-UUV 
respectively, are now discussed in detail to aid decision makers in utilizing the results of this 
analysis. This discussion includes a refined description, recommended improvements, updated 
Concepts of Operation, and an examination of the trade-offs in terms of advantages and 
disadvantages. In addition, a fusion of concepts to develop a more robust solution is considered, 
followed by recommendations on system verification and validation.
6.1 Primary Concept Recommendation: V-CAP
V-CAP’s baseline configuration is a pair of modular, configurable, torpedo-shaped 
UUVs. The two units are sized to fit a 21 inch torpedo tube, and are 19 feet in length in 
heavyweight configuration (12 feet in length for lightweight configuration). The UUVs consist 
of a series of functional modules that can be swapped for upgrades, maintenance, or mission 
tailoring, or removed to reduce weight and displacement to support airborne deployment. At least 
two units, a Hunter and Killer, must be deployed to provide minimal coverage. Increasing the 
number of Killer Units increases the size of the prosecution area and the number of targets that 
may be engaged before the system’s magazines are depleted. Increasing the number of Hunter 
Units improves the size and quality of the sensor footprint area and provides additional 
communication gateways and visual ISR nodes. Each proposed operational area must be 
analyzed prior to deployment to determine the appropriate number and type of V-CAP units that 
must be employed.
The Hunter Unit nominally consists of a propulsion module, a control module, a network 
module, a sensor module, and a communications module. The propulsion module contains a 
scaled-down OTTO fuel II engine and fuel tank, a battery, and electric drive components to 
augment the engine. The network module is essentially a magazine that holds deployable 
communications and sensor nodes. The control unit houses the UUV’s C3 suite, CPU, and 
guidance system. The sensor module contains a conformal, cylindrical passive sonar array. The 
communications module contains a deployable tethered buoy equipped with communications 
antennae and visual sensors.
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The Killer Unit consists of a propulsion module, a network module, a munitions module, 
and a control module. The propulsion, network, and control modules are identical to those 
installed on the Hunter Unit. The munitions module ideally holds multiple miniature torpedoes, 
but can be replaced with a larger single round warhead or different mission-specific munitions.
6.1.1 Improvements
V-CAP’s performance is on par with LD-UUV’s, with the two concepts trading top scores 
in most areas across the board. Lethality, deployability, and recoverability are the areas in which 
V-CAP has a marked advantage. These advantages (along with endurance, only three days 
shorter than LD-UUV’s) are driven by the size and configuration of the V-CAP system. 
Originally envisioned as a single torpedo-shaped configuration, V-CAP has evolved from 
a heavyweight design (Mk 48) to a lightweight design (Mk 54) to a modular, hybrid design. The 
results of the cost-risk-effectiveness analysis, and associated sensitivity analyses, highlight the 
value of such modularity. When performance analysis is conducted on a lightweight variant (12 
feet in length), LD-UUV becomes the superior concept. V-CAP is still the more cost- and risk-
effective alternative, but there is significant sensitivity between the two concepts. In other words, 
there is less confidence that V-CAP is truly the superior alternative when considering the 
lightweight variant alone. By designing V-CAP as a modular 21 inch diameter torpedo shape, the 
concept outperforms all others because it can be tailored to the specific mission. The strength of 
V-CAP lies in its tailorability.
The following list discusses the points that drove the evolution of V-CAP to a system of 
modular, configurable UUVs:
• A 12 foot long lightweight V-CAP unit will require a "sabot" or similar device to fill up 
the rest of a submarine torpedo tube to prevent damage to V-CAP or the submarine prior 
to and during launch. 
• P-8 launch will not be possible without a glider or similar attachment for the weapon due 
to the high altitude at which the torpedo must be launched.137 Current testing of 
lightweight torpedo launches from altitude show that the P-8 torpedo launch system 
requires an additional delivery vehicle to slow the weapon down to avoid damage on 
137 Raytheon, “Raytheon Ready to Help India Reach its Goals”, 15 Feb. 2010. 11 May 2011, 
<http://www.raytheon.com/newsroom/feature/rtn_insight_india/index.html>.
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impact and to actually deliver the weapon to the preferred target. Current fleet paradigms 
are based on P-3 low-altitude, low-speed launches, not high-speed, high-altitude launches 
synonymous with a platform derived from the commercial variant of the Boeing 737. 
• No variant of V-CAP can be launched with existing surface torpedo launchers; no matter 
the size, a 21 inch weapon can only be deployed via crane or davit, not tube launched.
Based on these three points, a tradeoff analysis emerges for the design of the V-CAP, 
consisting of four different options:
• Mk-54 shape V-CAP
• Lightweight V-CAP (21 inch diameter by 12 foot length)
• Heavyweight V-CAP (21 inch diameter by 20 foot length)
• Modular V-CAP (21 inch diameter with removable sections to change length and weight, 
including scaled down propulsion, fuel, battery, and warhead sections for deployment and 
mission tailoring)
A Mk-54 variant of the V-CAP would limit the battery size of the unit, and therefore, the 
endurance of the system. Calculations show a 50% decrease in endurance given a nominal 50 
NM inbound and outbound transit. Further, this would limit the warhead size (and therefore 
lethality and range of the weapon). With regard to deployability, air launch would be possible via 
a secondary delivery device,138 and surface launch would be relatively simple via existing 
launchers, but submarine launch would be hindered by the need for a launching canister. Further, 
the unit could not be deployed by submerged assets as a defensive torpedo round. 
A lightweight V-CAP variant would maintain the ability to launch submunitions, 
increasing lethality, but the short length would negatively impact endurance. Surface deployment 
would only be possible via crane or davit, as surface ship torpedo tubes are not designed to fit 21 
inch rounds. Submarine launch would still require a canister and the ability to employ V-CAP as 
a defensive round would still be absent.
A heavyweight V-CAP would improve endurance to match LD-UUV, as well as improve 
the number and size of submunitions, improving lethality. Airborne launch would be impractical 
due to size and weight restrictions and surface deployment would still be over-the-side, pending 
138 Raytheon.
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development of new surface torpedo launchers. Submarine launch would be significantly 
simplified as no canister would be required, and the unit could be launched as a defensive round.
A configurable variant with modules that could be added or subtracted to lengthen or 
shorten the unit (therefore adjusting the weight of the unit) not only allows tailoring of mission 
specific components and simplifies upgrade and maintenance, it provides airborne and surface 
deployment capability and the same submarine launch capability as a 21 inch heavyweight 
round, all while maintaining lethality.
It is evident that V-CAP must be fielded as a modular system with multiple 
configurations despite the assumed increase in risk and procurement cost due to the added 
complexity. The modular design could result in reduced maintenance costs, which could offset 
the procurement cost increase over the system life-cycle.
6.1.2 Concept of Operations
The appropriate number, type, and configuration of V-CAP Hunter and Killer Units will 
be deployed directly into the operational area or from a safe distance away from the operational 
area, as deemed necessary by the Operational Condition (i.e., whether clandestine insertion is a 
priority). P-8 or similar aircraft will drop V-CAP units from bomb-bay or wing mounts. Surface 
ships will deploy V-CAP by modified torpedo launchers or via cranes. Submarines will deploy V-
CAP units from torpedo tubes, Vertical Launch System Tubes, or Multiple All-up-round 
Canisters. Depending on the deployment zone, the V-CAP units will initialize and transit to the 
programmed operational area, or set up for operations if dropped directly into the operational 
area.
Phase Zero – Shape: During the shaping phase, V-CAP units will set up an ad-hoc 
network by dropping communications/sensor nodes from their network module magazines. The 
nodes may be dropped in a pre-determined pattern, or placed by V-CAP autonomously based on 
in-situ judgment.
Following the deployment of the network, the Hunter and Killer Unit(s) will moor on the 
seabed in the center of their respective portions of the operational area. The Hunter Unit will 
settle vertically with the propulsor on the seabed and the nosecone pointed at the surface. The 
sensor and communications modules will detach from the main body, but will remain connected 
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via tether. The sensor module’s sonar array will rise to a given stratum optimized for acoustic 
detection. The communications node will deploy a buoy that will sit on the surface and serve as 
the system’s antenna and gateway to external networks. Visual ISR sensors will be located on the 
buoy to provide “periscope” capability. The control unit will remain attached to the main body 
and establish communications with the network of nodes and the other V-CAP units.
The Killer Unit will moor on the seabed within acoustic communication range of a node 
or Hunter Unit. The unit will settle vertically with the propulsor on the seabed and nosecone 
pointing towards the surface. The munitions module will open, exposing multiple miniature 
torpedoes aimed upwards. In the event a single warhead is utilized, the weapon will remain 
dormant awaiting a kill order to launch as a full torpedo. The control unit will establish 
communications with the node network and the other V-CAP units.
The V-CAP system will provide ISR coverage of the region in the acoustic and visible 
spectrums. V-CAP will conduct covert collection of all vessels passing through the operational 
area, taking note of any specific threat contacts required by the mission profile. This information 
will be used to develop the system’s internal situational awareness, as well as provide the 
operational commander with inputs to the Combined Operational Picture, as EMCON allows. 
The system will conduct posture and EMCON adjustments to avoid detection and possible 
compromise by threat assets.
Phase One – Deter: In addition to providing general situational awareness, V-CAP will 
provide early warning of large or significant threat fleet movements, including en masse 
homeport shifts, and armadas leaving homeport. Given proper authority under ROE or under 
specific control or guidance, the V-CAP system may function as a smart minefield. If the United 
States announces the presence of a minefield to the enemy, V-CAP can then engage any target or 
specific threat targets, setting up an exclusion zone. V-CAP would work purely in a 
reactionary/defensive posture in this phase, providing hold-at-risk capability without risking 
traditional manned assets.
Merely the possibility of V-CAP’s presence will serve to deter and disrupt enemy 
operations. The relatively small size of V-CAP units permits the use of decoys. Unarmed and/or 
randomly transmitting units can be employed in an operational area to increase overall fleet 
effectiveness at a minimal cost.
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Phase Two – Seize: In the event of open hostilities, V-CAP will be able to change 
position to improve engagement capability or actively prosecute targets from an offensive 
posture, providing a relatively cost-effective and low-risk attack asset. Submarines and other 
high value assets will be free to conduct missions tailored to their unique capabilities.
Phase Three – Dominate: In Phase Three, V-CAP can actively defend inbound or on-
station friendly assets by denying threat contacts freedom of maneuver via an area-denial 
operation. Free of close-range threats, friendly assets may establish regional control of the seas. 
The high-endurance, persistent, and capable V-CAP system may provide continuous coverage as 
long as it is needed. Since V-CAP units can be readily and affordably replaced, the risks of such 
dangerous missions will be acceptable.
Phase Four – Stabilize: The V-CAP system will serve as a force multiplier during de-
escalation and stabilization efforts. As manned assets retire from the region, in-place V-CAP 
networks will continue to provide physical security for high value assets and ISR for situational 
awareness. The last asset to leave a region may well be V-CAP, especially considering its ability 
to operate independently of a manned asset.
6.1.3 Advantages
• Deployability: V-CAP’s relatively small displacement makes it deployable by air, 
surface, and submerged assets.
• Expandable Employment: V-CAP can be affordably scaled up by simply committing 
more units to an operation thus improving the coverage, lethality, and follow-on 
engagement capability of the system.
• Tailorability: Depending on the mission and the number of units available, V-CAP units 
can be equipped with additional payloads (i.e. a second network module to increase the 
size of the deployed node network) that can be substituted by on-station crews prior to 
system deployment.
• Renewability: After Killer Units expend their weapons magazines, or when units reach 
the end of their battery capacity, they can be replaced on station with more V-CAP units.
• Multi-functionality: If needed, the Killer Units may be launched as torpedoes. This 
allows deploying submarines a flexible self-defense posture when preparing to insert V-
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CAP in a hostile region because valuable torpedo tube space is not monopolized by assets 
that cannot be used for self-defense.
• Upgradeability: The modular construction of each V-CAP unit allows for the upgrade of 
the system via the substitution of mission modules. New munitions, sensors, network 
nodes, control systems, and propulsion systems may be added with minimal cost. Further, 
modified V-CAP configurations could be employed as mobile ISR platforms or as 
payload delivery systems to insert smaller UUVs into restricted areas.
• Cost-effectiveness: V-CAP can employ technologies and improvements in torpedo 
design to enhance V-CAP’s design and utility. Conversely, monies expended on V-CAP 
improvements may be used to improve torpedo technology. 
• Redundancy: The relatively small size of V-CAP and the versatility of its deployment 
allows more units to be carried per asset, improving redundancy and multiplying utility 
without limiting other mission capabilities of deploying assets.
• Expandable Visual ISR Coverage: V-CAP can provide a larger visual ISR sensor 
footprint by launching more Hunter Units.
6.1.4 Disadvantages
• Complexity: The use of segmented and deployable modules on the Hunter Unit raises 
complexity, which may affect maintenance and reliability. 
• Utility Limitations: The amount of equipment required to fit within the V-CAP may 
result in limitations on the effectiveness (i.e. range, bandwidth, battery and fuel capacity, 
warhead payload, etc.) of the system. Of further concern is whether or not the system will 
have sufficient effectiveness in a lightweight configuration (those variants intended for 
air deployment).
• Lethality: The use of miniature torpedoes limits the warhead size, and therefore lethality 
of the system. These miniature torpedoes may provide a mission kill by taking out a high-
value asset’s rudder or propulsion system, or inducing flooding sufficient to hinder 
operations, but it is unlikely that an adversary would be sunk without expending several 
rounds. Limited lethality would require more Killer Units to be deployed, increasing the 
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drain on deploying asset strike or ASW engagement capability, as well as increasing the 
cost of operations.
• Follow-on Salvo: The baseline configuration of V-CAP assumes only two miniature 
torpedoes per Killer Unit. A single pair of V-CAP units would have a very small follow-
on salvo capability.
• Procurement Cost: The amount of units needed to conduct missions may make the 
actual procurement of V-CAP so expensive that only limited numbers of units enter fleet 
service. As limited resources, they may not be readily available for every mission, or they 
may be sparingly employed by operational commanders for fear of the loss of expensive 
assets.
6.2 Secondary Concept Recommendation: LD-UUV
LD-UUV is a more conventional concept; there are similar systems in existence today. 
Essentially, LD-UUV is an unmanned miniature submersible. A device sized to fit within the 87 
inch diameter tubes intended for Multiple All-up-round Canisters or Special Operations Force 
equipment on SSGNs and future Virginia class SSNs, the LD-UUV has plenty of internal space 
and payload capacity to support weapons and sensor delivery. Further, the system may be used 
for delivery of other complementary systems. For instance, a separate ISR UUV unit may be 
carried in place of or in addition to weaponry. Baseline configuration includes a set of 16 
deployable, paired nodes and up to four lightweight torpedoes.
6.2.1 Improvements
Conceptually, LD-UUV is a graduation of NSWC Panama City Division’s L2D2-UUV 
design, essentially an automated conversion of a SEAL Swimmer Delivery Vehicle, which is less 
than 60 inches in diameter.139 In the interest of fully exploring the utility of large vehicles and 
making best use of available deployment space, the LD-UUV is graphically and stochastically 
modeled as a miniature submarine with an external diameter of 80 inches and no protrusions 
other than the control surfaces on the stern. This streamlined cylindrical shape reduces drag and 
simplifies storage on deployment and recovery platforms; however, use of this shape precludes 
139 Naval Surface Warfare Center, Panama City, “Large Diameter, Large Duration Unmanned Undersea Vehicle 
(L2D2-UUV) Initiative.” Panama City: Department of the Navy, 2010.
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the use of externally mounted ordnance or sensors, reducing the magazine size and lethality of 
the system.
In the same way that V-CAP’s modular design allows it flexibility in payloads, a modular 
configuration (similar to the L2D2-UUV)140 would allow LD-UUV to be mission tailored as 
well. As smaller weapons are developed, new launch modules could replace the existing unit. 
New propulsion, sensors, or deployables could be introduced rapidly, and AUWS could be 
employed for a wider range of missions, such as long distance payload delivery.
6.2.2 Concept of Operations
LD-UUV will be deployed from a submerged asset’s large diameter payload tubes or 
from a surfaced asset’s crane at a safe standoff range from the operational area. Presumably only 
one unit will be carried by each asset to minimize the impact on each asset’s payload or strike 
capability. The LD-UUV will transit to the center of the desired operational area and deploy a 
series of paired sensor and communications nodes in a pre-determined pattern within the area. 
These nodes will form an ad-hoc network of undersea acoustic tripwires to determine the 
presence and classification of contacts passing through the area.
Following deployment of all sensor nodes, LD-UUV will take station on the seabed in the 
center of the operational area and assume a passive posture. The system will deploy a tethered 
communications buoy with external communications antennae and visual ISR systems. This 
buoy may be reeled in rapidly to reduce the risk of detection. 
Phase Zero – Shape: During Phase Zero, LD-UUV will be deployed covertly outside of 
an operational area, transit to the operational area, and set up an ISR network before shifting to a 
passive EMCON posture. From the resting position in the middle of the operational area, LD-
UUV will fuse acoustic, visual, and electronic signatures to detect, identify, and catalog passing 
contacts, building an internal operational picture and broadcasting this information to assist the 
operational commander in developing a Combined Operational Picture. 
Phase One – Deter: Much like V-CAP, LD-UUV will provide an early-warning 
capability by notifying friendly forces of adversary fleet movements. In the event of these fleet 
movements, LD-UUV will also provide hold-at-risk capability as a smart minefield, restricting 
enemy forces from exiting port or transiting a critical area. The employment of LD-UUV can be 
140 Naval Surface Warfare Center, Panama City.
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feigned just like V-CAP for deterrence and disruption; however, the larger vehicle size will likely 
make decoys more costly.
Phase Two – Seize: During open hostilities, LD-UUV will use its organic capability to 
attack targets. Lightweight torpedoes will give LD-UUV a large “bang for the buck,” by giving 
the system a real capability to destroy high value assets.
Phase Three – Dominate: During Phase Three, LD-UUV will function as an area-denial 
tool by restricting enemy movement while allowing friendly forces to take station and establish 
regional control of the seas.
Phase Four – Stabilize: During the stabilization phase, LD-UUV can continue to provide 
ISR capability to enhance friendly force operations while providing physical security to friendly 
assets. Just like V-CAP, LD-UUV may well be the final asset to retire from the operational area.
6.2.3 Advantages
Payload: LD-UUV’s size and displacement allow it to be used as a delivery method for 
other systems or weapons with little or no modification. For instance, LD-UUV could carry 
small UUVs instead of lightweight torpedoes.
Proven Technology: the technological risk for the majority of required systems is low 
because less miniaturization is required due to the large size of each unit.
Improved Sensing and Communications: The use of hardwired nodes improves the 
accuracy of detections and the speed at which a detection can be made, classified, and 
transmitted. Threat discrimination is further enabled through the use of parallel processing 
among the networked sensor nodes.
Lethality: The use of lightweight torpedoes insures that LD-UUV can provide a 
significant lethality to eliminate high value assets vice provide a mission kill. This strength gives 
LD-UUV a better deterrence value, as well.
Upgradeability: LD-UUV’s modular internal configuration allows for rapid insertion of 
improved components.
6.2.4 Disadvantages
Deployability: Only surfaced and submerged assets can deploy LD-UUV due to its large 
size.
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Large Displacement: Where a single submarine can easily launch half a dozen V-CAP 
units from the same large diameter tube, only one LD-UUV can be deployed. Placing a second 
LD-UUV on board will negate the cruise missile vertical launch capability of that submarine.
Redundancy: the compromise, failure, or destruction of the LD-UUV will most likely 
result in mission failure because of the difficulties involved with launching a second LD-UUV 
without employing more manned delivery assets.
Follow-on Salvo: for a baseline configuration, LD-UUV can only supply a maximum of 
four separate engagements without doubling the cost of the system by introducing a second LD-
UUV.
Limited Visual ISR Coverage: only one buoy can be employed by LD-UUV, providing 
a smaller visual ISR sensor footprint than V-CAP, which can easily deploy multiple Hunter Units 
to add more visual ISR coverage in the operational area.
6.3 Comparison
The two recommended systems have very similar operational concepts; they just use 
vehicles of different sizes to accomplish the prescribed mission. Both systems can be deployed 
and recovered by a number of different platforms. Sensor and communications nodes to establish 
an ad-hoc sensing network prior to establishing a passive reconnaissance posture are deployed by 
both UUVs. From this posture, both systems have the capability to launch weaponry in order to 
neutralize threats. Following the completion of the mission, exhaustion of weapons magazines, 
casualty, or exhaustion of fuel and battery capacity, both systems may retire from the operational 
area for recovery. 
V-CAP’s small size gives it the edge in deployability, sensor footprint, redundancy, and 
follow-on salvo, while LD-UUV’s larger displacement allows for a higher lethality, faster 
communications, and more accurate sensing. 
6.4 Fusion of Concepts
To minimize the risks and disadvantages of either system, the key features that make each 
alternative the best in any given MOE might be enhanced or combined to produce improved or 
hybrid concepts. This enhancement is enabled by the inherent tailorability of both systems. 
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Consider the scaled up V-CAP system, with eight Killer Units and two Hunter Units, 
discussed during modeling and simulation results. Taking this concept one step further, the LD-
UUV’s paired nodes could be introduced to replace the V-CAP’s communications and sensor 
nodes. The same hard-wired node configuration that realized LD-UUV’s slightly superior 
endurance and communications times could improve the endurance (by lowering sensor power 
draw) of the V-CAP while speeding up communications times.
Running a model of this hybrid concept in the standard baseline modeling and simulation 
scenario reveals that an MCT of 3.1 to 3.4 minute can be achieved. While this result is slightly 
higher than LD-UUV, the difference is not statistically significant. Detection and prosecution 
performance is unaffected. The improvement in overall performance is to be expected, since V-
CAP’s modular design allows for the introduction of paired sensor nodes with minimal impact to 
the rest of the system. The use of an extra module may be necessary to accommodate the space 
used by spools of fiber optic cables.
Judging from modeling and simulation results, it is tempting to consider inclusion of 
Squid nodes in the hybrid concept. Squid’s highly distributed, redundant sensor field enables a 
near perfect Pd. V-CAP and Squid could be integrated into the same ad hoc network with minimal 
difficulty; however, the two systems would most likely require separate means of deployment, 
adding operational complexity. A cost benefit analysis favors the use of V-CAP alone. A Pd of 
over 90% can be achieved by only doubling the baseline number of units and the valuable 
elements of the system can be recovered, reducing overall cost. A further increase in Pd can be 
achieved by adding additional Hunter Units. It is left to decision makers to determine if 99% Pd 
is truly worth the employment of basically two separate systems, one of which is non-
recoverable.
The paired nodes utilized by the LD-UUV are the only portions of that system that 
provide a definitive edge over V-CAP. By adding this feature to V-CAP, the best performance 
aspects of all concepts may be realized without significantly increasing cost or risk.
6.5 Verification and Validation
Verification and validation are both critical feedback elements of any systems 
engineering process. At every phase in the process, efforts must be made to trace work products 
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back to the root problem statement and stakeholder requirements. This ensures that not only the 
correct system is being developed, but also that the system is being developed correctly.
System validation is achieved through clear and visible traceability back to the original 
problem, as defined by a thorough needs analysis. Both V-CAP and LD-UUV can trace their 
system architecture and concept of operations back to the problem statement. Each system 
centers on the critical physical elements, and corresponding functions, of weapons, sensors, and 
communicators. Each system employs these critical elements to address the seven identified 




• Persistent Forward Presence
• Enemy Prosecution (manned and unmanned)
• Operational Picture Development
• Platform Independence
Finally, by addressing these need areas, both V-CAP and LD-UUV provide a viable 
solution to the initial problem as stated below:
Over the next twenty years the capacity and capability of USW 
platforms will not meet operational demands in non-permissive 
areas.  Furthermore,  the  emergence  of  near-peer  competitor  
navies, the distributed nature of the asymmetric maritime threat,  
and the development of autonomous undersea threats present a  
unique challenge that current platform-centric solutions are not  
ideally designed to confront.
System verification, on the other hand, is ultimately a product of testing and evaluation. 
Limited verification is shown here through the use of modeling and simulation; however, a full 
test and evaluation program on physical prototypes is recommended to truly verify the V-CAP 
and LD-UUV systems. As a reference for future analysis, a notional Test and Evaluation Master 
Plan for V-CAP is included in Appendix J.
In addition to the systems developed, requirements must also be verified and validated. A 
system must be based on valid requirements in order for the system to be valid. Requirements 
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validation for AUWS is ultimately left to the warfighter; however, it is recommended that the 
need areas defined here be used as a basis for requirements definition. Given that these need 
areas are valid, this analysis should be a useful guide in developing an Initial Capability 
Document for AUWS. 
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7. Insights and Recommendations
The true value of this analysis lies not only in the discrimination of potential concepts, 
but also in the insights that can be gained and the broader recommendations that can be made 
based on those insights. Comprehensive analysis of alternatives gives rise to overarching 
principles that can be widely applied by the Navy as it seeks to develop the finest warfare 
systems of the future. The objective here is to inform decision makers of the operational insights 
gained and make recommendations on programmatic steps toward maintaining USW dominance 
in the future.
7.1 Operational Insights
Throughout this analysis, from initial problem definition to the results of cost, risk, and 
performance analyses, three principles, flexibility, scalability, and tailorability, stand out as keys 
to the success of AUWS. Collectively, these three principles effectively address the critical need 
areas for AUWS.
7.1.1 Flexibility
First, the flexibility with which AUWS can be employed is critical because it provides 
operational commanders with utility in a variety of circumstances. AUWS must be able to 
integrate flexibly with various communication networks, since all of the evaluated concepts rely 
heavily on relays to connect to external command centers. AUWS cannot afford to miss 
communication opportunities due to incompatibility.
AUWS must also be platform flexible so that it can be deployed and recovered in 
different situations as the mission dictates. AUWS may need to be deployed or recovered 
covertly, rapidly, or in large numbers; each potentially necessitating a different type of platform. 
Furthermore, the long duration of AUWS missions means that the same platform that 
deployed the system may not be available for recovery. True platform independence, however, 
leads to suboptimal design and therefore must be balanced among other critical needs. 
Flexibility of AUWS also applies to command and control. Routine, low level functions 
must be automated so that AUWS can contribute to the COP with minimal power draw and time 
latency of critical communications. All sensor nodes should have baseline signal processing 
capabilities to reduce data message sizes. Sensor nodes should also be programmed with limited 
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capability to prioritize the urgency of messages, mitigating the OPSEC risk of unnecessary 
signals. For all other functions, the autonomy level of AUWS should be adjustable based the 
current situation. This permits AUWS to operate even in communication degraded environments. 
Adjustable autonomy also enables operational commanders to manage the manpower devoted to 
the system, ranging from a single supervisor to many direct controllers. 
It is recommended that lethal effects remain under human control until larger cultural, 
ethical, and political issues are resolved regarding the use of autonomous weapons systems. 
While many technological challenges remain, the required accuracy in threat discrimination will 
most likely be achieved before the larger non-technical issues are resolved. AUWS should be 
designed to incorporate upgrades as they become available, so that the system is ready to respond 
once the order is given. Intermediate steps that could be taken include the use of non-lethal 
weapons, such as CRAW, and doctrine that only allows weapons release in specific 
circumstances, such as in defense of a high value unit.
7.1.2 Scalability
The second key to AUWS success is the scalability of the system. Unlike most current 
platform-centric solutions, AUWS must provide the operational commander with the ability to 
balance cost, risk, and performance by dedicating the appropriate number of units to any given 
mission.
The scalability of AUWS is the primary reason that it is considered more risk-effective 
than current USW systems, particularly in limited littoral operations. Submarines cannot be 
scaled down to mitigate risk in situations that require only a fraction of their capabilities, and 
they can only be scaled up by allocating another submarine. By employing an appropriate 
number of AUWS units, operational commanders can balance cost, risk, and required 
performance for any given mission. Consequently, submarines can be freed up to support the 
fleet with their unique capabilities. The relatively small physical size of elements gives AUWS a 
high probability that it will be well suited to the mission without resulting in performance and 
risk “overkill.” Secretary of Defense Robert Gates perhaps best summarizes the need for scalable 
solutions in his 2009 article “Striking the Right Balance:”
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“Given  that  resources  are  not  unlimited,  the  dynamic  of 
exchanging numbers for capability is perhaps reaching a point  
of diminishing returns. A given ship or aircraft—no matter how 
capable or well equipped— can only be in one place at one time
—and, to state the obvious, when one is sunk or shot down, there  
is one fewer of them.”141
Still, there is a trade-off between scalability and flexibility regarding physical size. On 
one extreme, submarines represent a highly flexible but not scalable solution. On the other 
extreme, very small elements can be scaled precisely to mission requirements, but the limitations 
on power capacity and prosecution capabilities hinder flexibility. Current US Naval mines are 
examples of systems that are highly scalable, but relatively inflexible in their operation. AUWS 
should strive to maintain balance between flexibility and scalability. It has been shown that even 
a flexible system such as V-CAP can be scaled up to improve performance without incurring 
unacceptable cost and risk. 
7.1.3 Tailorability
Third, AUWS must have the capability to be tailored to the specific requirements of each 
mission. For example, the modular design of V-CAP is one of the primary reasons for its superior 
cost- and risk-effectiveness. Not only can V-CAP be loaded with modules specifically suited for 
the current mission, but it can also be configured for submarine, surface, and airborne 
deployment. This tailorability allows the concept to have endurance on par with larger systems 
while still maintaining platform flexibility. To a lesser extent, the large internal payload 
capability of LD-UUV allows for mission tailoring and contributes to the concept’s overall value.
Tailorable systems can also provide a critical tactical advantage because they allow for an 
optimal level of redundancy in critical elements. Homogeneous networks, such as Glider, are 
highly redundant because each node can perform all critical functions. If a node is neutralized by 
the enemy, the system degrades gracefully instead of crashing because other nodes are still 
capable of conducting the mission. On the other hand, homogeneous networks pay a penalty in 
cost and/or performance because it not necessary for every single element to possess all system 
capabilities in order to operate effectively. Heterogeneous networks, such as V-CAP, enable 
141 Gates, Robert M. "The National Defense Strategy: Striking the Right Balance." Joint Forces Quarterly Jan. 
2009. 5-6.
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redundancy while minimizing waste since different nodes perform diverse functions within the 
system. As long as there is more than one of each type of element (sensor, weapon, 
communicator), the enemy is at a disadvantage because is difficult to disable the network with 
one shot. Even if the enemy destroyed one node, other nodes remain capable of exploiting 
engagement transients (e.g. active sonar, torpedo noise) and conducting a counterattack.
It is important to note that tailorable systems are not necessarily synonymous with highly 
distributed systems. The degree of distribution in the network is less significant than the 
separation of elements. Glider, for example, is a distributed network in which all critical 
elements are combined in each node (i.e. homogeneous). As modeled, this system can only be 
scaled, not tailored, to the mission at hand. In addition, highly distributed networks typically 
suffer in terms of cost and/or performance, so there is a point at which distribution begins to 
negatively impact cost-effectiveness. Further analysis is recommended to determine the exact 
relationship between system distribution, weapons capability (i.e. range, warhead size, etc.), and 
overall system utility. 
Separation of elements, on the other hand, provides the tactical advantages of redundancy 
without sacrificing cost-effectiveness. AUWS need not be highly distributed for success. Some 
distribution is necessary for redundancy, but separation of elements is critical for gaining the 
tactical advantage.
7.2 Recommendations
Specific recommendations are broken down into near, middle, and far term categories to 
give decision makers a clear guideline for the development of Advanced Undersea Warfare 
Systems. Recommendations are based on insights gained from the analysis in its entirety and not 
just the ranking of system concepts.
7.2.1 Near Term
Steps that can be implemented now, within the context of Future Years Defense Program 
2012-2016, include:
• Research organizations, such as NPS, should continue detailed analysis of V-CAP, LD-
UUV, and similar AUWS concepts. The following specific areas of focus for further 
analysis are recommended.
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◦ Implementation of Classified material, including specific threat and friendly 
capabilities, to ensure that analysis results accurately reflect the current situation.
◦ Development of AUWS top level requirements, using the identified need areas as a 
basis.
◦ Detailed analysis of autonomous command and control, including ways to improve 
threat discrimination and the effects of in-stride adjustable autonomy on overall 
mission accomplishment.
◦ Detailed design of system and subsystem components. Concurrently, a detailed 
feasibility analysis should be conducted to determine the design tradespace required 
to realize projected operational concepts.
◦ Refinement of the modeling and simulation effort, including a realistic, physics-based 
acoustic sensor input for distributed network performance.
◦ Development of Life Cycle Cost Estimates, to include R&D, procurement, O&S, and 
disposal costs. The operational costs developed in this analysis should be used as a 
basis.
• The cost-effectiveness and high endurance of gliders warrant further investment in these 
vehicles for non-tactical missions, such as oceanography. Development of the AUWS 
Glider concept is not recommended until maneuverability can be sufficiently improved 
without sacrificing high endurance and low cost. Since Glider and LD-UUV share an 
equivalent overall utility, it is recommended that the Navy continue its pursuit of LD-
UUVs for tactical purposes.
• DoD (and DoN) should review and update doctrine related to USW, unmanned systems, 
and autonomous systems. Specifically, ROE should clarify the differences between 
unmanned and autonomous systems, and between traditional undersea weapons and 
AUWS. Since AUWS does not adequately fit into the conventional definition of a mine, 
torpedo, or submarine, new definitions for concepts based on emerging technology are 
necessary. The tactical publications and training manuals that govern how the Navy fights 
in the undersea battlespace should also be updated based on the concepts discussed in this 
analysis, from both an offensive and defensive perspective.
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• ONR should use this analysis to aid in defining a specific Science and Technology Gap 
with respect to future USW and AUWS.
• ONR should assign a Future Naval Capabilities Manager to ensure AUWS concepts 
receive necessary R&D funding to meet middle term recommendations.
• To the greatest extent possible, prototypes of unmanned underwater systems should be 
included in fleet exercises. In order to improve operational concepts and, ultimately, 
mission effectiveness, sailors must be afforded the opportunity to interact with these 
systems at the operational and tactical levels. It is not important that such prototypes 
accurately resemble AUWS, since the underlying principles of operating unmanned and 
autonomous systems have wide applicability. Operators must become proficient in this 
unfamiliar dynamic in order to effectively wield future warfare systems.
7.2.2 Middle Term
In the intermediate time frame of FYDP 2016-2020, the following implementations 
should be considered:
• Based on this analysis and future analyses (including an S&T Gap Analysis), an Initial 
Capability Document should be developed to facilitate AUWS entry into the acquisition 
process.
• The ICD should form the basis of a Program of Record for the AUWS concept that 
provides the most utility to the Navy, given an updated assessment of the current 
capability gap.
• The Navy should not wait for technology to advance to optimal levels before making 
long term investments in AUWS or similar systems. Requirements, operational concepts, 
and tactics must lead the technology in the effort to maintain USW dominance in the 
future.
7.2.3 Far Term
Past the year 2020, it is difficult to predict the specific programmatic steps that will be 
required to ensure the United States Navy’s dominance in USW. The uncertainty involved in 
projecting what the future will look like in ten years makes detailed far term recommendations 
almost irrelevant. Still, the root problem facing the platform-centric model for USW remains, 
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and the insights gained from this analysis can be used to build upon near and middle term 
recommendations. The Navy should maintain a goal of achieving full operational capability for 
AUWS by 2030, provided that future reassessments of the undersea battlespace validate the 
initial problem defined in this analysis.
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8. Conclusion
The undersea battlespace of the future is a complex, dynamic environment that cannot be 
neatly divided along platform or community lines. Emerging technologies simultaneously enable 
and require the Navy to adopt new models for continued USW dominance. In the contested 
littoral waters where employment is likely, the Navy cannot accept the risk incurred by relying 
on multi-billion dollar assets to control the undersea battlespace, particularly when a wide range 
of potential adversaries have access to the same emerging technologies studied in this analysis. 
The Navy must posture itself, at all levels, to adapt to this new reality and exploit the 
opportunities generated. 
Advanced Undersea Warfare Systems are just one element of a comprehensive, unified 
approach to maintaining and enhancing USW dominance in the future. By focusing on systems 
that are flexible, scalable, and tailorable, the Navy can balance the cost, risk, and required 
performance for the array of USW challenges it can expect to face in the future. 
Ultimately, the objective of this analysis is to support decision makers as they begin to 
make major investments in systems such as AUWS. The true measure of success of any warfare 
system is its ability to address the needs of the warfighter, not the technology it comprises. Using 
the results and recommendations in this analysis, decision makers can more effectively harness 
emerging technology and thus drive its development toward systems built upon future warfighter 
needs in the undersea battlespace.
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Appendix A: Initial Tasking Document
XXX
MEMORANDUM FOR SEA-17 and TDSI STUDENTS
Subj:  2011/SEA 17 CAPSTONE PROJECT OBJECTIVES
Enclosures:  Tab A: Preliminary objectives: Regional Stability Project
Tab B: Preliminary objectives: Advanced Undersea Weapons Project
1. This memorandum provides guidance for the conduct of the integrated project which is 
required as partial fulfillment for your various degrees. You will deliver your completed 
project report and final briefing materials to the Project Advisor on or before 1 June 2011, in 
accordance with the following plan and milestones.
a. Develop a project proposal and a project management plan during the Fall Academic 
Quarter 2011. This proposal and plan will serve to focus your initial research and 
analysis. You should plan to review and update this plan frequently as you progress with 
your research.
b. Conduct project reviews approximately every six weeks, finishing with a final brief to be 
delivered to interested stakeholders on and off campus.
c. Begin outlining and preparing your Project Report as early as you can. Work with your 
faculty advisors, about every week, to prepare your Project Report for their approval and 
signature by 20 May 2011. The edited and processed final report is due on 1 June 2011.
2. There will be two projects and associated teams as part of the 2011 capstone experience. The 
preliminary objectives statements for the projects are contained in Tabs A and B. Your initial 
efforts should be to refine these objectives statements, based on research of current guidance 
documents and subject to the approval of your faculty advisors. Each of you will be assigned 
to one of the two projects.
3. You will be expected to identify and integrate students and faculty from across the campus -- 
and other resources from outside the school -- to participate directly in your project or to 
provide source documents, technical knowledge and insights, and knowledge of evolving 
requirements, capabilities, and systems. This participation could include students who would 
join your groups, students doing related individual thesis topics such as those from TDSI, 
faculty inside or outside NPS who have expertise related to your project, and appropriately 
engaged government agencies and industry developers. It will be your responsibility to 
integrate the efforts of outside participants in your projects. Your faculty advisors will, of 
course, assist in these efforts.
4. You should employ the systems engineering and analytical methodology you have been 
learning in your class work and from your advisors. The role of the SEA students in the 
campus-wide integrated project is that of the lead project systems engineering team, working 
197
closely with other members of the project engineering team from TDSI and other campus 
curricula. SEA 17 students will be expected to define the functions and performances of your 
system, develop alternative architectures to meet those functions, and evaluate the alternative 
architectures for performance. In executing these tasks you will be defining and 
understanding the overall project requirements (recognizing that this definition process is 
iterative and will evolve as the project progresses). Other teams, consisting of TDSI and 
other students are to be integrated into the overall task and assigned specific project 
responsibilities, to be negotiated among you as necessary.
5. SEA 17, working closely with TDSI and other students, will have to define the selected 
concepts for supporting systems (the components in your systems) and partition the overall 
system requirements to be addressed by supporting teams of students and faculty. Your role 
will include providing central guidance and requirements clarification and resolution, 
working with supporting teams, and completing your tasks according to your schedule. The 
efforts of all participants will have to be integrated to form a coherent, cohesive, finished 
report of the overall project.
6. Background research is a major part of the task for the participants. 
7. The grades assigned to the participants in these projects will be pass/fail, and will be assigned 
by the lead faculty advisor for each of the tasks. Although you will work as part of a team, 
your individual performance will be the basis for this evaluation. Successful completion and 
documentation of your project is a degree requirement. It would be unwise to assume that a 
grade of “pass” is automatic.
__________________
Prof. Charles Calvano 
OPNAV SEA Chair
Distribution:
SEA-17 students; TDSI students; other cooperating students; faculty advisors
Profs Calvano, Shebalin, Hughes, Papoulias, Paulo, Mansager, Stevens, Solitario, Kline, Olwell, 
Dell, Harney, Langford, RADM Williams, RADM Ellis, President Oliver, Provost Ferrari, Dean 
Sritharan, Dean Purdue, CDR Burton
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Tab B – Team B
Advanced Undersea Weapons and Mine Warfare
Mines have been used or encountered by the US Navy in nearly every maritime conflict in our 
nation’s history. In recent times, mines have often been the asymmetric weapon of choice for 
nations with less capable navies, rogue states or terrorists who have sought to limit or harass the 
execution of US naval missions by the use or threatened use of naval mines, but mines still have 
the potential for significant use by near-peer competitor navies. 
It is clear that the miner has a distinct advantage. Development and construction of naval mines 
can be accomplished quickly and relatively inexpensively. Applications of current technology to 
naval mine development can further complicate countering naval mines. Additionally, a variety 
of naval mines, some that are quite sophisticated, are available for purchase on the open market. 
Consequently, the range and variety of mines that may be encountered create the requirement for 
a complex and probably expensive approach to countering these threats. 
During recent discussions with the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander Naval Mine and 
ASW Command has suggested that the United States Navy should consider the development of 
Advanced Underwater Weapons Systems (AUWS). Rather than maintaining the obsolescent 
capability of current mine inventories and the warfare capability historically provided by static 
mine fields, the US Navy should work to harness the emerging technologies that can be found in 
underwater sensors, networks, undersea weapons, and unmanned vehicles to build an enhanced 
capability for undersea warfare dominance. Not only would such an approach provide a more 
comprehensive answer to both offensive and defensive undersea warfare, but such an approach 
should also create added pressure on any potential antagonist to expend resources to counter this 
approach.
Team B is tasked to “Define a system of capabilities that would be necessary to create and 
sustain an underwater operational picture of areas of interest and counter and engage adversary 
manned and unmanned systems when required.” Your system should be a deployable asset 
(either a permanent system for some areas and / or a temporarily deployable and recoverable 
system for other uses) by the 2025 time frame and should support the goal of shaping the 
underwater battlefield and denying areas to an adversary. You should consider currently existing 
systems and ongoing research as a starting point. Your work should address Planning, 
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) and Technology Readiness Levels (TRL) 
considerations where appropriate. Your alternatives should include low-cost and near-term 
options as well as options based on sophisticated technology.
A related task that would share many technological aspects with the above task is included. (This 
should be the work of a sub-team): 
Develop a Joint System of Systems concept and supporting architecture that supports the 
development and operations of a smart undersea weapon that whose primary mission is to protect 
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a ship at sea and in port. The smart undersea weapon is not controlled by the ship which is being 
protected. Consider current and evolving unmanned technologies to design solutions that take 
into account advanced concepts of underwater, surface, and air defense that would be packaged 
into the smart undersea weapon. Consider operations, command and control, autonomous 
operations, mine warfare and all aspects of Undersea Warfare.
Advisors: Prof. Gary Langford, SE faculty lead; RADM Rick Williams, Subject Matter Expert
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Subj: SEA-17B Capstone Project Survey Questionnaire
Dear Sir/Ma’am,
My name is ______________________, USN and I am a Systems Engineering Analysis 
(SEA) student at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, CA.  We have been tasked 
with developing an Advanced Underwater Weapons System (AUWS) to fulfill the requirements 
of out Capstone Project, the final event in our Master’s degree program. 
The AUWS will provide advanced offensive and defensive Mine Warfare (MIW), Anti-
Submarine Warfare (ASW), and Surface Warfare (SUW) systems with organic sensing and com-
munications capability for network-centric operations.  The AUWS is aimed at providing a low-
cost, rapidly deployable system of systems (SoS) solution beyond the existing Littoral Combat 
Ship (LCS) paradigm.
To properly craft this system, we must use a Systems Engineering Approach founded on a 
formal Stakeholder Analysis. You have been selected as one of the many people who hold an in-
terest in a project such as ours. Flag, Senior, and Commanding Officers in the USN warfare dis-
ciplines as well as DoD researchers, contractors, and analysts are all valuable resources for craft-
ing a robust and accurate portrait of the capability gap we must fill. 
We would greatly appreciate your taking the time to answer the following questions:
• Where do you see MIW in the future of USN operations?
• Where do you see ASW in the future of USN operations?
• Where do you see SUW in the future of USN operations?
• Do you see a need for Unmanned Vehicles in USN operations? If so, what kind of vehi-
cles do you envision, and with what capabilities should these units be equipped?
• Based on your experience, do you feel like this AUWS is a necessary aspect of future 
USN operations?
• Beyond the brief description above, what facets of USN operations should be included, 
excluded, stressed, or de-emphasized?
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• Do you know of any existing systems that address some or all aspects intended for ad-
dress by the AUWS?
• What gaps exist in the current USN Battle Fleet’s capability, to include weaponry, sen-
sors, material, and assets?
• If you were going to spend a dollar on AUWS, what aspect, function, or capability would 
you spend it on? Would you prefer to spend your dollar on a non-material solution (i.e. 
training)?
• What requirements would you, as a stakeholder in the military-industrial complex, have 
for a system such as AUWS?
• What parameters and metrics are important to you in the measurement of performance of 
a system such as AUWS?
• What additional comments or advice do you have for our team with regard to AUWS?
Thank you very much for your time. We will include your responses in our research for 
use in building our stakeholder analysis, and ultimately, or list of requirements. If you should 
need or want to contact us, we can be reached at SEA17B@nps.edu.
Very Respectfully,
____________________
SEA-17B, Naval Postgraduate School
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Appendix C: MOEs and MOPs
The following is a list of all MOEs and MOPs considered for analysis in AUWS. For the 
sake of simplicity, only a select few are thoroughly modeled and analyzed. It is recommended 
that future analysis on AUWS use this list as a conceptual foundation. 
Power
• Distribution (Endurance)
◦ MOE: Capability to Operate for Minimum of 30 Days
▪ MOP: Average Time Inactive (days)
▪ MOP: Average Time Conducting Loiter (days)
▪ MOP: Average Time Conducting Patrol (days)
▪ MOP: Average Time Conducting Sprint (hours)
▪ MOP: Proportion of Power Required for Mission Profile
▪ MOP: Rate of Component Efficiency/Power Draw
▪ MOP: Average Energy Production from Fuel 
▪ MOP: Rate of Fuel Consumption (gallons/hr)
▪ MOP: Average System Efficiency (%)
▪ MOP: Average Electrical Power Requirement
• Generation
◦ MOE: Capability to Recharge
▪ MOP: Rate of (Re)Charge(Ah)
▪ MOP: Average Time System Unavailable
• Storage
◦ MOE: Capability to Store Energy
▪ MOP: Average Capacity of Battery (Ah)
▪ MOP: Rate of Discharge (Ah)
C3
• Command
◦ MOE: Probability of Successful Command Automation
▪ MOP: Average Time to Process Data Sets Correctly
• The average elapsed time from the start of the entry of data sets to the correct 
completion of multiple tasks.
▪ MOP: Average Time to Correctly Process Retrieved Data Sets 
• The average elapsed time from the completion of receiving data sets from 
local data bases to the correct completion of multiple tasks.
▪ MOP: Average Time to Correctly Process Transmitted Data Sets
• The average elapsed time from the completion of the receipt of data sets from 
remote sites or the completion of retrieval of data sets from the local data 
bases to the time of correct processing of data sets.
▪ MOP: Average Time to Successively Transmit Data Set
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• The average elapsed time from start to successful completion of the 
transmission of data sets.
▪ MOP: Average Time to Successfully Retrieve Data Sets
• The average elapsed time from start to successful completion of the retrieval 
of data sets.
▪ MOP: Reliability of Network File Transfer
▪ MOP: Proportion of Data Sets Processed Correctly
• The ratio of the total number of data sets processed correctly to the total 
number of data sets entered for multiple tasks.
▪ MOP: Average Report Generation Time
▪ MOP: Utility of Communication Interface 
▪ MOP: Average Time to Correctly Process Retrieved Data Elements
• The average elapsed time from completion of retrieving data elements from 
the local site to the successful completion of processing to the total number of 
data elements processed.
▪ MOP: Average Time to Process Data Elements Correctly
• The average elapsed time from start of entry of data elements to the 
completion of processing to the total number of data elements processed.
▪ MOP: Average Time to Correctly Process Transmitted Data Elements
• Autonomous Control 
◦ MOE: Probability of designating the appropriate level of autonomy prior to 
deployment
◦ MOE: Capability to Vary (Change) Level of Autonomy
• Communicate
◦ MOE: Capability to Communicate
▪ MOP: Average Time to Establish Communications
▪ MOP: Call Completion Rate (CCR)
▪ MOP: Average Signal Range
▪ MOP: Average File Transfer Time over the Network
▪ MOP: Average Data Rate
◦ MOE: Capability to Receive Message 
▪ MOP: Message Completion Rate (MCR) 
▪ MOP: Average Time to Acknowledge Report
▪ MOP: Message Accuracy
◦ MOE: Capability to Transmit Message
▪ MOP: Average Data Message Completion Time (MCT)
▪ MOP: Average Transmission Backlog
▪ MOP: Average Duration of Transmission Wait
ISR
• Search
◦ MOE: Capability to Search for Target 
▪ MOP: Search Rate
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◦ MOE: Probability of Location Accuracy
▪ MOP: Average Range Error
• Detect
◦ MOE: Probability of Correct Target Detection Identification
▪ MOP: Reasons for No Detection
▪ MOP: Proportion of Detections
▪ MOP: Average Range of Detection
▪ MOP: Average Time from Target Presentation to Detection
▪ MOP: Average Target Presentation Range
◦ MOE: Probability of Correct Target Recognition Identification
▪ MOP: Reasons for Incorrect or No Recognition
▪ MOP: Time from Detection to Recognition
▪ MOP: Proportion of Correct Recognitions
▪ MOP: Proportion of Recognitions versus Classifications
▪ MOP: Average Range of Recognition
▪ MOP: Average Time from Target Classification to Recognition
▪ MOP: Proportion of Identifications versus Recognitions
▪ MOP: Average Time from Target Recognition to Identification
▪ MOP: Average Range of Identification
▪ MOP: Proportion of Time Fratricides Avoided
▪ MOP: Reasons for Incorrect or No Identification
• Track
◦ MOE: Probability of Correct Target Prioritization
▪ MOP: Time from Classification to Prioritization
▪ MOP: Reasons for Incorrect or No Prioritization
▪ MOP: Average Range of Prioritization
▪ MOP: Proportion of Manual Overrides to Automatic Prioritization
▪ MOP: Average Time from Identification to Prioritization
▪ MOP: Target Prioritization Rate
◦ MOE: Capability to Track Target 
▪ MOP: Average Distance between Uncorrelated Tracks
• The average distance between different sensor tracks when correlation 
between sensors failed.
▪ MOP: Proportion of Formations Resolved
• The ratio of the total number of formations resolved by the sensor to the total 
number of formations presented.
▪ MOP: Average Tracking Error 
• The average error between the sensor tracked location and the matched actual 
target location.
▪ MOP: Proportion of Track Correlation
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• The ratio of time when correlation did occur to the total possible time where 
correlation could have occurred.
▪ MOP: Proportion of Time Tracking Lost
• The sum of the intervals between each track drop and the next detect per time 
of possible tracking.
▪ MOP: Proportion of Time Tracked
• The ratio of the total time a target is tracked by a sensor to the total possible 
target tracking time
▪ MOP: False Track Sources
• The number, by category, of the sources of false tracks.
▪ MOP: False Track Rate
• The ratio of the total number of false tracks to the time of possible tracking.
▪ MOP: False Track Rate on Transmitted Cues
• The ratio of the number of transmitted cues on false tracks to the time of 
possible tracking.
▪ MOP: Reasons for Not Tracking
• The reasons, by category, for not tracking a target.
▪ MOP: Ratio of Track Duration Times
• The ratio of the sum of the duration times of each track and track segment per 
time of possible tracking.
▪ MOP: Average Range at Formation Resolution
• The average distance of the sensor from the formation when the formation is 
resolved.
▪ MOP: Track Drop Rate
• The number of track drops per total time of possible tracking.
• Classify
◦ MOE: Probability of Correct Target Classification 
▪ MOP: Proportion of Correct Classifications
▪ MOP: Reasons for Incorrect or No Classification
▪ MOP: Average Range of Classification
▪ MOP: Average Elapsed Time from Target Detection to Classification
▪ MOP: Proportion of Correct Classification Records
• The ratio of the total number of target records containing correct 
classification(s) to the total number of target records.
▪ MOP: Proportion of Classifications versus Detections
▪ MOP: Time from Identification to Classification
• Collect Intelligence
◦ MOE: Capability to Integrate Information from Various Sensor Sources and 
Consolidate Redundant Contacts into a Single Track 
◦ MOE: Capability to Develop Situational Intelligence
▪ MOP: Average Time to Generate ISR Report
▪ MOP: Proportion of Targets Reported
206
▪ MOP: Average Time to Release ISR Report
Prosecute
• Deter
◦ MOE: Probability of Successful Employment of Decoy
◦ MOE: Probability Threat Retreats
• Engage
◦ MOE: Probability of Successful Engagement
▪ MOP: Number of Successful Engagements on the first day Threat present
▪ MOP: Average Range of Engagement 
▪ MOP: Proportion of Fire Missions Completed
▪ MOP: Reasons for No Engagement
▪ MOP: Capability to engage in sea state 3
◦ MOE: Probability of Timeliness
▪ MOP: Average Time from Target Engagement to Hit
▪ MOP: Average Time From Target Presentation to Hit
▪ MOP: Engagement Rate
▪ MOP: Hit Rate
▪ MOP: Kill Rate
▪ MOP: Average Fire Mission Processing Time
▪ MOP: Average Time from Target Acquisition to Engagement
▪ MOP: Average Kill Range
▪ MOP: Average Target Handoff Time
◦ MOE: Probability of Accuracy
▪ MOP: Proportion of Rounds Meeting Stated Accuracy
▪ MOP: Average Round Error
▪ MOP: Reasons for No Hit
▪ MOP: Proportion of Hits vs Engagements
◦ MOE: Probability of Effectiveness
▪ MOP: Proportion of Target Engagements vs Acquisitions
▪ MOP: Average Hit Range
▪ MOP: Average Burst Radius
▪ MOP: Reasons for No Kill
▪ MOP: Loss Exchange Ratio
▪ MOP: Proportion of Target Kills vs Engagements
▪ MOP: System Exchange Ratio
▪ MOP: Force Exchange Ratio
OPSEC
• Detection
◦ MOE: Probability of Detection Avoidance 
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▪ MOP: Detection Avoidance Proportion
▪ MOP: Detection Survivability Ratio
▪ MOP: Average Exposure Time
▪ MOP: Average Dimensions of Radar Cross Section of the System (Meters2)
▪ MOP: Average Threshold Levels of Infrared Emission 
(Kelvin/Exitance/Wavelength or Watts/Steradian)
▪ MOP: Average Threshold Levels of RF Emission (Watts)
▪ MOP: Average Threshold Levels of Contrast Reflectance (luminance, 
chromaticity, and visual texture measured in percentage)
▪ MOP: Average Threshold Levels of Acoustic Emission ((dB/Hz relative to 1Pa at 
1m))
▪ MOP: Average Dimensions of Laser Cross Section (Meters2)
▪ MOP: Average Threshold Levels Magnetic Anomalies (Amps/Meter or ratio 
against Earth’s magnetic strength)
◦ MOE: Probability of being detected during deployment/recovery
• Compromise
◦ MOE: Capability to self-neutralize
▪ MOP: Average Time to Execute Self-neutralization procedures
▪ MOE: Probability of Surviving Detection
▪ MOP: Acquisition Survivability Ratio
▪ MOP: Hit Survivability Ratio
Maneuver
• Deploy
◦ MOE: Probability of Surviving Deployment
▪ MOP: Proportion of Deployment within Required Time
▪ MOP: Average Setup Time: The average elapsed time to set up the system
▪ MOP: Average Time to Deploy
▪ MOP: Displacement
▪ MOP: Average Displacement Time
▪ MOP: Proportion of Displacements within Required Time
◦ MOE: Capability for Deployment by both Contemporary and Future Platforms
▪ MOP: Proportion of System Compatibility with Existing Platforms, Systems and 
Subsystems
◦ MOE: Capability for Rapid Deployment
▪ MOP: Average Time to Deploy
◦ MOE: Capability for Mass Deployment
▪ MOP: Average (or Max) square mileage covered by AUWS units per deploying 
platform
▪ MOP: Average Standoff Range of Deploying Unit
• Patrol
◦ MOE: Capability to Maneuver
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▪ MOP: Rate of Speed
▪ MOP: Average Speed for Conditions
• Recover
◦ MOE: Probability of Surviving Recovery
▪ MOP: Average Disassembly Time
• The average elapsed time to breakdown the system
▪ MOP: Average time to conduct battle-damage repairs ‘in situ’ for fast re-launch 
and reusability
▪ MOP: Average Time to Recover
◦ MOE: Capability for Rapid Recovery
▪ MOP: Average Time to Recover
◦ MOE: Capability for Autonomous or Semi-autonomous Recovery
◦ MOE: Probability of Immediate Reusability after Recovery
▪ MOP: Average Time System Unavailable
◦ MOE: Capability for Rapid Battle-Damage Reparability
▪ MOP: Average Time to Repair
▪ MOP: Proportion of Repairs Conducted on Site
◦ MOE: Capability for Recovery by both Contemporary and Future Platforms
▪ MOP: Proportion of System Interoperability with Existing Platforms, Systems and 
Subsystems
• Navigate
◦ MOE: Capability to Navigate Successfully
▪ MOP: Average Height Terrain Profiling Radar Used
▪ MOP: Proportion of Detected Obstacles
▪ MOP: Average Maneuver Error
▪ MOP: Average Location Error
▪ MOP: Proportion of Navigation Equipment Usage
▪ MOP: Average Error for Self-location
Provide Structure
◦ MOE: Capability to house physical elements for each function without adversely 
affecting performance of other functions
◦ MOE: Capability to integrate physical elements
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Appendix D: Functional Analysis Diagrams




From Figure D.1, Provide Power consists of a loop function denoting the continuous 
cycle of the overall process. Within the loop, functional flow starts at Receive Power (Function 
1.2.1), continues to Store Power (Function 1.2.2), then proceeds to Manage Power (Function 
1.2.3) before reaching an AND branch, denoting that Distribution (Function 1.2.4) and 
























Figure D.1: Provide Power FFBD
Figure D.2 shows the functional flow internal to Distribution (Function 1.2.4.) Here, the 























Figure D.2: Distribute Power FFBD
Figure D.3 shows a similar process occurring within Generate Power (Function 1.2.5). 
The system must either Conduct a Recharge (Function 1.2.5.1) and provide new power for use or 























Figure D.3: Generate Power FFBD
1.3 Perform C3
Viewing the Perform C3 function as a one level FFBD in Figure D.4, it is apparent that 
Command (Function 1.3.1), Control (1.3.2) and Communicate (1.3.3) must occur simultaneously 











Figure D.4: Perform C3 FFBD
Figure D.5 shows the Command function FFBD. This function also works in a loop, 
starting with the simultaneous receipt of Orders (Function 1.3.1.1), Processing of Status 
(1.3.1.2), and Processing of ISR Data (1.3.1.3) for the sake of incorporating all inputs to the 
command module for attempting Analysis (Function 1.3.1.4) and ultimately, Execution of that 
Order (Function 1.3.1.5) before entering the next iteration. In this way, an OODA (observe,  
orient, decide, act) loop is created.
1.2











Execute Order LP Ref.
Figure D.5: Command FFBD
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Figure D.6 shows the functional flow occurring within Process Status (Function 1.3.1.2). 
This linear process starts with the receipt of Component Status (Function 1.3.1.2.1), which is 


















Figure D.6: Process Status FFBD
Figure D.7 shows the internal functional flow for Process ISR Data (Function 1.3.1.3). 
This linear process starts with the receipt of ISR data (Function 1.3.1.3.1) which is then 
Analyzed (Function 1.3.1.3.2) to concurrently produce Environmental Status (Function 1.3.1.3.3) 



















Figure D.7: Process ISR Data FFBD
Figure D.8 is the FFBD for the Control Function (Function 1.3.2). This one-level diagram 
uses OR logic to denote that only one mode of operation can be used at any given time, be it 















Figure D.8: Control FFBD
Figure D.9 is the FFBD for Control (Function 1.3.3). This iterative function describes a 
situation where data is both Received (Function 1.3.3.1) and Distributed (Function 1.3.3.2) or 
transmitted either Externally (Function 1.3.3.3) or Internally (Function 1.3.3.4). The loop closes, 
indicating that the process is continuous throughout AUWS operation as data is sent and 
received.
1.2















Figure D.9: Communicate FFBD
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1.4 Maneuver
Maneuver’s FFBD is depicted in Figure D.10. AUWS is deployed (Function 1.4.1), then 
simultaneously Patrols (Function 1.4.2) and Navigates (Function 1.4.3) before proceeding to the 












Figure D.10: Maneuver FFBD
Figure D.11 breaks Deploy (Function 1.4.1) into four possible methods: Submerged 
(Function 1.4.1.1), Surfaced (Function 1.4.1.2), Airborne (Function 1.4.1.3) and Shore (Function 
1.4.1.4). Since a single unit on mission can only be deployed by one method each time (despite 
the fact that multiple AUWS units may be introduced to an area in a multi-platform operation) it 





















Figure D.11: Deploy FFBD
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Figure D.12 is the FFBD for Patrol (Function 1.4.2). Another OR loop, this function 
shows that AUWS will either Loiter (Function 1.4.2.1), Rove (Function 1.4.2.2), Sprint (1.4.2.3) 
or Transit (Function 1.4.2.4) if needed. This OR function is nested with a loop, indicating that the 
operations will be performed in sequence as required before completing the function. For 















Figure D.12: Patrol FFBD
Figure D.13 is the FFBD for Navigate (Function 1.4.3). Location is Established (Function 
1.4.3.1) first to determine system response to conduct Patrol (Function 1.4.2) operations. The 
functional flow proceeds to an AND branch where Propulsion (Function 1.4.3.2) and Steering 
(Function 1.4.3.3) are simultaneously employed to move AUWS. The loop then returns to the 
start of the process due to the feedback loop required between self-location and system response. 
When this loop has been performed enough times to meet all variations of the Patrol (Function 
1.4.2) loop, the functional flow for Maneuver (Function 1.4) may continue to the final phase: 













Figure D.13: Navigate FFBD
The Recover function (Function 1.4.4) is shown in Figure D.14. Like Deployment 
(Function 1.4.1), this is an OR logic branch with no iteration. AUWS must be recovered via 















Figure D.14: Recover FFBD
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1.5 Perform ISR
The FFBD for ISR Performance (Function 1.5) is shown in Figure D.15. An AND 
denotes the performance of tactical and intelligence collection using installed sensor suites. The 
top branch is a nested loop function proceeding from Search (Function 1.5.1) to Detect (Function 
1.5.2) to Track (Function 1.5.3) to Classify (Function 1.5.4) before closing the loop, showing the 
continuous search for target signatures and the ensuing process of establishing tracks and 
classifying all detections in the sensor sweep area. The bottom branch shows Intelligence 

















Figure D.15: Perform ISR FFBD
Figure D.16 expands the functional flow within Collect Intelligence (Function 1.5.5). 
ACINT (Function 1.5.5.1), COMINT (Function 1.5.5.2), SIGINT (Function 1.5.5.3), ELINT 
(Function 1.5.5.4) or EO/IR Data (Function 1.5.5.4) is collected as allowed by circumstances and 
readiness status. While no loop is shown within the function, it must be noted that the overall 
























Figure D.16: Collect Intelligence FFBD
1.6 Prosecute
Figure D.17 shows the FFBD for Prosecute (Function 1.6). The OR loop dictates that 
AUWS, when given the order to Prosecute, will either Monitor (Function 1.6.1), Deter (Function 
1.6.2), or Engage (Function 1.6.3), as directed. The OR branch is nested in a loop to indicate that 
while AUWS can only do one function at a time, it will continue to iterate until given further 
guidance, either externally or internally.
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1.2








Figure D.17: Prosecute FFBD
Figure D.18 shows the FFBD for Engage (Function 1.6.3). With that function, AUWS 
may either employ Non-Lethal (Function 1.6.3.1) or Lethal Measures (Function 1.6.3.2). No 










Figure D.18: Engage FFBD
1.7 Provide OPSEC
The FFBD for Provide OPSEC (Function 1.7) is shown in Figure D.19. The AND loop signifies 












Figure D.19: Provide OPSEC FFBD
Figure D.20 is the FFBD for Minimizing the Risk of Detection (Function 1.7.1), which 
consists of an OR branch such that the system will either Provide EMCON (Function 1.7.1.1) or 









Figure D.20: Minimize Risk of Detection FFBD
Figure D.21 is the FFBD for Minimizing the Risk of Compromise (Function 1.7.2). 











Figure D.21: Minimize Risk of Compromise FFBD
2. Integrated Definition for Function Modeling (IDEF)
Discrimination between Inputs and Controls for the IDEF0 provided automatic 
refinements to the FFBD series. The following diagrams and accompanying descriptions will 
detail overall inputs, controls, and outputs for AUWS from a top level perspective. 
The language for the AUWS IDEF0 series is that inputs will enter from the left of the 
function box and outputs will exit from the right, while controls will enter from the top. 
Mechanisms were not considered, as that would imply the existence of physical constructs in a 
strictly functional architecture. Therefore, no data will enter the bottom of any functional box. 
From Figure D.22, AUWS has the following top-level inputs, controls, and outputs:
• Inputs
◦ Weapons – the warheads and associated expendables required to provide effective 
kinetic engagement and deterrent capabilities.
◦ Resources: the fuels and expendables required to generate and provide power within 
an AUWS unit.
◦ Materials: the parts, components, and raw materials needed to build the physical 
construct of the AUWS system.
◦ Internal Communications: Transmissions received from other AUWS units in an 
AUWS network.
◦ External Power: Electrical Power provided from external sources to an AUWS unit 
for storage.
◦ External Communications: Transmissions received from sources external to the 
AUWS network, such as controlling asset.
• Controls
◦ Software: the basic programming that governs system behavior regardless of mission 
requirements. 
◦ Mission Plan: the requirements, data, rules of engagement (ROE), and constraints 
provided by pre-planned mission profiles.
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• Outputs
◦ Asset Kill: a contact destroyed or sunken by AUWS weapons systems (preferably the 
desired threat contact).
◦ External Transmission: data intended for an asset external to the AUWS network, 
such as a controlling asset, OTH shooter, or Operational Commander.
◦ Internal Transmission: data intended for other AUWS units within an AUWS 
network.
◦ Mission Kill: a contact rendered non-functional by AUWS weapons systems 
(preferably the desired threat contact)
◦ Neutralized Unit: an AUWS unit that has rendered itself inert, unrecoverable, and 
otherwise destroyed to prevent compromise.
◦ Recovered Unit: an AUWS unit that has been successfully recovered by a friendly 
















Figure D.22: AUWS A0
Opening the A0 diagram, the top level AUWS IDEF0 is revealed as shown in Figure 
D.23. The same six inputs, two controls, and six outputs appear as they relate to the seven 
primary AUWS functions. Between those seven functional boxes are internal inputs, controls, 
and outputs. The diagram is too cluttered to provide a concise yet accurate written description of 
the relationships contained therein. The next several pages will provide a brief overview of the 
inputs, controls, and outputs contained in Figure D.23 with accompanying A0 diagrams. All 


















































Figure D.23: AUWS IDEF0
2.1 Provide Structure
Focusing on the A0 diagram for Provide Structure in Figure D.24, the top level input of 
Materials is used as the sole input to the function box. The sole output is Structure, which will 




Figure D.24: Provide Structure A0
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2.2 Provide Power
Figure D.25 is the A0 diagram for Provide Power (Function 1.2).
• Inputs
◦ Resources: top level input.
◦ External Power: top level input.
• Controls
◦ Structure: physical structure provided by Function 1.1.
• Outputs
◦ Distributed Power: the electrical power provided to all components of the AUWS 
unit.
◦ System Power Status: the readiness status of the AUWS unit power system, to include 









Figure D.25: Provide Power A0
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2.3 Perform C3
Figure D.26 is the A0 diagram for Perform C3 (Function 1.3).
• Inputs
◦ Target Track: the firing solution for a contact of interest or threat contact provided by 
Function 1.5.
◦ System Response: Component readiness as provided by most major functions.
◦ Internal Communications: top level input.
◦ External Communications: top level input.
◦ Environmental Status: the environmental conditions of the immediate area provided 
by Function 1.5.
◦ Distributed Power: electrical power provided by Function 1.2.
◦ Contact Track: the firing solution for a contact other than a contact of interest or 
threat contact provided by Function 1.5.
• Controls
◦ System Power Status: power system readiness from Function 1.2.
◦ Structure: physical structure provided by Function 1.1.
◦ Software: top level control.
◦ Mission Plan: top level control.
• Outputs
◦ Command: internal order to be executed by one of the major functions of AUWS.
◦ External Transmission: top level output.
◦ Internal Transmission: top level output.
















Figure D.26: Perform C3 A0
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2.4 Maneuver
Figure D.27 is the A0 diagram for Maneuver (Function 1.4).
• Inputs
◦ Scuttle Order: order to self-neutralize from Function 1.7.
◦ Distributed Power: electrical power provided by Function 1.2.
• Controls
◦ Command: internal order from Function 1.3.
◦ Structure: physical structure provided by Function 1.1.
• Outputs
◦ Deployed unit: an AUWS unit that has been successfully deployed.
◦ Desired Operational Position: the placement of AUWS in the correct operational area; 
an input to Function 1.5/6.
◦ Neutralized Unit: top level output.
◦ Power Demand: requirement for a specific amount of power from Function 1.2.
◦ Propulsion: motive force for the AUWS unit.
◦ Recovered Unit: top level output.
◦ Steering: positional adjustment for the AUWS unit.
◦ System Response: component status provided to Function 1.3.
Figure D.27: Maneuver A0
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2.5 Perform ISR
Figure D.28 is the A0 diagram for Perform ISR (Function 1.5).
• Inputs
◦ Distributed Power: electrical power provided by Function 1.2.
◦ Desired Operational Position: the placement of AUWS in the correct operational area 
as a result of Function 1.4.
◦ Deployed unit: an AUWS unit that has been successfully deployed as a result of 
Function 1.4.
• Controls
◦ Structure: physical structure provided by Function 1.1.
◦ Steering: positional adjustment for the AUWS unit provided by Function 1.4.
◦ Software: top level control.
◦ Propulsion: motive force for the AUWS unit provided by Function 1.4
◦ Mission Plan: top level control.
◦ Command: internal order from Function 1.3.
• Outputs
◦ Contact Track: the firing solution for a contact other than a contact of interest or 
threat contact provided to Function 1.2.
◦ Environmental Status: the environmental conditions of the immediate area, provided 
to Function 1.3.
◦ Power Demand: requirement for a specific amount of power from Function 1.2.
◦ System Response: component status provided to Function 1.3.

















Figure D.28: Perform ISR A0
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2.6 Prosecute
Figure D.29 is the A0 diagram for Prosecute (Function 1.6).
• Inputs
◦ Weapons: top level input.
◦ Distributed Power: electrical power provided by Function 1.2.
◦ Desired Operational Position: the placement of AUWS in the correct operational area 
as a result of Function 1.4.
◦ Deployed unit: an AUWS unit that has been successfully deployed as a result of 
Function 1.4.
• Controls
◦ Structure: physical structure provided by Function 1.1.
◦ Steering: positional adjustment for the AUWS unit provided by Function 1.4.
◦ Propulsion: motive force for the AUWS unit provided by Function 1.4
◦ Command: internal order from Function 1.3.
• Outputs
◦ Asset Kill: top level output.
◦ Mission Kill: top level output.
◦ Power Demand: requirement for a specific amount of power from Function 1.2.














Figure D.29: Prosecute A0
2.7 Provide OPSEC
Figure D.30 is the A0 diagram for Provide OPSEC (Function 1.7).
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• Inputs
◦ Distributed Power: electrical power provided by Function 1.2.
◦ Desired Operational Position: the placement of AUWS in the correct operational area 
as a result of Function 1.4.
◦ Deployed unit: an AUWS unit that has been successfully deployed as a result of 
Function 1.4.
• Controls
◦ Structure: physical structure provided by Function 1.1.
◦ Steering: positional adjustment for the AUWS unit provided by Function 1.4.
◦ Propulsion: motive force for the AUWS unit provided by Function 1.4
◦ Command: internal order from Function 1.3.
• Outputs
◦ Power Demand: requirement for a specific amount of power from Function 1.2.
◦ Scuttle Order: order to scuttle; an input to Function 1.4.












Figure D.30: Provide OPSEC A0
The IDEF0 analysis constituted the final portion of the Functional Analysis, validating 
the Functional Decomposition and FFBD. Best of all, the top level A0 provided an easy visual 
representation of the I/O requirements for the system which allowed a traceability check with 
needs analysis as well as a list of tangibles from which to derive requirements.


























































































































































Figure D.37: Process ISR Data IDEF0
Structure
Power Demand































































































































































































































































































Figure D.51: Minimize Risk of Compromise IDEF0
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Appendix E: Technology Review
This analysis considers a wide range of promising and popular technologies, terms which 
are not always synonymous. Not all technologies considered are included in system concepts and 
thoroughly analyzed. The systems briefly described here are a small representation of programs 
currently being tested and evaluated. In an effort to only consider technologies mature enough to 
be fully mission capable in 2030, technology readiness levels (TRL), are used to indicate the 
maturity of a system or the technological risk, as shown in Figure E.1. When a program is first 
conceptualized, the technical risk is high, and the TRL of the system is low. Immature 
technologies have a higher risk of surpassing a pre-established budget or schedule and are likely 
to cause program failure. 
This analysis pursues system solutions at TRL 5 and above. It is the assessment of the 
Project Team that all technologies included in system concepts will be able to successfully enter 
into the DoD’s acquisition process with enough maturity to provide for operational deployment 
by 2030. The following review provides a representative sample of the technologies considered 
potentially viable at the outset of the alternative generation process.
Figure E.1: NASA TRL Meter142
142 National Aeronautics and Space Administration. "NASA TRL Meter." Washington: NASA, 2004.
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Weapons: The current US Navy’s mine inventory consists of the Quickstrike family of 
aircraft laid, shallow water, bottom mines, Figure E.2, and the Submarine Launched Mobile 
Mine (SLMM), Figure E.3. Over the years, Quickstrike mines have received only minimal 
updates, with the most recent modification in 2007 consisting of target detection, safety, and 
battery improvements. Initiated in 1969, Quickstrike mines are essentially General Purpose 
Bombs that have been tailored and re-fitted for use as naval mines.143
Figure E.2: Quickstrike Family of Mines144
The SLMM, a modified Mk-37 torpedo, provides covert mining for hostile or areas 
otherwise inaccessible to deployment platforms. Once on station, the SLMM functions as a 
standard shallow water bottom mine. Original versions of the SLMM are being phased out, while 
development of an improved SLMM, with two deployable mines and greater range and 
precision, stopped in 2002.145 146 The specifications for the SLMM are outlined in Table E.1.
143 United States Navy Fact File. “U.S. Navy Mines” 15 Jan. 2009. 
<http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=2100&tid=700&ct=2>.
144 Martin, Gifford. Quickstrike (QS) Mod 3 Program Overview. Nov. 2009
145 Federation of American Scientists. "Submarine-Launched Mobile Mine (SLMM)." 12 Dec. 1998. fas.org. 19 
May 2011. <http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/weaps/slmm.htm>.
146 Truver, Scott C. “What 'Weapons That Wait?'” Seapower. Jun. 2011. 6.
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Figure E.3: Submarine Launched Mobile Mine
Table E.1: SLMM Specifications
Weight 1,765 pounds / 1658 pounds (754 kilograms)
Length 13' 4" / 161 inches (409 centimeters)
Width 1' 9" / 19 inches (48.5 centimeters)
Detection System Magnetic/seismic or Magnetic/seismic/pressure target detection devices (TDDs)
Depth Range Up to 600 feet (183 meters)
Explosives 330 pounds (150 kilograms) of high explosive
Date Deployed 1983
Weapons needed in the 2030 time frame will need to be far superior to the current US 
mine inventory. Miniature torpedoes, like the Compact Rapid Attack Weapon (CRAW), are an 
example of how technology is progressing. Modified from the defensive Common Very 
Lightweight Torpedo (CVLWT), Figure E.4, the CRAW is designed as an offensive variant, 
capable of being carried by a wide range of platforms, including UAVs and UUVs. The CRAW 
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provides a mission kill by homing in on a target’s propeller, rudder, or other mission critical 
system.147
Figure E.4: CVLWT (same hardware as CRAW)148
Distributed Undersea Networks: Distributed undersea networks are a promising way to 
improve sensor coverage without relying on large, expensive platforms. Several technologies are 
currently under development that take advantage of this opportunity. One such technology is 
Seaweb, Figure E.5, a program being developed at NPS. Seaweb is an underwater 
communications network that consists of many acoustic sensor nodes and a gateway node. Each 
sensor node communicates to each other, wirelessly, using acoustic modems. The surfaced 
gateway node houses radio communication equipment to communicate with command and 
control centers, either directly or via airborne or satellite relay. Currently, these gateway nodes 
allow near real time bi-directional communication capabilities. Additionally, Seaweb enables 
submarines, and potentially UUVs, to be equipped with a node and thus have access to the 
deployed nodes as off-board sensors. This system could permit a UUV to continue transit at 
147 McMullen, Teresa. Compact Rapid Attack Weapon (CRAW). Arlington: 2009.
148 McMullen 6.
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programmed speed and depth and still be able to communicate through Seaweb to a command 
center or even an aircraft.149
Figure E.5: Seaweb Buoy150
AUWS will need to have the capability to communicate a maritime Combined 
Operational Picture (COP) to combatant commanders, task force commanders, or ships and 
squadrons operating in the local area. Communication needs to be effective and efficient. If 
AUWS needs to wait for an engagement order, then the system needs to sense, identify, 
communicate the COP, request a firing order, as well as receive that order in a matter of minutes, 
all before the threat is outside a predetermined engagement window. Gateway nodes, such as 
those used in Seaweb, are one means of providing sufficient information flow.
Unmanned Underwater Vehicles: Recently, UUVs have been at the forefront of future 
undersea technological development. UUVs are considered viable solution for AUWS, provided 
that they can address the critical need areas and perform the critical functions identified in this 
analysis. Some of those UUV systems include the Navy-sponsored Seahorse Autonomous 
Underwater Vehicle (AUV) at the Penn State Applied Research Lab, the Columbia Group’s Long 
Duration Large Diameter (L2D2) UUV, as well as many other programs by major defense 
contractors like Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Northrop Grumman.
The Seahorse, Figure E.6, is a 38 inch diameter AUV powered with alkaline batteries. It 
is able to operate for over 100 hours at a sustained speed of four knots, and a sprint speed of six 
knots. It uses onboard sonar and GPS navigation. The Seahorse can communicate via RF, Iridium 
satellite, and acoustic modem. Command and control systems allow for pre-programmed 
operations from either ship or shore.151
149 Honegger, Barbara. NPS Pioneers “Seaweb” Underwater Sensor Networks. 2010. 
<http://www.nps.edu/About/News/NPS-Pioneers-Seaweb-Underwater-Sensor-Networks.html>.
150 Rice, Joseph. Seaweb. Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 2010.
151 Galambos, James. P. Advanced Technology, Applied Research Lab, Pennsylvania State University. 2009. 
<http://www.arl.psu.edu/capabilities/at.html>.
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Figure E.6: Seahorse AUV152
The L2D2, Figure E.7, is a 60 inch diameter diesel-electric hybrid UUV. Working with 
NSWC Panama City Division, the Columbia Group is developing this UUV based on a modified 
body of a Seal Delivery Vehicle. It is designed to operate at speeds up to 6 knots and with ranges 
up to 900 nautical miles. This larger UUV has multiple weapon payload configurations as well as 
sonar detection and navigation capabilities. Communication equipment includes acoustic 
modems and surface RF antennae.153
152 Galambos 1.
153 Dudinsky, J. "L2D2: Large Diameter Long Duration Littoral UUV." Panama City: 2011.
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Figure E.7: Prototype L2D2 Body
(left to right: RADM (ret.) Jerry Ellis, RADM (ret.) Rick Williams, LT Phil Castaneda, LT Jim 
Drennan, RADM (ret.) Paul Shebalin, Dr. Tim Chung)
Energy Systems: The CNO stated in 2010 a goal to develop, within 7 years, UUVs 
capable of operating independently for 30 days.154 In support of this goal, current research is 
underway to extend battery life while minimizing their size, as well as potentially harness energy 
from the environment. 
The Renewable At Sea Power (RASP) program at the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (DARPA) aims to develop capabilities that will enable UUVs or other sensor 
stations to operate continuously. The program is currently developing unmanned, un-moored 
buoys or platforms, capable of collecting and storing wave energy, to use as recharging stations 
for autonomous systems such as AUWS.155 Several companies have candidate technologies 
already in production. Ocean Power Technologies makes power generating buoys rated at 150 
kW, and has a 500 kW version in development.156
In addition to DARPA, military contractors like Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Northrop 
Grumman, are investing millions of dollars towards solving the energy concerns of the Navy. 
Specific areas of focus include high capacity batteries, fuel cells, and diesel-electric hybrids. 
154 Standifer, C. "CNO Wants 30-Day Mission in Seven Years." Inside the Navy. 22 Oct. 2010.
155 DARPA. “Renewable at-sea power.” <http://www.darpa.mil/Our_Work/STO/Programs/Renewable_At-
Sea_Power.aspx>.
156 Ocean Power Technologies. (n.d.). “PB150 PowerBuoy.” OceanPowerTechnologies.com. 20 May 2011. 
<http://www.oceanpowertechnologies.com/pb150.htm>
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Appendix F: Supplementary Calculations
Baseline Acoustic Detection Range
Noise estimates are taken from Discovery of Sound in the Sea.157
 
Given:
Common ship underway noise ~180 dB re 1uPa @ 1 m
Estimated Sea Ambient Noise level at the ship frequency ~70 dB
Spherical Spreading Loss at 5 km ~ 74 dB
Absorption Loss of low frequency sounds ~ 5 dB/km
Assume:
System requires 10 dB signal to noise ratio (SNR) to perform positive detection.
Therefore, the noise generated by the ship must arrive at the hydrophone at 80 dB (70 dB Noise 
Level + 10 dB SNR) strength for positive detection.
Ship Noise at hydrophone (from 5 km dist) = 180 dB – 74 dB (spreading loss at 5 km) – 25 dB 
(Absorption loss at 5 km) = 81 dB
Therefore, ship is detected. 5 km (2.7 NM) is used as the baseline maximum detection range.
V-CAP Range
Note: These range calculations are based on a lightweight variant of V-CAP, endurance 
calculations contained in Section 5.1.2 are based on a heavyweight variant. The purpose is 
to show the versatility of this modular concept.
Water @ 1 atm & 273 K: Density, 
Dynamic Viscosity,  




Mk-46 Fineness Ratio:  
From Figure F.1, all structures have approximately the same coefficient of drag ( . 
V-CAP performance is considered more analogous to the Mk-46 than the Mk-48 due to the 
limited space available for power and propulsion. Table F.1 shows power calculations for various 
speeds.
157 University of Rhode Island. "DOSITS: What are common underwater sounds?" 2009. DOSITS.org. 2 May 2011 
<http://www.dosits.org/science/soundsinthesea/commonsounds/>.
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MK-46 Performance Numbers:158 Range approx, 10000 yards @ 45 knots
Equivalent to, 9140m @ 23 m.s-1
Calculations:  ; ;
Power needed to overcome drag, ;
Table F.1: Power Calculations for Various Speeds














20 10.0 2.66 E 7 798 8.0
10 5.0 1.32 E 7 200 1.0
5 2.6 0.67 E 7 54.0 0.14
Figure F.1: Drag Coefficients of Cylindrical Bodies in Axial Flow159
Total energy expended by torpedo to travel 10000 yards @ 45 knots is, 
Most of the energy in the fuel tank is expended to keep the torpedo at 45 knots in water for 
10000 yards, hence assume the energy required to power the guidance & control systems as well 
as the initial energy required to accelerate the torpedo to cruise speed as relatively small, 
. Therefore total energy stored in the fuel tank, 
158 IHS Global Limited 1.
159 Hoerner, Sighard. Fluid Dynamic Drag. Brick Town: Hoerner Fluid Dynamics, 1965.
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Mk-46 fuel tank is approximately half the body length.160
In order to create space for operational requirements, only 1/10 of the space in V-CAP is 
available for propulsion. Therefore total chemical power available for the V-CAP system =
.
Calculating for theoretical max range at different speeds, 
Table F.2 shows range calculations for various speeds.
Table F.2: Range Calculations for Various Speeds















Area is the cross sectional area of the vehicle, modeled as a circle of given diameter. 
Time in operation is the time required to travel the given distance with the given speed. Power 
draw is the number of watts required to power the system during maneuvering operations, given 
as the drag equation for force162 multiplied by velocity. Effectively, power is equal to one-half of 
the product of the coefficient of drag, density of seawater, cross-sectional area of the unit, and 
the cube of the unit’s speed. 
Power=
Cd  A v
3
2
From this calculation comes a value in watts, meaning that for every watt required, the 
system will require that many joules of energy for every second of operation. Given the time in 
seconds previously calculated, a total number of joules required for propulsion and maneuvering 
is obtained. 
Sensor capacity is the number of joules required to operate the system’s sensors and 
communications suites for a 30-day period. By multiplying the estimated sensor and 
160 The Ordnance Shop. "MK 46 TORPEDO." ordnance.org. 3 May 2011 
<http://www.ordnance.org/mk_46_torpedo.htm>.
161 Assuming that the same amount of energy is expended to power guidance, control systems as well as to 
accelerate the torpedo up to speed, regardless of the speed it had to accelerate to, the energy available would 
therefore be Wtot less 1.9MJ.
162 Benson, 2010.
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communications draw (0.375 W) by 30 days, or 2,592,000 seconds, a value of 972 kJ is reached. 
This value plus the joules required to provide propulsion equal the total draw on each LD-UUV’s 
energy store (532.13 MJ).
To determine the capacity of LD-UUV’s battery, the mass is calculated by multiplying the 
cross sectional area by the length of the unit to develop a total volume, then multiplying that 
volume by the density, assumed to be equivalent to a Mk-48 ADCAP. Given a battery percentage 
of 20%, a battery comprising approximately one-fifth of the total mass is estimated. The LD-
UUV battery weight is multiplied by the lithium ion energy density to determine system capacity 
in joules. 
Dividing the sum of propulsion and sensor draw by total battery capacity provides a 
fraction indicative of the portion of battery capacity expended over a 30-day operation. Dividing 
30 days by this percentage gives a theoretical number of days required to expend the battery 
completely. 
Glider Maximum Intercept Range
Equations are taken from Eagle’s Approaching Target Model,163 illustrated in Figure F.2.
 
163 Eagle, James. Naval Tactical Analysis Lecture Notes. Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 2009.
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Figure F.2: Approaching Target Model
Given: d: Glider maximum distance off Target track
Rt: Glider distance to Target at start of intercept
Rs: Range at intercept (assume = 0)
U: Glider speed
V: Target speed
Assuming a Glider speed of 2 knots, Target speed of 15 knots, and a zero Rs,
Rt is estimated by determining the an initial detection point and the distance the Target is 
able to travel before the engagement order reaches the prosecuting Glider. Assuming best case 
(which leads to an minimal estimate of # Gliders required), the Target is detected 2.7 NM before 
it reaches the AOR. Allowing for one minute of processing and an approximate six minutes for 
communication time, based on Glider’s baseline data rate, the Target travels 1.75 NM before 
intercept begins. Therefore,
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Combining this with the previous equation,
Solving for d yields, d = 0.53 NM. Adding a nominal 5% increase for terminal 
maneuvering boost, the maximum intercept range is estimated at 0.55 NM. 
Weapon Model
Calculations for all weapons are taken from Shin’s Ship Shock Model.164 All weapons are 
assumed to use HBX-1 explosive.
Given: P(t): pressure from shock wave caused by underwater explosion, as a function of time
Pmax: peak overpressure
W: weight of explosive
R: range to target at time of detonation
A1, K1: parameters specific to HBX-1 explosive
A1 = 1.144 
K1 = 22347.6
Pmax = K1(W⅓/R)A1 psi
For each intercept, a random value of R is generated between 0 and 5 feet. The resulting 
Pmax is compared to the tensile strength of the target hull, which is randomly generated between 
55 and 70 ksi. If Pmax exceeds the tensile strength of the hull, prosecution is successful.
Sensor Model (Attempted)
The Probability of Detection, Pd, is determined using the expressions165 as shown below. 
The idea is to model the target and noises as a form of voltage, A and Vo respectively. For 
instance, high voltage is to represent good detection, i.e. noisy target or target in near vicinity. 
The threshold voltage, VT, varies according to the sensor’s operating threshold. 
System Noise:
164 Shin, Young S. Ship shock modeling and simulation for far-field underwater explosion. Monterey: Elsevier Ltd., 
2002.
165 Harney, Robert C. "Sensor Functional Characteristics. Vol. 1." Harney, Robert C. Combat Systems. Monterey: 





The following assumptions are made to supplement the Pd plot:
• Assume the deployed sensor as a typical hydrophone with maximum detection range of 
up to 3km.
• Assume target will move across the sensor in a systematic (or linear) way.
• Assume ambient noise of 70dB which corresponds to sensor operating at center 
frequency of 200Hz in heavy shipping traffic and sea state 3.166
• Assume system noise is small as compared to the ambient noise.
• Assume noise is constant within a 3km radius of the sensor.
The expressions were generated in MATLAB and a sample plot, shown in Figure F.3, of 
Pd against Range was obtained using arbitrary values – target voltage, A = 50, threshold voltage, 
VT = 80 and noise voltage, Vo = 70, to simulate the sensor operating in a moderately noisy 
environment. The resultant Pd was surprisingly low compared to currently available technology, 
and no explanation could be found. Further verification of this model is recommended to 
determine the root of the error.
166 United States Naval Academy. "Ambient Noise: The background noise of the sea." USNA.edu. 13 May 2011 
<http://usna.edu/Users/physics/ejtuchol/Chapter11.pdf>.
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Figure F.3: Pd as a Function of Range of CPA (Attempted Model)
Figure F.4 shows the sensor profile ultimately used as the input to the system models. Pd 
is generated from the following function of Range of CPA (R, in meters):
Where kn is a sensor parameter based on the capabilities of each system:
• k1 = 5 (Squid)
• k2 = 7.5 (LD-UUV)
• k3 = 10 (V-CAP)
• k4 = 10 (Glider)
Figure F.4: Pd as a Function of Range of CPA (Optimistic)
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Appendix G: Discrimination Analysis
Threat discrimination – the ability for AUWS to autonomously tell the difference 
between a threat and a non-threat – is considered separately from modeling and simulation 
because an effective analysis would likely require writing the actual algorithms for making threat 
determinations based on sensor data. Instead, a similar system is analyzed: IBM’s Watson, the 
computer that competed and won on Jeopardy!.167 
Figure G.1: IBM’s Watson Competing on Jeopardy!
Discrimination is essentially the ability to make a good decision. Watson makes a 
decision on whether or not to buzz in based on a “buzz threshold” (represented by the vertical 
white line in Figure G.1), which is constantly re-calculated based on the present situation. In a 
similar way, AUWS would decide whether or not to designate a contact as a threat and engage it. 
Jeopardy! is an appropriate game to compare to the USW scenario space because they both 
involve confusing, ambiguous, and often unpredictable inputs. 
In order to compare Watson to AUWS, a “flip” is necessary. Considering the scenario 
used in modeling and simulation, most inputs received by AUWS are non-threats, likewise most 
of the inputs received by Watson are known answers. So, a threat for AUWS is like an answer 
that Watson doesn’t know. Similarly, Watson not buzzing in is like AUWS engaging. If Watson 
doesn’t buzz in for an answer that it knows,168 that is equivalent to AUWS engaging a friendly 
contact.
During the Jeopardy! game, Watson didn’t know 25% of the answers, which would mean 
25% of all contacts were actual threats for AUWS. This is a higher threat occurrence rate than 
modeled, but not an unreasonable one for wartime operations. Watson guessed incorrectly 8% of 
the time, equivalent to AUWS letting a threat pass by. Watson knew the correct answer but chose 
not to buzz in 6% of the time, equivalent to AUWS engaging a non-threat. In other words, 10 of 
90 non-threats were engaged by a computer the size of ten refrigerators (shown in Figure G.2).
167 Jeopardy! Dir. Kevin McCarthy. Sony Pictures Television. 2011.
168 On-screen presentation of Watson’s top three guesses allows the viewer to determine Watson knows an answer. 
If the top guess is correct, Watson knows the answer.
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Figure G.2: Watson Server Racks (10 total)169
Significant technological advancement is required before reaching desired discrimination 
capabilities in deployable computers. Even if current supercomputers were able to perform threat 
discrimination with desired accuracy, Moore’s Law – which predicts (accurately for the last half 
century) that the capacity of integrated circuits will double approximately every two years170 – 
would have to hold strong for the next 20 years. Ultimately, discrimination in autonomous 
weapons is not a technological issue. It is a cultural issue. Once technology matures sufficiently, 
ethics, politics, law, and many other factors will still govern the use of autonomous weapons. 
Nevertheless, striving for tactical and technical excellence is essential to prevent unintended 
casualties. 
Regarding the four AUWS concepts, LD-UUV appears to have an advantage with respect 
to discrimination. Parallel processing could potentially reduce the probability of identification 
errors. The group based decision making process for LD-UUV’s intelligent sensor nodes, shown 
in Figure G.3, prevents a single node from errantly identifying and engaging a friendly or neutral 
vessel. If each sensor is biased toward false negative (i.e. letting a threat go), it is difficult for a 
false positive (i.e. neutral/friendly identified as threat) to propagate through the system to the 
weapon.
169 Medrano, Antonio. "IBM Watson." 2011. engr.ucsb.edu. 13 May 2011 
<http://www.engr.ucsb.edu/~medrano/CS240A/HW1/CS240A_Homework_1/CS240A_Homework_1_-
_F._Antonio_Medrano.html>.




Figure G.3: Discrimination Process for LD-UUV Sensor Nodes
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Appendix H: Individual Criteria Risk Considerations
The failure rates of the components listed in this appendix were utilized by the Project 
Team in determining the overall failure rates used in the risk analysis section. The following data 
points were gathered from several unclassified sources and are by no means intended to be an all 
inclusive list of associated probabilities.
Table H.1: Power Considerations
Concept Components Failure Rate of Component
V-CAP Battery pack (Li-Ion) 1 @ 250khrs MTBF171
LD-UUV 4 battery packs (Li-Ion or silver-zinc) 1 @ 250khrs MTBF172
Glider Fuel Cell Technology 1080hrs/3000hrs173
Squid Li-Ion Battery Technology 1 @ 250khrs MTBF174
Table H.2: C3 Considerations
Concept Components Failure Rate of Component
V-CAP Underwater ModemVHF Transceiver
10-6 bit error rate or better175
1.6 FITs176 (1.6x10-9)
LD-UUV Buoys with acoustic communication
0.01177 (assume proportionally to 1 failed 
node in a 112-node array)
Glider Transceiver 1.6 FITs178 (1.6x10-9)
Squid Acoustic Modem 10-6 bit error rate or better179
171 IEEE, “Lithium-Ion Batteries for Telecom Application”, 2007 IEEE 23 Apr. 2011 
<http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=04448872>. 
172 IEEE, “Lithium-Ion Batteries for Telecom Application”, 2007 IEEE 23 Apr. 2011 
<http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=04448872>. 
173 2010 Fuel Cell Seminar & Exposition, October 18-21, Richard Carlin 23 Apr. 2011 
<http://www.fuelcellseminar.com/media/5502/carlin_10_19_2010.pdf >.
174 IEEE, “Lithium-Ion Batteries for Telecom Application”, 2007 IEEE 23 Apr. 2011 
<http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=04448872>. 
175 DSPCOMM. “AquaComm: Underwater wireless modem.” DSPCOMM, 2007-2009 23 Apr. 2011 
<http://www.dspcomm.com/products_aquacomm.html>. 
176 Avago Technologies. “Reliability Data Sheet, AFCT-57J5APZ, AFCT-57J5APZ-XXX.” Avago Technologies 7 
Jun. 2008. 23 Apr. 2011.
177 Warren A. Rosen, and Alan D. George. “FAULT TOLERANCE CONSIDERATIONS IN AUTONOMOUS 
ACOUSTIC ARRAYS.” Office of Naval Research.
178 Avago Technologies. “Reliability Data Sheet, AFCT-57J5APZ, AFCT-57J5APZ-XXX.” Avago Technologies 7 
Jun. 2008. 23 Apr. 2011.
179 DSPCOMM. “AquaComm: Underwater wireless modem.” DSPCOMM, 2007-2009 23 Apr. 2011 
<http://www.dspcomm.com/products_aquacomm.html>.
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Table H.3: ISR Considerations
Concept Components Failure Rate of Component
V-CAP Hydrophones 1 in 18,300 years180 (5.46x10-5)
LD-UUV Paired Sensors
1 in 18,300 years181 (assume a network of 8 pairs, 
8x5.46x10-5)
Glider Paired Sensors 1 in 18,300 years182 (5.46x10-5)
Squid Pressure SensorPassive sonar sensor
4.90x10-7 1/hr183 (assume from Honeywell)
1 in 18,300 years184 (5.46x10-5)
Table H.4: Armament Considerations
Concept Components Failure Rate of Component185
V-CAP Multi-shot scaled down CRAW version with a shaped charge
Functional: 0.99
Safety: ≤ 1 x 10-6
LD-UUV 4x Lightweight Torpedoes Functional: 0.99Safety: ≤ 1 x 10-6
Glider 1x 10 kg High Explosive shaped charge Functional: 0.99Safety: ≤ 1 x 10-6
Squid 6x1kg High Explosive shaped charges per node Functional: 0.95Safety: ≤ 1 x 10-6
Table H.5: OPSEC Considerations
Concept Components Failure Rate of Component186
V-CAP Sub-Munition Self-Neutralization Mechanism 7%
LD-UUV Sub-Munition Self-Neutralization Mechanism 5%
Glider Tamper-proof mechanismCryptographic Software
0.8%
Squid Sub-Munition Self-Neutralization Mechanism 12%
180 Digital Energy Journal. “Ocean bottom seismic – improving cost and reliability.” Digital Energy Journal 19 Jul. 
2010. 23 Apr. 2011. 
<http://www.findingpetroleum.com/n/Ocean_bottom_seismic_improving_cost_and_reliability/58f46b59.aspx>.
181 Digital Energy Journal. “Ocean bottom seismic – improving cost and reliability.” Digital Energy Journal 19 Jul. 
2010. 23 Apr. 2011. 
<http://www.findingpetroleum.com/n/Ocean_bottom_seismic_improving_cost_and_reliability/58f46b59.aspx>. 
182 Digital Energy Journal. “Ocean bottom seismic – improving cost and reliability.” Digital Energy Journal 19 Jul. 
2010. 23 Apr. 2011. 
<http://www.findingpetroleum.com/n/Ocean_bottom_seismic_improving_cost_and_reliability/58f46b59.aspx>. 
183 Goble, W.M. “Getting Failure Rate Data.” Exida 2002.
184 Digital Energy Journal. “Ocean bottom seismic – improving cost and reliability.” Digital Energy Journal 19 Jul. 
2010. 23 Apr. 2011. 
<http://www.findingpetroleum.com/n/Ocean_bottom_seismic_improving_cost_and_reliability/58f46b59.aspx>.
185 Tan, Geoffrey. Warheads. Singapore: DSO National Laboratories, 2010. 4. 
186 Hiznay, Mark, Operational and technical aspects of cluster munitions. Washington: Arms Division of Human 
Rights Watch, 2006. 20. 
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Table H.6: Maneuver Considerations
Concept Components Failure Rate of Component
V-CAP Underwater Propulsion System: OTTO Fuel 1 in 2000hours187
LD-UUV Underwater Propulsion System
Glider Underwater Propulsion System
Squid Dependent on ProjectileUnable to move on its own.
1 in 122 hours188
 
187 Rowinski, Lech. “Submersible propulsion and energy.” 18 Mar. 2002. underwater.pg.gda.pl. 23 Apr. 2011. 
<http://www.underwater.pg.gda.pl/publikacje/submersible_conceptual_design_using_computer_aids.pdf>.
188 155-mm M109 SP Howitzer, Military Periscope, 1 Jun. 2009. 23 Apr. 2011. 
<http://www.periscope.ucg.com/mdb-smpl/weapons/artguns/selfprop/w0003617.shtml>.
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This Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) has been written in support of the new 
development program for the Advanced Underwater Warfare System (AUWS).
System Description
AUWS will integrate deploying assets and controlling assets in order to effectively monitor, 
engage, and/or neutralize a target or threat.  It will be capable of being deployed from airborne, 
surface, sub-surface, and shallow water shore locations.  The system consists of dual torpedo-
shaped vehicles that act as an autonomous ISR and engagement platform.  AUWS will serve as a 
deterrent by posing the threat of area denial to an adversary, potentially forcing a change in 
operations and the expenditure of significant resources.  The system will also be capable of 
protecting friendly assets in port or at sea from mines or any other asymmetric threat, including 
adversary submarines.  The two units are deployed in tandem, transit to their assigned area, lay a 
sensing communications node network, and take station.  The first unit deploys sonar, electro-
optical, and communications arrays and serves as an intelligence-gathering command station, 
while the second unit stands by to launch like a torpedo or deploy sub-munitions, depending on 
warhead payload. 
Section 2: Mission Need and Operational Requirement
Mission Need
As the face of Naval Warfare has continued to change the need for a viable system capable of 
creating and sustaining an underwater operational picture of interest has become clear:  The 
Navy needs an unmanned, non-platform-centric USW system to provide ISR and threat 
engagement capability in littoral areas of interest.  The system should be capable of operations 
under varying levels of autonomy, such that it can seamlessly shift from fully autonomous 
operations to remote manual operations and provide the Navy with a cost-effective—yet 
technologically advanced—solution to bridge the widening capability and capacity gap in the 
underwater domain.   
Operational Requirements
1. AUWS shall be capable of operating independently of a tending asset for at least thirty 
days.
2. AUWS must have an adjustable autonomy feature that allows a controlling station to 
authorize fully autonomous operations or completely manual operations via remote 
control or any posture in between. 
3. AUWS must have a continuous two-way communications capability between distributed 
components and tending/controlling/launching assets.
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4. AUWS must be capable of searching, detecting, tracking, and classifying contacts via 
organic sensors and processing.
5. AUWS must be capable of conducting Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
missions.
6. AUWS must be capable of correctly discriminating between contacts of interest and 
regular contacts.
7. AUWS must be capable of kinetically engaging a target as needed/directed.
8. AUWS must be capable of deployment from airborne assets (P-8, F/A-18), surface assets 
and subsurface assets (SSN/SSBN/SSGN/LD-UUV).
9. AUWS must be capable of recovery by surface assets and subsurface assets 
(SSN/SSBN/SSGN).
10. AUWS must be capable of transit from covert launch insert point to 100 NM.
11. AUWS must be rapidly deployable via air-drop.
12. AUWS must be capable of avoiding detection by enemy assets.
13. AUWS must be capable of self-neutralization in the event of compromise or the inability 
to be recovered.
14. AUWS shall be capable of operating at a depth of 500 ft.
15. AUWS shall have an operational availability of 0.95 when in standby for launch.
16. AUWS shall have an operational availability of 1.0 when on station for the first thirty 
days.
Section 3: Scope of the Evaluation
Table J.1: Critical Technical Parameters
Technical Parameter Measurement
1 Range 100 NM from delivery vehicle10 NM within operating area
2 Endurance Minimum Days Deployed = 30 days
3 Mobility
Max Speed (Deployment Phase) = 5 kts
Max Speed (On Station) = 3 kts
Max Speed (Weapon Delivery Phase) = 40 kts
4 Weight Max Weight (Gross Weight) = 2000 lbs
5 Size/Cube Max Length = 146”Max Width = 21”
6 Energy Efficiency Average Hullform Efficiency = 70%Average Battery Life = 75 hours
7 Recharge Ability Average Recharge Rate = 1% per hour
8 Detect-to-Engage 5 mins
9 Transportability
Air delivery from fixed wing assets (P-8)
Surface delivery and recovery from any surface 
vessel equipped with davit system
Sub-surface delivery and recovery from undersea 
assets (SSN/SSBN/SSGN)
10 Reliability Mean-Time-To-Repair (MTTR) < 24 hoursMean-Time-Between-Failure (MTBF) > 30 days
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General Function and Capability Dendritics
Figure J.1: Master Functional Dendritic
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Figure J.2: Partial Dendritic for Capability
Table J.2: Critical Operational Issues 
COI 
# Title Question
1 Endurance Can AUWS operate tactically for a minimum of 30 days?
2 Mobility Is the mobility of AUWS sufficient for accomplishment of its combat mission in varying terrain and environmental conditions?
3 Computability Is the computing capability of AUWS robust enough to maintain varying levels of autonomy?
4 Target Detection Is AUWS capable of detecting targets in a timely manner?
5 Classify Is AUWS capable of accurately classifying targets in a timely manner?
6 Prosecution Does AUWS have the capability to effectively engage threat systems?
7 Lethality Is the lethality of AUWS sufficient to destroy, defeat, or disrupt an adversary target of interest? 
8 Employment Are the tactics developed for AUWS for deter and engage targets scenarios effective?
9 Transportability Can AUWS be deployed and recovered from multiple platforms?
10 Survivability Can AUWS satisfactorily survive in various operating environments?
11 Human System Integration Is AUWS user friendly and safe for human involvement?
12 Interoperability Will AUWS be interoperable with existing platforms and systems currently employed?
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MOE/MOP/DR
• COI 1 – Endurance
o MOE 1.1 Capability to Operate for Minimum of 30 Days
• MOP 1.1.1 Proportion of Power Required for Mission Profile
• MOP 1.1.2 Rate of Fuel Consumption 
o DR 1.1.2.1 Number of Gallons per Hour Used
• MOP 1.1.3 Average Electrical Power Requirement
o MOE 1.2 Capability to Recharge
 MOP 1.2.1 Rate of (Re)Charge
 MOP 1.2.2 Average Time System Unavailable
o MOE 1.3 Capability to Store Energy
• MOP 1.3.1 Average Capacity of Battery 
• MOP 1.3.2 Rate of Discharge 
• COI 2 – Mobility
o MOE 2.1 Capability to Maneuver
 MOP 2.1.1 Rate of Speed
 MOP 2.1.2 Average Speed for Conditions
o MOE 2.2 Navigation
 MOP 2.2.1 Average Maneuver Error
 MOP 2.2.2 Average Location Error
• DR 2.2.2.1 Known location of System
• DR 2.2.2.2 System’s determined location
 MOP2.2.3 Average Error for Self-location
• COI 3 – Computability
o MOE 3.1 Probability of Successful Command Automation
 MOP 3.1.1 Proportion of Transmitted Data sets correctly processed
• DR 3.1.1.1 Total number of data sets processed correctly
• DR 3.1.1.2 Total number of data sets processed
o MOE 3.2 Average Speed of Processing
 MOP 3.2.1 Proportion of Retrieved Data Elements Correctly Processed
o MOE 3.3 Capability to Change Level of Autonomy
• COI 4 – Target Detection
o MOE 4.1 Probability of Target Detection
 MOP 4.1.1 Proportion of Detections
• DR 4.1.1.1 Number of Targets Presented
• DR 4.1.1.2 Number of Detections
 MOP 4.1.2 Average Range of Detection
 MOP 4.1.3 Average Time from Target Presentation to Detection
o MOE 4.2 Probability of Correct Target Classification
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 MOP 4.2.1 Proportion of Classification
 MOP 4.2.2 Average Range of Classification
 MOP 4.2.3 Average Elapsed Time from Target Detection to Classification
o MOE 4.3 Probability of Target Recognition
 MOP 4.3.1 Proportion of Correct Recognitions
 MOP 4.3.2 Average Range of Recognition
 MOP 4.3.3 Average Time from Target Recognition to Classification
• COI 5 – Classify
o MOE 5.1 Probability of Correct Target Classification 
 MOP 5.1.1 Proportion of Correct Classifications
• DR3.3.1.1:  Number of Correct Classifications
• DR3.3.1.2:  Number of Incorrect Classifications
 MOP 5.1.2 Average Range of Classification
 MOP 5.1.3 Average Elapsed Time from Target Detection to Classification
• COI 6 – Prosecution
o MOE 6.1 Probability of Successful Engagement
 MOP 6.1.1 Average Range of Engagement
 MOP 6.1.2 Proportion of Engagements Completed
 MOP 6.1.3 Reasons for No Engagement
o MOE 6.2 Probability of Timely Engagement
 MOP 6.2.1 Engagement Rate
 MOP 6.2.2 Hit Rate
 MOP 6.2.3 Kill Rate
o MOE 6.3 Probability of Effective Engagement
 MOP 6.3.1 Proportion of Hits versus Presentation
• DR 3.3.1.1 Number of Target Hits
• DR 3.3.1.2 Number of Target Presentations
 MOP 6.3.2 Average Hit Range
 MOP 6.3.3 Proportion of Target Kills versus Engagements
• COI 7 – Lethality
o MOE 7.1 Probability of Weapon Timeliness
 MOP 7.1.1 Average Time from Target Presentation to Hit
 MOP 7.1.2 Average Time Between Rounds
o MOE 7.2 Probability of Weapon Accuracy
 MOP 7.2.1 Proportion of Rounds Meeting Stated Accuracy
 MOP 7.2.2 Proportion of Hits versus Engagements
o MOE 7.3 Probability of Weapon Effectiveness
 MOP 7.3.1 Average Hit Range
 MOP 7.3.2 Average Burst Radius
 MOP 7.3.3 Proportion of Target Kills versus Target Engagements
• DR 7.3.3.1 Number of Target Kills
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• DR 7.3.3.2 Number of Target Engagements
• COI 8 – Tactical Employment
o MOE 8.1 Probability of Correct Target Prioritization
 MOP 8.1.1 Time from Classification to Prioritization 
 MOP 8.1.2 Average Range of Prioritization
 MOP 8.1.3 Average Time from Identification to Prioritization
o MOE 8.2 Probability of Successful Employment of Decoy
 MOP 8.2.1 Average Success of Decoy
• DR 8.2.1.1 Number of Decoys Utilized
o MOE 8.3 Probability Threat Retreats
• COI 9 – Transportability
o MOE 9.1 Capability for Deployment and Recovery by both Contemporary 
and Future Platforms
 MOP 9.1.1 Proportion of System Compatibility with Existing 
Platforms, Systems and Subsystems
• DR 9.1.1.1 Number of Compatible Airborne Assets
• DR 9.1.1.2 Number of Compatible Surface Assets
• DR 9.1.1.3 Number of Compatible Sub-surface Assets
o MOE 9.2 Capability for Rapid Employment
 MOP 9.2.1 Average Time to Employ
• MOE 9.3 Capability for Rapid Recovery
 MOP 9.3.1 Average Time to Recover
• COI 10 – Survivability
o MOE 10.1 Detection Avoidance
 MOP 10.1.1 Detection Avoidance Proportion
 MOP 10.1.2 Detection Survivability Ratio
o MOE 10.2 Situation Awareness
 MOP 10.2.1 Threat False Alarm Rate
• DR 10.2.1.1 Number of Alarms
• DR 10.2.1.2 Number of Actual Threats
 MOP 10.2.2 Target resolution
o MOE 10.3 Acquisition Avoidance
 MOP 10.3.1 Acquisition Survivability Ratio
• COI 11 – Human System Integration
o MOE 11.1 Human Factors Engineering
 MOP 11.1.1 Listing of maintainability problems and assigned impact rating by 
severity rating
• DR 11.1.1.1 List of maintainability problems
 MOP11.1.2:  Listing of Workspace Adequacy Problems and their Degree of 
Severity
o MOE 11.2 Human Factors Safety/Health Hazards 
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 MOP11.2.1 Listing of Safety Health Hazards Rated by Code IAW MILSTD-
882
• COI 12 – Interoperability 
o MOE12.1 Capability to Communicate
 MOP12.1.1:  Call Completion Rate
• DR12.1.1.1 Number of Message Attempts
• DR12.1.1.2 Number of Messages Completed
• DR12.1.1.3 Number of Messages Interfered
 MOP12.2.2 Average Data Rate
o MOE12.2 Capability to Transmit Message
 MOP12.2.1 Proportion of Files Transferred
 MOP12.2.2 Average Data Message Completion Time
o MOE12.3 Capability to Receive Message
 MOP12.3.1 Proportion of Uninterrupted Communications
 MOP12.3.2 Message Accuracy
 MOP12.3.3 Message Complete Rate
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Table J.3: Test Objective Matrix
COI Test Objective and Sub-Objectives Test
Endurance To determine the capability for AUWS to operate tactically for a minimum of 30 days E-1
Mobility
To determine the tactical mobility of AUWS
• Speed of AUWS (E-2a)
• Navigation Accuracy (E-2b)
E-2
Computability
To determine the capability of the AUWS computer system
• Automation (E-3a)
• Processing Speed (E-3b)
• Level of Autonomy (E-3c)
E-3
Target Detection
To determine the target detection capability of AUWS during an attack 
mission
• Target Detection (E-4a)
• Target Identification (E-4b)
E-4
Classify
To determine the classification capability of AUWS during a combat 
mission
• Target Classification 
E-5
Prosecution
To determine the ability of AUWS to prosecute enemy threats
• Engagement Rate Against One Target (E-6a)
• Engagement Rate Against Multiple Targets (E-6b)
E-6
Lethality
To determine the sufficiency of lethality of the firepower of AUWS in 
performance of its combat mission
• Timeliness of Fires (E-7a)
• Accuracy of Fires (E-7b)
• Effect of Fires (E-7c)
E-7
Employment
To determine the tactics of AUWS during a combat mission
• Target Prioritization (E-8a)
• Decoy Employment (E-8b)
E-8
Transportability
To determine the capability of AUWS to be deployed and recovered 
from multiple platforms
• Deployment Time (E-9a)
• Recovery Time (E-9b)
E-9
Survivability
To determine the survivability of AUWS
• Detection Avoidance (E-10a)
• Threat False Alarm Rate (E-10b)




To determine the user friendly capability and the safety of AUWS
• Human Factors Engineering (S-1a)
• Safety/Health Hazards (S-1b)
S-1
Interoperability
To determine the ability of AUWS to interact with existing platforms 
and systems currently employed
• Data Interchange 
S-2
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General Test Operations and Scenario Overview
• Scenario A:  ISR in a Strategic Chokepoint.  AUWS is tasked with detecting and classifying 
traffic in a strategic chokepoint.  AUWS will be responsible for a 3NM by 3NM area and 
varying types of vessels, including submarines, will transit the area at random intervals along 
the same axis (e.g. East/West).
• Scenario B:  ASW in a Strategic Chokepoint. AUWS is tasked with detecting, classifying, 
and engaging any enemy submarines that attempt to navigate a strategic chokepoint.  AUWS 
will be responsible for a 3NM by 3NM area and varying types of vessels will transit the area 
at random intervals along the same axis.  At random, a submarine will transit the area and 
AUWS will be evaluated on its ability to detect, classify, identify, and decide to engage in a 
timely manner.  All engagements will be simulated.
• Scenario C: Area Denial in a Strategic Chokepoint.  AUWS is tasked with detecting, 
classifying, and engaging any enemy naval asset or any vessel known to be aiding the enemy 
in a strategic chokepoint.  AUWS will be responsible for a 3NM by 3NM area and varying 
types of vessels, including submarines, will transit the area at random intervals along the 
same axis.  AUWS will be evaluated on its simulated ability to engage targets designated 
hostile and its ability to allow non-hostile targets to pass through the area.
Instrumentation Requirements
Actual vessels – including naval, merchant, and submarine – will be needed for all test scenarios. 
Also, support vessels will be needed for deploying, monitoring, and recovering AUWS and 
associated test equipment.  Telemetry equipment will need to be placed on sensor, communicator, 
and weapon nodes to determine if appropriate signals are detected, transmitted, and received.  RF 
communications equipment, apart from the equipment organic to AUWS, may be necessary to 
transmit real-time telemetry data to a monitoring support vessel or shore station.  A mockup of an 
AUWS operator console will be needed to determine is AUWS is displaying the correct 
information to the user. 
Conduct of tests at the Atlantic Undersea Test and Evaluation Center (AUTEC) is recommended. 
AUTEC is an instrumented laboratory that performs integrated three-dimensional 
hydrospace/aerospace trajectory measurements covering the entire spectrum of undersea 
simulated warfare: calibration, classifications, detection, and destruction.   Facilities for fixed 
and rotary wing aircraft support are available.  
AUTEC utilizes the Tongue of the Ocean (TOTO), as shown in Figure J.1.  TOTO is a unique 
deep-water basin approximately 110 nautical miles long by 20 nautical miles wide, varying in 
depth from 700 to 1100 fathoms.  The basin floor is relatively smooth and soft, with very gradual 
depth changes. TOTO is bounded on the west by Andros Island (home of the testing facility), to 
the south and east by large areas of very shallow banks that are non-navigable, and to the north 
by the Northwest Providence Channel.  This unique geography results in very low vessel traffic, 
minimal distant shipping noise, an absence of large ocean swells, and slight currents, while 
providing operational security and easy access to deep water.  The test range sea surface covers 
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2,670 square nautical miles.  North of the TOTO is a shallow-water plateau that varies in depth 
from 5-400 fathoms (9-731 meters). This convenient plateau is a prime choice for satisfying 
littoral warfare test requirements. 
Figure J.3: Overview of AUTEC Geography189
The AUTEC Range Support Facility houses a torpedo post-run workshop, test torpedo 
Intermediate Maintenance Activities (IMA) and extensive technical laboratory facilities.  The 
complex also includes electrical and physical calibration labs, a complete electronics 
maintenance shop, a dive locker, a precision machine shop/office and logistic spaces. 
The AUTEC Weapons Range is primarily used to gather highly accurate positional data required 
to analyze and assess the performance of undersea warfare weapons, weapons systems, and 
component subsystems. The range provides for 3-dimensional in-water and in-air tracking of 
multiple objects simultaneously and is over 9 nm wide and 35 nm long.  Installed telemetry is 
capable of tracking nine objects simultaneously.
Limitations to Scope of Test
Primarily, the test will be limited in realism by the quantity, variability, and behavior of the test 
vessels simulating normal maritime traffic.  It may not be feasible in a testing environment to 
apply the same number of large vessels that actually transit many strategic chokepoints, such as 
the Strait of Malacca, on a daily basis.  The test may not determine the traffic density at which 
189 Bahamas Marine Mammal Research Organization. "News - November 2006." November 2006. 
BahamasWhales.org. 16 May 2011 <http://www.bahamaswhales.org/images/autec.gif>.
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AUWS becomes overwhelmed.  The sheer variability of vessel types that transit the world’s 
waterway may also not feasible to re-create in a testing environment.  Therefore, the test may not 
determine the system’s ability to classify rare vessel types or which types the system has trouble 
classifying. Last, the erratic behavior of vessels in real world situations is very difficult to 
simulate. Rather than trying to mimic random navigation routes and sporadic course and speed 
adjustments, the test will utilize simple traffic patterns to establish a baseline performance for 
AUWS. These limitations to scope may impact several COIs, including Target Detection (Is 
AUWS capable of detecting targets in a timely manner?), Classification (Is AUWS capable of 
accurately classifying targets in a timely manner?), and Employment (Are the tactics developed 
for AUWS for deter and engage targets scenarios effective?).
The test will also be limited by the test site since it will only represent one type of environment 
where AUWS may be tasked to operate.  It is impossible to test AUWS in every conceivable 
operating environment, so the test site chosen should be a physically representative sample of the 
most likely operating environments.  This limitation will impact COIs such as Survivability (Can 
AUWS satisfactorily survive in various operating environments?) and Mobility (Is the mobility 
of AUWS sufficient for accomplishment of its combat mission in varying terrain and 
environmental conditions?). 
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Section 4: Operational Effectiveness
Scenarios and Run Profiles
Example Scenario
General Mission: AUWS is tasked with establishing a maritime operational picture in a 
strategically important strait.  AUWS will be responsible for a 3NM by 3NM area and varying 
types of merchant and naval vessels, including submarines, are expected to transit the strait. 
AUWS is tasked with detecting and classifying traffic to establish baseline patterns and 
identifying contacts of interest.  AUWS must report contacts of interest and suspicious activity to 
a remote command center in a timely manner.  AUWS must transit 100 NM to the operating area 
to maintain safe standoff range for manned deployment assets.
Background and Context: Over recent months, the strait and surrounding region have become 
increasingly unstable.  The world economy is being disrupted by piracy and smuggling in the 
area. Local military and law enforcement efforts have proven ineffective.  The lack of order 
increases the risk of maritime terrorism against US naval and merchant ships.  One of the 
regional powers near the strait has been building up its navy for several years.  Intelligence 
indicates that the nation intends to establish maritime superiority in the strait and surrounding 
waters.  In addition, the nation is believed to possess autonomous vehicle capabilities.  Several 
smaller powers in the region rely on small, fast craft and diesel submarines for coastal defense.
Figure J.4: Scenario Diagram
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Test Environment: Operational testing will be conducted at the Atlantic Undersea Test and 
Evaluation Center (AUTEC) near Andros Island, Bahamas.  Additional target vessels, or noise-
generating devices, will need to be utilized to simulate realistic operating conditions.
Test Participants: The AUWS testing team, AUTEC range personnel, and personnel to man the 
target vessels will be participating in the testing.
Test Vessels: In order to simulate realistic traffic in the strait, a variety of merchant and naval 




o 1 Container Ship
o 1 High Speed Vessel (e.g., SEA SHADOW, SEA FIGHTER, or HSV)
o 4 Small (e.g., fishing) Vessels
• Threat
o 1 Patrol Craft (PC) 
o 1 Frigate (FFG)
o 1 Diesel Submarine (SS must be borrowed from international military partner, last 
US diesel submarine, USS Dolphin, decommissioned in 2007)
A support vessel for testing team and AUTEC personnel will also be utilized.  The support vessel 
will simulate a deploying asset and deploy AUWS over-the-side at the southern end of TOTO, 
transit to the operating area, and then monitor the test.
Threat Tactics: Diesel Submarine will transit the area running on battery in attempt to remain 
undetected.  Threat surface combatants will attempt to flood the area with broadband noise to 
confuse AUWS and prevent the system from communicating critical information and completing 
an engagement.
Table J.4: COIs Addressed
COI 
# Title Question
2 Mobility Is the mobility of AUWS sufficient for accomplishment of its combat mission in varying terrain and environmental conditions?
4 Target Detection Is AUWS capable of detecting targets in a timely manner?
5 Classification Is AUWS capable of accurately classifying targets in a timely manner?
10 Survivability Can AUWS satisfactorily survive in various operating environments?
11 Human System Integration Is AUWS user friendly and safe for human involvement?
12 Interoperability Will AUWS be interoperable with existing platforms and systems currently employed?
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Figure J.5: Run Profile Diagram
Run Profile Timeline
1. Support vessel deploys AUWS at the southern end of TOTO, 100 NM from the operating 
area.
2. AUWS transits north to the operating area at 2-3 kts. Support vessel does not need to 
transit with AUWS since AUTEC installed equipment can monitor AUWS’ transit. 
Although the long transit significantly increases the duration of the test, it is necessary to 
test the operational mobility of the system. When AUWS reaches the operating area, it 
deploys sensor/comms nodes and places the Hunter and Killer units in the center of the 
area. Test vessels begin transiting at 15 kts once AUWS is on station and operational.
3. AUWS will detect merchant traffic and collect ISR data. AUWS will prioritize which 
information must be transmitted based on mission and tactical situation. During the test, 
all information collected on merchant traffic should be stored and only information 
regarding threat contacts should be transmitted.
4. AUWS will detect and classify threat surface combatant. After the node(s) collects as 
much data as possible, and it is behind the threat sonar’s field-of-view, it will 
communicate a processed message (not raw data) to the Hunter unit. 
5. The Hunter will determine whether the information needs to transmitted urgently or 
routinely to an external command center (e.g. test support vessel), and propose a 
recommended course of action. The Hunter will consider the current mission, tactical 
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situation, past experience, threat behavior, and many other factors in its decision making 
process. During the test, only the threat submarine should be reported urgently to the 
support vessel. The Killer unit will not be tested in this scenario.
6. The second threat surface combatant will utilize broadband noisemakers to confuse 
AUWS and prevent communication via the acoustic network. Upon detecting the 
broadband noise, the Hunter unit will deploy its retractable sensor buoy and attempt to 
identify the source vessel with an optical sensor. If required, the Hunter unit could cue the 
Killer unit with laser communications to prosecute the jamming vessel (will not be 
evaluated in this test). The Hunter unit will send a message to the support vessel that the 
system is being jammed and, if possible, provide a visual image of the jamming vessel. 
Broadband noise will stop before the submarine enters the operating area.
7. AUWS will detect and classify the threat submarine. After the node(s) collects as much 
data as possible, and it is behind the threat sonar’s field-of-view, it will communicate a 
processed message (not raw data) to the Hunter unit. The Hunter unit will report detection 
of the submarine and associated information, including course, speed, confidence level, 
and recommended course of action.
Effectiveness Test 2b: Mobility (Navigational Accuracy)
Objective
To determine the undersea mobility of AUWS with regard to navigational accuracy.
Procedure
AUWS will be fit with precise GPS sensors external to AUWS’ internal navigation sensors. 
During execution of all run profiles, data will be collected on AUWS’ actual location at one 
second intervals.  Data will simultaneously be collected from the AUWS’ internal navigational 
sensors at one second intervals.  Data collection will occur throughout operations encompassing 
various speeds, elevation, and terrain conditions.  The data will then be transferred to the E-2 
Data Sheet (Annex B) immediately following completion of the scenario run.  This test addresses 
MOE 2.2, MOP 2.2.1, MOP 2.2.2, and MOP 2.2.3.  
Data Analysis
Data analysis will be quantitative in nature.  The data will be analyzed to determine the 
difference between the reported location and the actual location, both in terms of location and 
elevation.  The data will be analyzed via t-tests to determine whether there is a statistical 
difference between the actual and reported locations (in terms of meters).  A confidence level 
will be determined and a “Go” assessed if it is determined that there is no statistically significant 
difference between the sensors’ readings.
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Effectiveness Test 6a/b: Prosecution (Engagement Rate)
Objective
To determine the ability of AUWS to prosecute enemy threats in a timely manner.
Procedure
The engagement rate will assess the time required to positively identify and deploy a weapon. 
The tactical scenarios will include a single target as well as multiple threat targets in the 
operating area.  The time from target presentation to weapon release will be recorded for each 
threat.  Delays in the firing sequence will be noted and recorded.  Data will be recorded to the E-
6 Data Sheet following each scenario run.  HSI data will be collected from the HSI survey 
conducted at the completion of all testing.  This test addresses MOE 6.1, MOP 6.1.1, MOP 6.1.2 
and MOP 6.1.3.   
Data Analysis
AUWS engagement rate will be quantitative in nature.  AUWS must be able to engage an 
identified threat target within 5 minutes or less.  Data will be analyzed on AUWS’ ability to 
satisfy single and multiple engagements.  Mission aborts and delays will be collected and 
analyzed.  Operator errors and mechanical failures will also be recorded and analyzed.  A “Go” 
will be assessed if AUWS can meet the criterion outlined in the operational requirements. 
Confidence intervals will be calculated using the t-statistic.
Effectiveness Test 7b: Lethality (Accuracy)
Objective
To determine the accuracy of AUWS weapons system. 
Procedure
The accuracy test will assess the reliability of AUWS weapons to fire and hit targets at 
prescribed ranges to satisfy operational requirements.   AUWS will be placed in a weapons range 
and tasked to engage targets (singly) at various ranges.  A trial will be conducted for 10 separate 
targets .  The test will end upon completion of the 10 engagement trials.  Data will be recorded 
for each engagement.  This test will address MOE 7.2, MOP 7.2.1, and MOP 7.2.3.  
Data Analysis
Accuracy will be quantitative in nature.  Mission aborts and delays will be recorded and 
analyzed.  Mechanical failures and crew errors will also be recorded and analyzed.  A “Go” is 
achieved if the weapon intercept achieves criteria specified in operation requirements. 
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Confidence levels will be calculated using the t-statistic.  The effectiveness data will be recorded 
on Data sheet E-7.  HSI data will be recorded on Datasheet S-7.
Effectiveness Test 10a: Survivability (Detection Avoidance)
Objective
To determine AUWS’ ability to avoid detection by enemy threats. 
Procedure
The detection avoidance test will assess AUWS’ ability to avoid detection in multiple operating 
environments.  AUWS will then take measures to conduct operations against the contacting force 
while reducing its detection.  Such actions will include incorporating stealth, running silent, and 
other masking procedures, as well as using terrain to minimize exposure. Data will be recorded 
via underwater range telemetry equipment.  Time of enemy actions will be recorded.  Data will 
be recorded on Data Sheet E-10 immediately following scenario conclusion.  This test will 
address MOE 10.1, MOP 10.1.1 and MOP 10.1.2. 
Data Analysis
Data analysis will be both qualitative and quantitative in nature.  Qualitative assessments will be 
made of the environmental conditions at the locations of AUWS during detections to account 
terrain, current, ambient noise, scaled from zero to one.  Quantitative assessments will determine 
the mean and standard deviations of the detection range.  Additionally, sensor data will be 
evaluated to determine the percent of a particular AUWS component actually detected 
(communication vs. weapon unit).  From this data, we will develop a confidence interval 
describing the ability of AUWS to avoid detection.  Data errors will be recorded and analyzed.  A 
“Go” will be assessed if AUWS can avoid detection at distances greater than 10 meters.
Section 5: Operational Suitability
Suitability Test 1a/b: Human Factors
Objective
To determine the user-friendly degree and safety of AUWS.
Procedure
In order to test Humans Factors Engineering all items requiring maintenance during operational 
tests will be logged by test technicians.  Additionally, potential sources of frustration will be 
noted by technicians for further review at the conclusion of the test.  Safety and Health Hazards 
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will also be identified in a running log by test technicians.  This test addresses MOE 11.1, MOP 
11.1.1, MOP 11.1.2, MOE 11.2 and MOP 11.2.1. 
Data Analysis
The Humans Factors Engineering will be identified form the list of maintainability problems and 
assigning a impact rating based on a severity rating.  Severity will be based on man-hours 
required for each maintenance requirement.  The Safety and Health Hazards will be logged and 
rated by an associated Risk Assessment Code.
Suitability Test 2: Interoperability
Objective
Determine the interoperability of AUWS with existing platforms and systems.
Procedure
During operational testing AUWS will transfer data to airborne, surface, and sub-surface assets 
to determine interoperability of the system with systems on other platforms.  The data transfer 
will occur at multiple ranges to determine maximum range at which sufficient data transfer 
occurs.  This test addresses MOE 12.1, MOP 12.1.1, MOP 12.1.2, MOE 12.2, MOP 12.2.1, and 
MOP 12.2.2. 
Data Analysis
The data that will be analyzed will the total number of data exchanges and total number of 
successful data exchanges.  The MOE will be the proportion of successful data exchanges.
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Annex A: Resource Requirements
Resource Type Required
Test Articles AUWS (qty 3)
Test Sites
Surface and Undersea Operating Areas (AUTEC)
Undersea Weapons Range (AUTEC)
Fleet Concentration Area





Small Vessels (qty 4)
PC (Patrol Craft)
FFG/LCS










Operator Teams (qty 2)
Test Site Personnel
Assigned Ship’s Force
Special Requirements Data Collection and Analysis at Test Site(s)
T&E Funding $19M
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Annex B: Data Sheets and Questionnaires














































































































































INSTRUCTIONS:  For each question, circle the response that best represents your degree of 
agreement with the statement.  Comments are required for “Neutral,” “Disagree,” and “Strongly 
Disagree” responses, optional for “Strongly Agree” and “Agree.”
1.  The AUWS Control is easy to power ON / OFF.







2.  The AUWS Digital Control Displays are easy to read.








3.  All labels and warning/caution placards were easy to read from a normal seated position.







4.  Procedures for responding to system casualties were readily available.







5.  The required information needed to initiate a launch is readily available from the console.







6. AUWS position and navigation appeared to update near-real time.








7. The AUWS navigation controls are easy to control/manipulate.







8.  The reaction time from when a navigation command to when the system appears to respond is 
satisfactory.







9.  All controls can be reasonably reached by the operator from a comfortable operating position.







10.  The transitions between levels of autonomy appeared seamless.








11.  You clearly understood the operational implications of each level of autonomy.







12.  System operation was consistent with current Rules of Engagement (ROE).







13.  Data link connectivity is easily monitored by the console operator.







14.  All physical controls (buttons, switches, toggles, etc) appear durable and can withstand 
normal operational usage.








15.  All alarm indications were easily audible or visible.







16.  All alarm conditions were easily identified once the operator is alerted.







17.  Targeting function satisfactorily responds and readies the user and system for firing 
sequence.







18.  Weapon selection and employment was easily completed.








19.  The number of false contacts was minimal (did not distract operator from valid contacts).







20.  The system satisfactorily completed all tasking in the operational testing scenario.







21.  The console did not cause physical discomfort when the operator was in normal seated 
position.







22.  You felt safe the entire you were operating AUWS.








23.  Training was adequate (operator felt prepared to execute tasking at completion of training).







24.  Actual console operation was consistent with training received.







25.  I am confident that this system can satisfactorily complete mission assignments.










Annex D: Data Analysis Plan
Variable Control Factor Level/Treatment
Neutral Vessel Movement Systematically Varied Transit, Loiter
Threat Surface Vessel Movement Systematically Varied Transit, Loiter
Threat Submarine Movement Systematically Varied Transit, Loiter
Sound Velocity Profile Uncontrollable As occurs
Atmospheric Transmission Uncontrollable As occurs
Undersea Currents Uncontrollable As occurs
System/Equipment Failures Uncontrollable As occurs
Weather Uncontrollable As occurs
Deployment Method Constant Single Hunter/Killer Pair
Communications Constant Undersea and UHF
Software Constant Version X.X
Position Accuracy Measured Meters
Number of Detections Measured Instances
Weapon Accuracy Measured Meters
Engagement Time Measured Minutes
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